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A critical discussion of Jonathan Dancy's moral particularism /Schwind, Philipp. January 2007 (has links)
Thesis (M.Phil.) - University of St Andrews, June 2007.
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A principled sensibility rules and the life of virtue /Stangl, Rebecca Lynn. January 2005 (has links)
Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Notre Dame, 2005. / Thesis directed by W. David Solomon for the Department of Philosophy. "July 2005." Includes bibliographical references (leaves 187-192).
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Moral Particularism and the Argument from Holism about ReasonsBülow, William January 2011 (has links)
Proponents of moral particularism have often sought support for their negative claim about moral principles in a doctrine called holism in the theory of reasons. According to holism, a feature that is a reason in one case may be no reason at all, or even the opposite reason, in another. The aim of this thesis is to investigate and elucidate the supposed connection between holism and particularism. This is done by considering the particularistic position embraced by Jonathan Dancy in his book Ethics without Principles and the arguments against the argument from holism recently put forth by Sean McKeever and Michael Ridge in their book Principled Ethics: generalism as a regulative ideal. In conclusion it is argued that holism does provide at least some support for the form of particularism which Dancy defends.
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On reasons and disagreement in ethicsGaff, Andrew Douglas January 2007 (has links)
This thesis explores reasons and disagreement in ethics, and their connection to personal identity. I begin by arguing that reasons are open; what gives them direction is how they feature in my life and weigh with me. Of course, this does not tell us what reasons are available to a person when they act. In this connection I argue against Bernard Williams’ internal reasons thesis, showing that there are occasions when we will want to say someone has a reason to act even though they are unable to see it. Continuing with Williams, I explore moral necessity, drawing also on the works of Winch, Rhees and Cordner, arguing that Williams too readily conflates psychological with ethical limits. In particular, the possibility of recanting what we took to be necessary should inform our view of moral necessity, since it can show that I had misconstrued the nature of the limits I took myself to have reached. Following this use of recantation, I explore narrative in detail, arguing that my narrative is partly constitutive of who I am. My agency is therefore interpretive. This has ramifications for thinkers such as Christine Korsgaard and Jonathan Dancy, whose work I explore in two excursuses. In different ways, both fail to appreciate the significance of our interpretive identities.
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