The Tax Administration Act (28 of 2011) (TA Act), which was promulgated on 4 July 2012 and came into effect on 1 October 2012, was enacted with the purpose of aligning all the administrative provisions dealt with under the various sections of the Income Tax Act (58 of 1962) (IT Act) and the Value-Added Tax Act (89 of 1991) (VAT Act) under one piece of legislation. The TA Act (28 of 2011) provides guidance on various matters of tax administration, including a very controversial penalty levying regime. Prior to the TA Act (28 of 2011), section 76 of the IT Act (58 of 1962) and section 60 the VAT Act (89 of 1991) (hereafter referred to as the pre-TA Act (28 of 2011) penalty provisions) dealt with the levying of additional taxes in cases of understated tax returns. Sections 76 and 60 of the respective acts unfortunately did not provide proper guidelines on the assessment and calculation of these additional taxes or on how the levying of these additional taxes could conform to matters of administrative justice. These matters have been included under sections 221 to 223 of the TA Act (28 of 2011) (hereafter referred to as the understatement penalty percentage provisions under the TA Act (28 of 2011)) and have been welcomed by most taxpayers. This research study focused on the critical evaluation of the understatement penalty percentage provisions under the TA Act (28 of 2011) as well as the provisions which were repealed and replaced by the TA Act (28 of 2011) and which were previously applied in terms of the pre-TA Act (28 of 2011) penalty provisions. A comparison between the latter provisions, the understatement penalty percentage provisions under the TA Act (28 of 2011) and foreign legislation is made with the purpose of addressing how effective and fair the TA Act (28 of 2011) will prove to be. The study also includes brief advice on any possible improvements or practical approaches regarding the understatement penalty percentage provisions under the TA Act (28 of 2011). It is also seen as necessary to evaluate the effectiveness of the regulations promulgated in terms of sections 221 to 223 of the TA Act (28 of 2011), and to identify possible problems with the application and interpretation of the relevant understatement penalty percentage provisions under the TA Act (28 of 2011) by the Commissioner. A literature review was used to critically analyse and compare various pieces of legislation and precedents, including South African and foreign laws and legislation, with possible practical illustrative examples. The objective with the literature review was to clarify issues such as the fairness of the understatement penalty percentage provisions under the TA Act (28 of 2011) and the pre-TA Act (28 of 2011) penalty provisions. The findings of the research study revealed that the enactment of the understatement penalty percentage provisions under the TA Act (28 of 2011) on 1 October 2012 partially achieves the objective of providing taxpayers with a penalty levying system that is more reasonable and fair in comparison with the pre-TA Act (28 of 2011) penalty provisions. Despite a more favourable outcome achieved by the TA Act (28 of 2011), the research concludes that proper guidance and measures for levying a penalty are still lacking and that the legislation is unfortunately still failing in this regard. Harsh penalty percentages based on certain behavioural criteria that are not defined create the need for obvious improvements. That said, the TA Act (28 of 2011) is still young and creates a basis on which further amendments and improvements can take place. / MCom (South African and International Taxation), North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2014

