<p>This sentence is whatever truth is <em>not</em>. The subject of this master’s thesis is the power, influence, and solvability of the liar paradox. This paradox can be constructed through the application of a standard conception of truth and rules of inference are applied to sentences such as the first sentence of this abstract. The liar has been a powerful problem of philosophy for thousands of years, from its ancient origin (examined in Chapter One) to a particularly intensive period in the twentieth century featuring many ingenious but ultimately unsuccessful solutions from brilliant logicians, mathematicians and philosophers (examined in Chapter Two, Chapter Three, and Chapter Four). Most of these solutions were unsuccessful because of a recurring problem known as the liar’s revenge; whatever truth is <em>not</em> includes, as it turns out, not <em>just</em> falsity, but also meaninglessness, ungroundedness, gappyness, and so on. The aim of this master’s thesis is to prove that we should not consign ourselves to the admission that the liar is and always will just be a paradox, and thus unsolvable. Rather, I argue that the liar <em>is</em> solvable; I propose and defend a novel solution which is examined in detail in the latter half of Chapter Two, and throughout Chapter Three. The alternative solution I examine and endorse (in Chapter Four) is not my own, owing its origin and energetic support to Graham Priest. I argue, however, for a more qualified version of Priest’s solution. I show that, even if we accept a very select few true contradictions, it should <em>not</em> be assumed that inconsistency inevitably spreads throughout other sets of sentences used to describe everyday phenomena such as motion, change, and vague predicates in the empirical world.</p> / Master of Arts (MA)