Limao and Panagariya (L&P, 2007) modify Grossman and Helpman’s (1994) lobbying model in an attempt to understand why anti-trade bias is the predominant pattern in observed trade policy. L&P (2007) propose that governments seek to reduce inequality between sectors by modifying trade policies in a way that reallocates income from the smaller to the larger sector. We assess the empirical validity of L&P’s (2007) theory by exploiting the World Bank Distortions to Agricultural Incentives database (Anderson and Valenzuela, 2008), using their measure of trade bias as our dependent variable. We find little empirical support for L&P’s (2007) theory, and estimated coefficients on most control variables are insignificant. Lagged trade policies are significant determinants of current trade policy, suggesting the presence of policy persistence. We conclude that it is difficult to generalise L&P’s (2007) theory across a wide and unbalanced panel of countries that extends from the 1950s to the 2000s.

Limao and Panagariya (L&P, 2007) modify Grossman and Helpman’s (1994) lobbying model in an attempt to understand why anti-trade bias is the predominant pattern in observed trade policy. L&P (2007) propose that governments seek to reduce inequality between sectors by modifying trade policies in a way that reallocates income from the smaller to the larger sector. We assess the empirical validity of L&P’s (2007) theory by exploiting the World Bank Distortions to Agricultural Incentives database (Anderson and Valenzuela, 2008), using their measure of trade bias as our dependent variable. We find little empirical support for L&P’s (2007) theory, and estimated coefficients on most control variables are insignificant. Lagged trade policies are significant determinants of current trade policy, suggesting the presence of policy persistence. We conclude that it is difficult to generalise L&P’s (2007) theory across a wide and unbalanced panel of countries that extends from the 1950s to the 2000s.

1 Abstract Block exemptions are very specific institute of competition law but although they have existed in European law for many decades, their application is not well-known in public. Certain activities in an economic competition were generally considered distorting the free competition and thus being undesirable so the EU institutions decided to prohibit them unless otherwise provided. The cartels and state aid generally bring imbalance and unfair conditions in the internal market, but there are certain circumstances which justify their usage and allowance in some cases. The actions, which are allowed due to their specific circumstances and under certain conditions, are provided in the form of so called block exemptions. Block exemptions are issued in two areas of competition law, agreements between undertakings and state aid. Agreements between undertakings, i.e. cartels, which affect the business in the internal market, are prohibited by Art. 101 (1) TFEU and the block exemptions determine the categories of cartels which can be allowed. On the other side, the state aid is only considered as incompatible with the internal market in Art. 107 (1) TFEU. According to Art. 108 (1, 3) TFEU, the Commission has to be notified by Member States about every state aid which is scheduled to be provided in advance...

The focal point of the dissertation is the term of cartel, which could be described as agreements distorting competition concluded by competitors on the horizontal level of the market, and, above all, legal instruments which are used in the process of detecting and punishing cartels. In particular, the dissertation thesis deals with three of possible instruments used in the enforcement process of cartels, i.e. with dawn rides (unannounced on-the-spot inspections/investigations carried out in business and non-business premises), sanctions and sanction policies and with the leniency programs. These instruments are generally thought to be the most important and most effective tools in the enforcement process of cartels and necessary precondition of efficiency of competition law itself. In accordance with the topic, the dissertation thesis is divided into three parts. The first part is concerned with theoretical and normative definitions of agreements distorting competition and cartels. The main purpose of this part is to provide basic characteristics of these terms and to describe them in a way which will create a basement for explanation of the three legal instruments, which form the focal point of the thesis. Second, fundamental part of the dissertation, deals with commentary to selected legal instruments, mentions already above. In particular it consists of three chapters, each one dealing with one of the instruments in question. In the final part of the dissertation are introduced conclusions and evaluations of the three legal instruments and also some proposals pro futuro.

Magister Legum - LLM / It has been held that agricultural domestic support would not be such a contentious issue if its only effect was the benefit of local farmers, but this is not the case.1 It was found that several forms of domestic support have the effect of distorting the patterns of agricultural production and trade at an international level, leaving non-supported farmers elsewhere worse off.2 It was thus concluded that such support measures may indeed nullify the benefits which accrue from trade liberalisation and explains how the AoA3 regulates these measures in a way that reduces their trade distorting effects.4 It has been noted that the agricultural sector only accounted for a small percentage of the developed world's Gross Domestic Product {GDP}, yet the regulation of international agricultural trade was not an easy task.5 Smith explains that numerous attempts were made to implement some form of regulation, including a half-hearted effort in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the subsequent AoA upon the creation of the WTO in 1995.6 According to Smith, the successful regulation of international agricultural trade remained elusive, despite Desta MG and McMahon JA explain that the WTO is not very concerned with countries that provide domestic support to their agricultural sectors, as this only matters to the extent that it hopes for liberalising trade in the sector.7 affects trade in that sector.8 It is further observed that the AoA balances out the freedom to provide domestic support with the need to reduce or eliminate the trade distortive effects thereof and note that the AoA has essentially made all forms of domestic support more transparent and easier to deal with.9 A party is therefore unlikely to be challenged, successfully, if domestic support is given in accordance with the provisions of the AoA.10 The aforementioned views only seem to address the merits of the AoA and the way in which it regulates the use of agricultural subsidies. It should however be noted that the literature fails to address the fact that the WTO has not enforced the provisions of the AoA very effectively against the EU and the USA, in light of the continued misuse of subsidies within both parties. In this regard it must be ascertained whether the WTO should impose stricter penalties as a means to deter its member states, especially the EU and USA, from using subsidies in an abusive way. In addition to this, it must be determined which types of penalties can and should be imposed.

No abstract available. / Dissertation (LLM)--University of Pretoria, 2013. / Centre for Human Rights / unrestricted

No description available.