The Tax Administration Act (28 of 2011) (TA Act), which was promulgated on 4 July 2012 and came into effect on 1 October 2012, was enacted with the purpose of aligning all the administrative provisions dealt with under the various sections of the Income Tax Act (58 of 1962) (IT Act) and the Value-Added Tax Act (89 of 1991) (VAT Act) under one piece of legislation. The TA Act (28 of 2011) provides guidance on various matters of tax administration, including a very controversial penalty levying regime. Prior to the TA Act (28 of 2011), section 76 of the IT Act (58 of 1962) and section 60 the VAT Act (89 of 1991) (hereafter referred to as the pre-TA Act (28 of 2011) penalty provisions) dealt with the levying of additional taxes in cases of understated tax returns. Sections 76 and 60 of the respective acts unfortunately did not provide proper guidelines on the assessment and calculation of these additional taxes or on how the levying of these additional taxes could conform to matters of administrative justice. These matters have been included under sections 221 to 223 of the TA Act (28 of 2011) (hereafter referred to as the understatement penalty percentage provisions under the TA Act (28 of 2011)) and have been welcomed by most taxpayers. This research study focused on the critical evaluation of the understatement penalty percentage provisions under the TA Act (28 of 2011) as well as the provisions which were repealed and replaced by the TA Act (28 of 2011) and which were previously applied in terms of the pre-TA Act (28 of 2011) penalty provisions. A comparison between the latter provisions, the understatement penalty percentage provisions under the TA Act (28 of 2011) and foreign legislation is made with the purpose of addressing how effective and fair the TA Act (28 of 2011) will prove to be. The study also includes brief advice on any possible improvements or practical approaches regarding the understatement penalty percentage provisions under the TA Act (28 of 2011). It is also seen as necessary to evaluate the effectiveness of the regulations promulgated in terms of sections 221 to 223 of the TA Act (28 of 2011), and to identify possible problems with the application and interpretation of the relevant understatement penalty percentage provisions under the TA Act (28 of 2011) by the Commissioner. A literature review was used to critically analyse and compare various pieces of legislation and precedents, including South African and foreign laws and legislation, with possible practical illustrative examples. The objective with the literature review was to clarify issues such as the fairness of the understatement penalty percentage provisions under the TA Act (28 of 2011) and the pre-TA Act (28 of 2011) penalty provisions. The findings of the research study revealed that the enactment of the understatement penalty percentage provisions under the TA Act (28 of 2011) on 1 October 2012 partially achieves the objective of providing taxpayers with a penalty levying system that is more reasonable and fair in comparison with the pre-TA Act (28 of 2011) penalty provisions. Despite a more favourable outcome achieved by the TA Act (28 of 2011), the research concludes that proper guidance and measures for levying a penalty are still lacking and that the legislation is unfortunately still failing in this regard. Harsh penalty percentages based on certain behavioural criteria that are not defined create the need for obvious improvements. That said, the TA Act (28 of 2011) is still young and creates a basis on which further amendments and improvements can take place. / MCom (South African and International Taxation), North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2014

Text in Afrikaans / By ontbinding van 'n huwelik buite gemeenskap van goed beskik die hof oor 'n diskresionere bevoegdheid om 'n herverdeling van bates van die onderskeie boedels te gelas. Die voorvereiste, naamlik 'n bydrae tot die instandhouding of vergroting van die boedel van die ander en die uitleg van die bewoording van die wet bring egter mee dat die hof se diskresie om 'n billike herverdeling te beveel ingekort is. Bydrae behoort op gelyke vlak tesarne met al die relevante faktore 'n rol te speel. Huwelikswangedrag behoort 'n beperkte rol te speel by herverdelingsbevele. In sekere gevalle sal dit egter onbillik wees om skuld as faktor te ignoreer. Die skuld van die party teen wie die verdeling gevra word behoort nie 'n rol te speel nie. Sekere wetswysiginge is nodig ten einde die doel van die wet, naamlik bereiking van geregtigheid tussen die partye, te bewerkstellig. / On dissolution of a maniage out of commwrity of property the court has discretionary power to order a distribution of the assets of the different estates. The precondition, namely a contribution to the maintenance or increase of the estate of the other, and the interpretation of the words of the act, however, results in a curtailment of the court's discretion to order a just and equitable distribution. Contribution should play a role on the same level as all the other relevant factors. Misconduct should play a restricted role in a redistribution order. However, in certain cases it would be inequitable to ignore misconduct as a factor. The misconduct of the party against whom the redistribution is sought should not play a role. Certain amendments of the act are necessary to achieve the aim of the act, namely the attaining of equity between the parties. / Private Law / LL. M.

