Cotutelle entre l'Université de Montréal et Sorbonne Université / Zénon de Kition, le fondateur du stoïcisme, a reçu une partie de sa formation philosophique chez le cynique Cratès de Thèbes. Ce contact a laissé une empreinte durable sur l’école stoïcienne, qui a continué d’entretenir des liens étroits avec le cynisme. Ma thèse propose une contribution à notre connaissance de ce rapport entre les deux courants philosophiques en analysant toutes les références au cynisme dans les écrits stoïciens, de Zénon à Marc Aurèle. La première partie de ma thèse recense tous les textes du corpus, cités en grec ou en latin, avec une traduction française. Chaque texte est accompagné d’un commentaire philologique et philosophique. La complexité du rapport que les stoïciens entretiennent avec le cynisme se manifeste particulièrement chez ceux dont les écrits sont bien conservés. C’est le cas de Sénèque, qui offre dans son œuvre philosophique des portraits élaborés de deux cyniques, Diogène et Démétrius, tout en critiquant certains aspects du cynisme. La contribution d’Épictète est encore plus importante, puisqu’il consacre un entretien complet à la vie et au rôle du cynique, et réserve à Diogène une place de premier choix dans son enseignement. Son admiration pour les véritables cyniques contraste avec le jugement sévère qu’il porte sur les faux cyniques de son temps. La deuxième partie de ma thèse analyse en détail trois textes qui font état d’un débat stoïcien sur la possibilité que le sage « cynicise » (D.L., VII 121 ; Cic., Fin. III 68 ; Arius Didyme apud Stob., II 7, 11s). Certains stoïciens refusent que le sage cynicise, d’autres l’acceptent dans certaines circonstances, et d’autres encore, comme Apollodore de Séleucie, considèrent que le cynisme est une voie d’accès à la vertu rapide mais difficile. En établissant un lien entre les portraits du sage et la doctrine des actions convenables, j’analyse le débat à travers la classification morale des actions dans l’éthique stoïcienne. Pour éclairer davantage la position d’Apollodore, je m’intéresse au lien qui l’unit à la doxographie cynique générale (D.L., VI 103-105) et j’examine la signification de l’image de la voie vers la vertu à travers sa genèse et sa postérité. Il en ressort trois caractéristiques fondamentales du cynisme : le rejet des devoirs sociaux, le choix de la pauvreté et le refus des longues études. Pour approuver ce mode de vie, dont les traits sont contraires aux recommandations stoïciennes habituelles, les stoïciens pro-cyniques adoptent une posture de compromis et fixent des limites étroites à l’intérieur desquelles la pratique du cynisme devient légitime. / Zeno of Citium, the founder of Stoicism, received part of his philosophical instruction from the Cynic Crates of Thebes. This connection left a lasting imprint on the Stoic school, which continued to maintain strong ties with Cynicism. My dissertation proposes a contribution to our knowledge of the relationship between the two philosophical movements by analyzing all the references to Cynicism in Stoic writings, from Zeno to Marcus Aurelius. The first part of my dissertation lists all the texts composing the corpus, cited in Greek or Latin, with a French translation. Each text is accompanied by a philological and philosophical commentary. The complexity of the Stoics’ perspective on Cynicism is made evident in those whose writings are well preserved. This is the case of Seneca, who offers in his philosophical works elaborate portraits of two Cynics, Diogenes and Demetrius, while criticizing some aspects of Cynicism. The contribution of Epictetus is even more important, since he devotes an entire discourse to the life and role of the Cynic, and gives Diogenes a prominent place in his teaching. His admiration for true Cynics contrasts with his harsh judgment on the fake Cynics of his time. The second part of my dissertation analyzes at length three texts that report a Stoic debate on the possibility for the sage to “cynicize” (D.L., VII 121; Cic., Fin. III 68; Arius Didymus apud Stob., II 7, 11s). Some Stoics refuse to allow the sage to cynicize, while some accept it under certain circumstances and others, such as Apollodorus of Seleucia, consider Cynicism to be a quick but difficult path to virtue. By establishing a link between the portraits of the sage and the doctrine of proper actions, I analyze the debate through the moral classification of actions in Stoic ethics. To shed further light on Apollodorus’ position, I explore his connection to the Cynic doxography (D.L., VI 103-105) and examine the meaning of the image of the path to virtue through its genesis and posterity. Three fundamental characteristics of Cynicism emerge: the rejection of social duties, the choice of poverty, and the refusal of extended studies. To endorse this lifestyle, whose features are contrary to customary Stoic advice, pro-Cynic Stoics adopt a posture of compromise and set narrow limits within which the practice of Cynicism becomes legitimate.

