The objective of this research was to analyze the evolution of Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) during the twenty-first century, using historical institutionalism as a framework. Three critical junctures were President Putin’s election in 2000, the Nord-Ost Terrorist Crisis in 2002, and the Beslan Terrorist Crisis in 2004; theories dealing with insecurity, the psychological effects of terrorism, and domestic intelligence were also incorporated. This study found that the expansion of the FSB has provided it with greater potential for carrying out its functions as a domestic intelligence service as well as abusing authority and assisting the state in regime consolidation. Consolidation, in the intelligence community and state, was made possible by legitimate terrorist crises and the perception of threats, which were manipulated by Vladimir Putin’s administration. Public support for consolidation, favoring security over freedom, was mobilized around Putin’s war against terrorism and perceived foreign “threats” within a political system devoid of effective checks against the executive. / text

Domestic intelligence is very important in preventing disorder while ensuring unity and security during a time of national crisis. However, if uncontrolled, domestic intelligence can be subject to political misuse, which causes serious damage both to individuals and to democratic institutions. There are various theoretical explanations for political misuse of domestic intelligence. The political use of domestic intelligence is best explained by the sociological theory of unfulfilled needs. On the other hand, political counterintelligence can be best explained by Threat Theory. In order for a domestic intelligence organization to be effective, its organizational discretion must be limited by establishing clear legislation that is not secret, on the focus, limits, and techniques of domestic intelligence. This system must be supported by a multi-level control mechanism.