Text in Afrikaans / By ontbinding van 'n huwelik buite gemeenskap van goed beskik die hof oor 'n diskresionere bevoegdheid om 'n herverdeling van bates van die onderskeie boedels te gelas. Die voorvereiste, naamlik 'n bydrae tot die instandhouding of vergroting van die boedel van die ander en die uitleg van die bewoording van die wet bring egter mee dat die hof se diskresie om 'n billike herverdeling te beveel ingekort is. Bydrae behoort op gelyke vlak tesarne met al die relevante faktore 'n rol te speel. Huwelikswangedrag behoort 'n beperkte rol te speel by herverdelingsbevele. In sekere gevalle sal dit egter onbillik wees om skuld as faktor te ignoreer. Die skuld van die party teen wie die verdeling gevra word behoort nie 'n rol te speel nie. Sekere wetswysiginge is nodig ten einde die doel van die wet, naamlik bereiking van geregtigheid tussen die partye, te bewerkstellig. / On dissolution of a maniage out of commwrity of property the court has discretionary power to order a distribution of the assets of the different estates. The precondition, namely a contribution to the maintenance or increase of the estate of the other, and the interpretation of the words of the act, however, results in a curtailment of the court's discretion to order a just and equitable distribution. Contribution should play a role on the same level as all the other relevant factors. Misconduct should play a restricted role in a redistribution order. However, in certain cases it would be inequitable to ignore misconduct as a factor. The misconduct of the party against whom the redistribution is sought should not play a role. Certain amendments of the act are necessary to achieve the aim of the act, namely the attaining of equity between the parties. / Private Law / LL. M.

This study focuses on the discretionary inter vivos trust. It specifically investigates what the discretion of a trustee comprises and in which circumstances (if any) the court may amend the trustee‟s discretion as stipulated in the deed of trust. In order to make any meaningful conclusions, the different types of trusts, and more specific the way in which trusts are classified, needs to be researched. An inter vivos trust is classified as a contract for the sake of a third. Consequently contract law rules are applied in the interpretation and amendment of an inter vivos trust. The source, goal and tenor of a trustee‟s discretion, as well as the circumstances wherein this discretion may be amended, are investigated. The general rule is that courts have no discretion to amend a trust, but there is an exception to the rule. In accordance with article 13 of the Trust Property Control Act 57 of 1988 courts do have the power to amend or cancel the deed of trust in certain circumstances. In Potgieter and Another v Potgieter NO and Others 2012 (1) SA 637 (HHA) the court ruled that the power granted by article 13 does not enable judges to create law by amendment of the deed of trust according to their subjective interpretation of what is fair and just. The facts of the Potgieter case serve as problem statement for this study by focusing on the problems and unjust consequences of the strict application of contract law rules on a trust when the court does not take the changing circumstances of the trust founder into account. / LLM (Estate Law), North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2014

This study focuses on the discretionary inter vivos trust. It specifically investigates what the discretion of a trustee comprises and in which circumstances (if any) the court may amend the trustee‟s discretion as stipulated in the deed of trust. In order to make any meaningful conclusions, the different types of trusts, and more specific the way in which trusts are classified, needs to be researched. An inter vivos trust is classified as a contract for the sake of a third. Consequently contract law rules are applied in the interpretation and amendment of an inter vivos trust. The source, goal and tenor of a trustee‟s discretion, as well as the circumstances wherein this discretion may be amended, are investigated. The general rule is that courts have no discretion to amend a trust, but there is an exception to the rule. In accordance with article 13 of the Trust Property Control Act 57 of 1988 courts do have the power to amend or cancel the deed of trust in certain circumstances. In Potgieter and Another v Potgieter NO and Others 2012 (1) SA 637 (HHA) the court ruled that the power granted by article 13 does not enable judges to create law by amendment of the deed of trust according to their subjective interpretation of what is fair and just. The facts of the Potgieter case serve as problem statement for this study by focusing on the problems and unjust consequences of the strict application of contract law rules on a trust when the court does not take the changing circumstances of the trust founder into account. / LLM (Estate Law), North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2014