[pt] O cinismo – entendido tanto em seu sentido antigo como uma escola filosófica helenística, quanto em seu sentido moderno como uma falsa consciência esclarecida – é o tema da presente tese. A partir da pergunta Como escrever uma história do cinismo?, pretendemos avaliar as condições de possibilidade e, ao mesmo tempo, propor uma tal história. Para dar conta dessa empreitada, lançamos mão da noção de dialética cínica. Em nosso capítulo inicial, apresentamos quatro momentos-chave da história do cinismo – personificados por Diógenes de Sínope, Luciano de Samósata, Jean-Jacques Rousseau/Denis Diderot e Friedrich Nietzsche. Em seguida, examinamos a historiografia recente sobre o tema, com foco nos trabalhos de Heinrich Niehues-Pröbsting, Peter Sloterdijk e Michel Foucault. Por fim, no último capítulo, refletimos sobre o que é e como se dá a dinâmica da dialética cínica. O nosso objetivo, depois de percorrido todo o texto, é deixar claro como o discurso cínico opera de forma dialética na medida em que ele sempre escorrega de sua própria definição. / [en] Cynicism – understood both in its ancient sense as a Hellenistic philosophical school, and in its modern sense as an enlightened false consciousness – is the subject of the present thesis. Starting with the question How to write a history of cynicism?, we intend to assess the conditions of possibility and, at the same time, propose such a history. To deal with this endeavour, we resorted to the notion of cynical dialectic. In our opening chapter, we present four key moments in the history of Cynicism – personified by Diogenes of Sinope, Lucian of Samosata, Jean-Jacques Rousseau/Denis Diderot and Friedrich Nietzsche. After that, we examine the recent historiography on the subject, focusing on the works of Heinrich Niehues-Probsting, Peter Sloterdijk and Michel Foucault. Finally, in the last chapter, we reflect on what the cynical dialectic is and how its dynamics works. Our objective, after going through the entire text, is to make clear how the cynical discourse operates in a dialectical way, inasmuch as it always slips away from its own definition.

Visigothic Hispania, Islamicate al-Andalus and Christian Spain are names representing three scriptural monotheistic civilizations in Iberia. Al-Andalus has stood apart from this list by representing a time and a place of convivencia in which Christians, Jews and Muslims cooperated and coexisted. Why and how the Islamicate civilization in al-Andalus differed from the Visigoths or the Spanish, despite all three sharing a religious orientation is an historical puzzle. By exploring the legal status of Jews within the legal regimes of Christian Rome and Visigothic Hispania, this thesis will suggest that it is cosmopolitanism and its converse exclusivism that best explain concepts of convivencia or coexistence in the face of religious diversity.

Chapter one: A perennial (if controversial) concern in both theology and philosophy of religion is whether religious belief is ‘reasonable’. Austin Farrer (1904-1968) is widely thought to affirm a positive answer to this concern. Chapter One surveys three interpretations of Farrer on ‘the believer’s reasons’ and thus sets the stage for our investigation into the development of his religious epistemology. Chapter two: The disputed question of whether Farrer became ‘a sort of fideist’ is complicated by the many definitions of fideism. Chapter two thus sorts through these issues so that when ‘fideism’ appears in subsequent chapters a precise range of meanings can be given to it, and the ‘sort of fideist’ Farrer may have become can be determined more accurately. Chapter three: Although Farrer’s constant goal was to develop ‘a viable and sophisticated natural theology,’ an early moment of philosophical illumination involved recognising the limits of reason. Chapter three begins with a sketch of Farrer’s life, looks at his undergraduate correspondence where some ‘fideistic’ themes are first articulated, and then focuses on his classic text of ‘rational theology,’ *Finite and Infinite* (1943). Chapter four: In subsequent years, Farrer became increasingly open to placing a greater emphasis on faith. And yet, he continued to press the question: ‘Can reasonable minds still think theologically?’ Chapter four argues that, stimulated by Diogenes Allen’s doctoral dissertation and citing it explicitly, Farrer’s *Faith and Speculation* (1967) attempts to blend Allen’s more fideistic position with a continuing concern for legitimate philosophical critique. Chapter five: The fifth chapter evaluates the significance of Farrer’s final position in the context of contemporary religious epistemology and the current wide-spread interest in spirituality. In conclusion, Farrer finally seems to locate theistic evidence not primarily in nature or reason, but in holy lives and our own attempts to live by faith: ‘It is solved by sacrifice’.

Diogène de Sinope, principal représentant du cynisme ancien, affirme dans une de ses œuvres qu’« il mettait la liberté au-dessus de tout ». Il n’est pas question ici du sens politique de la liberté, mais plutôt de son acception morale et individuelle, dont les origines remontent au moins au VIe s. av. J.-C. et peut-être à la racine même du mot ἐλεύθερος. Retracer l’histoire de cette notion révèle diverses influences sur le cynisme, que ce soit la figure de l’« esclave libre » chez les tragiques, ou la correspondance entre nature et liberté chez les Sophistes et Démocrite. Pour atteindre l’autarcie et l’apathie, les deux caractéristiques de la liberté cynique, Diogène doit soumettre son corps à un entraînement de nature physique, seul moyen de s’émanciper des chaînes de la civilisation. Socrate, surtout chez Xénophon et dans une certaine mesure chez Platon, avait déjà fait des exercices corporels une condition d’acquisition de la liberté. Toutefois, l’émancipation de l’individu débouche avec Socrate sur l’apprentissage du savoir qu’il juge nécessaire à la vertu. Les Cyniques, quant à eux, rejettent la vertu-connaissance et limitent leur activité philosophique à la pratique d’une ascèse corporelle rigoureuse, de sorte que la liberté mène sans détour à la vertu et au bonheur au point de s’y identifier. Les Cyniques se différencient donc de leurs prédécesseurs socratiques en ne prolongeant pas leur quête philosophique au-delà du moment de la libération et, par le fait même, font de la liberté la véritable marque distinctive de leur philosophie. / Diogenes of Sinope, the main representative of ancient Cynicism, says in one of his works that « he preferred freedom above everything ». He does not mean here freedom in its political sense, but rather in its moral and individual meaning, which dates back at least to the sixth century BC and perhaps to the very root of the word ἐλεύθερος. Tracing the history of this notion reveals diverse influences on Cynicism, whether the figure of the « free slave » of the tragedians, or the correspondence between nature and freedom of the Sophists and Democritus. To reach self-sufficiency and apathy, the two characteristics of Cynic freedom, Diogenes must submit his body to physical training, it being the only way to break free from the chains of civilization. Socrates, especially in Xenophon and to a certain extent in Plato, had already made physical exercises a condition for acquiring freedom. However, with Socrates the emancipation of the individual ends in gaining knowledge that he deems necessary to virtue. Cynics, for their part, reject virtue-knowledge and limit their philosophical activity to the practice of a rigorous physical asceticism, so that freedom leads directly to virtue and happiness to the point of identifying with it. Therefore, Cynics differ from their Socratic predecessors by not extending their philosophical quest beyond the moment of liberation and thereby make freedom the true hallmark of their philosophy.

Le cynisme est un mouvement philosophique qui s’est développé en Grèce à partir du IVe s. av. J.-C. autour de Diogène de Sinope. La critique moderne a souvent vu dans ce mouvement l’expression d’un naturalisme radical, une doctrine fondée sur le refus des valeurs de la vie civilisée, qui par conséquent pourrait être définie comme une “croisade contre la civilisation” ou comme un “courant anti-prométhéen”, le “feu civilisateur” étant à l’origine des maux des hommes. La morale cynique consisterait ainsi dans la proposition d’un “retour à la nature” ou d’une vie “selon la nature” (kata phusin), guidée par l’idée d’animalité et de primitivisme, c’est-à-dire d’une vie inspirée par le comportement animal ou par le modus vivendi des premiers hommes. La présente thèse a pour but de soumettre à l’épreuve des textes qui nous ont été transmis par l’Antiquité cette interprétation largement répandue du cynisme. L’hypothèse avancée ici, qui s’appuie entre autres sur l’examen de deux textes – le Discours VI de Dion Chrysostome et le dialogue du Pseudo-Lucien intitulé Le cynique, – qu’on a confrontés à d’autres témoignages, comme le livre VI des Vies et doctrines des philosophes illustres de Diogène Laërce ou les lettres pseudépigraphes attribuées à Diogène de Sinope et à Cratès de Thèbes –, consiste à définir le cynisme comme la recherche d’une vie “selon la facilité” (kat’ euteleian) et la pensée diogénienne comme une forme radicale de pragmatisme, au sein de laquelle les dualismes – notamment celui qui oppose nomos et phusis – tendent à être supprimés au nom d’une morale déterminée selon les circonstances concrètes de la vie individuelle. / Cynicism is a philosophical movement which started in Greece in the 4th century B.C. around the figure of Diogenes of Sinope. Modern interpreters often understand this movement as the expression of a radical naturalism, a doctrine founded on a drastic refusal of all the values of civilized life and consequently defined as a “crusade against civilization” or as an “anti-promethean current”, identifying in the “civilizing fire” the very origin of all the troubles, vices and misfortunes that men have to cope with. Accordingly, Cynic ethics would advocate a “return to nature” or to a life “according to nature” (kata phusin), guided by the idea of animality and of primitivism, that is to say a life modeled on animal behavior or on the modus vivendi of the primitive men. The present thesis aims at questionning this widely spread interpretation of cynicism on the basis of an analysis of the texts transmitted by Antiquity. The alternative interpretation that we offer rests on the reading of two major texts: the Sixth Discourse by Dio Chrysostomus and the dialogue The Cynic transmitted under the authority of Lucian of Samosate, along with some other sources, like the sixth book of Lives and opinions of eminent philosophers written by Diogenes Laertius and the Letters attributed to Diogenes of Sinope and to Crates of Thebes. It redefines Cynic philosophy as the quest for a life “according to easiness” (kat’ euteleian) and — in modern terminology — as a radical form of pragmatism, within which dualisms – notably the one between nomos and phusis – tend to be abolished in the name of a morality conditioned by the actual circumstances of individual life.

À travers l’étude des romans de trois écrivains jugés cyniques – au sens antique ou moderne du terme –, il s’agit de chercher à définir un nouveau statut auctorial dans l’histoire du champ littéraire du XIXe au XXIe siècles : celui de romancier cynique. Le fil conducteur de cette recherche procède, avant tout, du rapport fondamental qu’entretient le cynisme avec la vérité. Vérité historique, lorsque ces écrivains envisagent le cynisme (notion qui touche aussi bien à la philosophie, à la psychologie qu’à la morale) comme un matériau romanesque, autrement dit, un thème, un caractère, une attitude à exposer afin de dévoiler au mieux la réalité de leur siècle respectif. Vérité transhistorique, quand ils s’attachent à révéler ce que sont l’homme et le monde. Le cynisme relève alors d’une pratique, celle du dire-vrai, qui favorise le caractère aléthique du texte littéraire et conditionne la teneur du discours véhiculé par le roman : c’est un centre autour duquel gravitent des thèmes, des éléments narratifs et des procédés d’écriture communs aux écrits romanesques de Mirbeau, de Drieu et de Houellebecq, dont les horizons sont pourtant bien distincts. Cette forte implication du cynisme dans l’espace littéraire suppose nécessairement un rapport singulier au réel ; elle exige du romancier qu’il ménage la rencontre du fictif et du vécu, tout en déclenchant un processus de dévoilement, franc et lucide, à l’égard de la littérature elle-même. Le romancier cynique se doit de mettre à nu les faiblesses, les contradictions, voire les travers de la littérature afin d’être au plus près de ce qu’elle est vraiment. / The antique and modern study of the novels by these three cynical writers aims at trying to portray a new authorial status in the history of nineteenth to twenty-first century literature : the status of the cynical novelist. First and foremost, the common thread of this research comes from the essential link between cynicism and truth. On the one hand, truth as historic truth is defined when cynicism (in its philosophical, psychological and ethical terms) is considered by these novelists as a novel material, in other words, a theme, a character, and an attitude, which exposes the reality of their respective century. On the other hand, truth as transhistorical truth is when they endeavour to unveil what mankind and world are. Cynicism comes therefore from the habit of truth-telling, the one that promotes the alethic aspect of the literary text and determines the content of the speech conveyed by the novel. Mirbeau, Drieu and Houellebecq novels have really definite horizons of their owns. But if I consider the common points to these three writers, I can say that this truth-telling process is a centre around which themes, narrative elements and writing processes gravitate. This strong involvement of cynicism in the literary space necessarily implies a singular connection to reality, therefore, it implies for the novelist both to handle carefully this melting of fiction and real-life experiences and to trigger a process of a honest and lucid disclosure towards literature itself. A cynical novelist must expose the weaknesses, the contradictions and even the quirks of literature in order to be as close as possible to what it really is.

My thesis is intended to analyse the interactions between Greek and Roman Comedy and Cynicism. My study, that considers all the complex issues related to the sources of Cynicism, is developed using a double perspective. On the one hand, I examine the formal debts that Cynical tradition has contracted towards Comedy and the different functions of the geloion in the communicative forms used by Cynics. In this perspective, I also analyse the passages where the ancient sources put into relation Cynics with Comedy or with a specific comedian and the passages in which the attribution fluctuates between comedians and Cynics. On the other hand, I study the representation of Cynics in Comedy. Therefore, the significant part of my research is committed to the collection and to the comments of the comic verses where there is a reference to Cynics or where scholars have suspected an allusion to them. In this analyse, I devote a special attention to the comparison between the representation of Cynics in Comedy and these in other sources. From this analysis we can infer that there are not many differences about elements used to the representation, but rather a risemantisation and a different connotation of same elements. / Mon travail de thèse se propose d’analyser les interactions entre Comédie grecque et latine et Cynisme. Mon étude, qui prend en compte toutes les problematiques complexes liées aux sources du Cynisme, se developpe selon deux directions. D’un côté, j’étudie les dettes formelles que la tradition cynique a envers la comédie et les différentes fonctions du geloion dans les formes communicatives adoptées par les Cyniques. Dans cette première perspective, j’analyse aussi les passages où les sources anciennes associent les Cyniques à la Comédie ou à un comique en particulier et les passages pour lesquels l’attribution oscille entre comiques et Cyniques. De l’autre, j’étudie la manière dont les Cyniques sont représentés par les comédiens. La partie la plus consistante de la thèse est donc dédiée au receuil et au commentaire ponctuel des vers comiques dans lesquels figure une référence explicite aux Cyniques ou dans lesquels les chercheurs ont soupçonné une allusion.

Dès sa découverte en 1962, le Papyrus de Derveni, le plus ancien manuscrit d'Europe, n'a pas cessé de soulever des interrogations majeures relatives à la transmission, à l'interprétation et à la fonction des textes orphiques. Le Papyrus de Derveni nous fournit aussi un témoignage de premier ordre quant à l'influence de la philosophie présocratique sur les doctrines orphiques. Cette thèse est la première édition critique française du Papyrus de Derveni. Celle-ci comprend un apparat critique complet ainsi que des notes au texte. Ce travail de recherche propose aussi une étude monographique du Papyrus de Derveni. Nous avons porté une attention toute particulière à l'analyse du poème orphique, aux techniques exégétiques employées et aux thématiques philosophiques de l'écrit contenu dans le Papyrus de Derveni. Nous avons, en outre, comparé les doctrines cosmologiques et philosophiques proposées par son auteur avec les théories d'Héraclite d’Éphèse, d'Anaxagore de Clazomènes, de Diogène d'Apollonie et Archélaos d’Athènes. / Since his discovery in 1962, the Derveni Papyrus, the most ancient manuscript of Europe, has rase full of major questions about the transmission, the interpretation and the function of the orphic texts. The Derveni Papyrus offers us an emblematic testimony about the influence of Presocratic Philosophy on the orphic doctrines. This thesis is the first french critical edition of the Derveni Papyrus with a critical apparatus and notes on the text. This research paper also provides a monographic study of this document. We especially focused our attention on the orphic poem quoted by the author of the Derveni Papyrus, on the exegetical technics he employed and on the philosophical doctrines he proposed. We particularly compared the cosmological and philosophical theories of the Derveni Papyrus author with that of Heraclitus of Ephesus, Anaxagoras of Clazomenae, Diogenes of Apollonia and Archelaus of Athens.

A Sceptical Aesthetics of Existence: The Case of Michel Foucault Emmanouil Simos (Hughes Hall) Michel Foucault's genealogical investigations constitute a specific historical discourse that challenges the metaphysical hypostatisation of concepts and methodological approaches as unique devices for tracking metaphysically objective truths. Foucault's notion of aesthetics of existence, his elaboration of the ancient conceptualisation of ethics as an 'art of living' (a technē tou biou), along with a series of interconnected notions (such as the care of the self) that he developed in his later work, have a triple aspect. First, these notions are constitutive parts of his later genealogies of subjectivity. Second, they show that Foucault contemplates the possibility of understanding ethics differently, opposed to, for example, the traditional Kantian conceptualisation of morality: he envisages ethics in terms of self-fashioning, of aesthetic transformation, of turning one's life into a work of art. Third, Foucault employs these notions in self-referential way: they are considered to describe his own genealogical work. This thesis attempts to show two things. First, I defend the idea that the notion of aesthetics of existence was already present in a constitutive way from the beginning of his work, and, specifically, I argue that it can be traced in earlier moments of his work. Second, I defend the idea that this notion of aesthetics of existence is best understood in terms of the sceptical stance of Sextus Empiricus. It describes an ethics of critique of metaphysics that can be understood as a nominalist, contextualist, and particularist stance. The first chapter discusses Foucault's late genealogy of the subject. It formulates the interpretative framework within which Foucault's own conceptualisation of the aesthetics of existence can be understood as a sceptical stance, itself conceived as nominalist, contextualist and particularist. As the practice of an aesthetics of existence is not abstract and ahistorical but the engagement with the specific historical circumstances within which this practice is undertaken, the second chapter reconstructs the intellectual context from which Foucault's thought has emerged (Heidegger, Blanchot, and Nietzsche). The third chapter discusses representative examples of different periods of Foucault's thought -such as the "Introduction" to Binswanger's "Traum und Existenz" (1954), Histoire de la folie (1961), and Histoire de la sexualité I. La volonté de savoir (1976)- and shows in which way they constitute concrete instantiations of his sceptical aesthetics of existence. The thesis concludes with responses to a number of objections to the sceptical stance here defended.