Esta investigación comenzó como el intento de profundizar en las tesis de licenciatura de algunos estudiantes de la Facultad de Ciencias y Artes de la Comunicación en la Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú (PUCP). Esos trabajos de tesis presentaban y analizaban experiencias creativas y artísticas en poblaciones excluidas, al interior de las cuales se generaron espacios novedosos de reconocimiento entre sus participantes, a menudo con el apoyo de los jóvenes autores de esas investigaciones. Los procesos, las historias y las personas que se dejaban mostrar en sus páginas han informado en los últimos años mis preguntas como profesor, estudiante de doctorado y profesional interesado en temas de desarrollo, ciudadanía e interculturalidad. Me han confirmado también que la investigación académica puede seguir aportando a una comprensión más profunda de estos espacios de nuestra realidad actual y contribuir a su fortalecimiento.

Thesis (MPhil (Philosophy))--University of Stellenbosch, 2005. / This study seeks to give a philosophical account of, and justification for the intuition that subjectivity is not a stable “Archimedean point” on the basis of which an intersubjective relation can be founded, but is instead profoundly affected by each different “Other” with which it enters into a relation. As a preliminary to the positive philosophical account of how this might work in Part II of the thesis, there is an attempt to critique certain of the classical accounts of intersubjectivity found in phenomenology, in order to show that these positions cannot give a satisfactory account of the type of intersubjective relation which gives rise to the abovementioned intuition. The thesis therefore starts off by examining the account of intersubjectivity in Husserl’s Cartesian Meditations (especially the Fifth Meditation). Husserl is there engaged in an attempt to overcome the charge of solipsism that might be levelled at phenomenology, since phenomenology is concerned with experience as, by definition, the experience of the subject. We try to show that Husserl cannot give a satisfactory account of the Other because he tries to derive it from the Subject, and hence reduces the Other to the Same. We then turn to two other phenomenological thinkers – Merleau-Ponty and Levinas, both of whom are themselves critical of Husserl – to examine whether they provide a better account, but conclude that (although each represents a certain advance over Husserl), neither are able to provide a decisively better account, since each is still too caught up in phenomenology and its focus on consciousness. In Part II of the thesis, we then turn to a non- (or even anti-) phenomenological thinker, namely Gilles Deleuze, to try and find an alternative theory that would be able to provide the account we seek. Our contention is that Deleuze, by seeking to give an account of the constitution of the subject itself, simultaneously provides an account of the constitution of the Other as arising at the same time as the Subject. Crucial to this account is the inversion of priority between the poles of a relation and the relation itself. Deleuze argues that a relation is “external to its terms”, and precedes these terms. Hence, by returning to a level which precedes consciousness and the order of knowledge – that is, by returning to the level of the virtual multiplicities and singular events that underlie and precede the actualization of these events and multiplicities in distinct subjects and objects – we argue that Deleuze shows that, contra phenomenology, there is in fact no primordial separation between subject and Other. The contention is therefore that the problem of intersubjectivity as posed by phenomenology is a false one that can be eluded by means of Deleuze’s philosophy. This philosophy is not based on the subject, but instead shows the subject to be the product of an underlying network of relations. Finally, we turn to Deleuze’s appropriation of Nietzsche to trace out the transformation of “ethics” that result from adopting a position like that of Deleuze.

This thesis explores the political reformation of “faction” in the political thought of Montesquieu, David Hume, and Edmund Burke, three thinkers whose works span what Pierre Manent calls “an exquisite moment of liberalism.” It examines the transformation of faction from one based largely on class to one based largely on political function and argues that as the political emphasis of “party” overtook that of class, a disconnect in constitutional theory appeared between the principles formerly associated with class, such as honor, and the principles now associated with parties. This disconnect is examined by focusing on the interrelated concepts of political principle, or that which motivates and regulates men, and faction, itself divided into two types, principled and singular. This thesis further considers the role of political principle to faction in each thinker’s thought in order to demonstrate how limited domestic political conflict could sustain itself via a party system. Each thinker recognized that limited political conflict did not weaken the state but rather strengthened it, if engendered by “principled faction” cognizant of a nominal sovereign. Accordingly, it is argued that a similar understanding of “principled faction,” though focused largely on aristocratic ideas of prejudice, self-interest, and inequality, better promoted political liberty within the state and contributed to a greater acceptance of party in political thought.

My thesis explores the posthumous literary life in the early modern period by examining responses to ‘dead poets’ shortly after their deaths. Analysing responses to a series of literary figures, I chart a pre-history of literary biography. Overall, I argue for the gradual emergence of a linkage between an individual’s literary output and the personal life that predates the eighteenth century. Chapter 1 frames the critical investigation by contrasting examples of Lives written for authors living before and after my chosen period of specialisation. Both these Lives reflect changed attitudes towards the writing of poets’ lives as a result of wider discourses that the following chapters examine in more detail. Chapter 2 focuses on the events following the death of Robert Greene, an author often described as the first ‘professional’ English writer. The chapter suggests that Greene’s notoriety is for the most part a posthumous construct resulting from printed responses to his death. Chapter 3 is concerned with the problem of reconciling a poet’s life-narrative with the vita activa model and examines potential causes for the ‘gap’ between Sir Philip Sidney’s public life and his works, which continues to pose a challenge for biographers. Chapter 4 examines the evolution of Izaak Walton’s Life of Donne. The ‘life history’ of Walton’s Lives, particularly the Life of Donne, reflects an accidental discovery of a biographical technique that anticipates literary biography. My method is mainly based on bibliographical research, comparing editions and making distinctions between them which have not been made before, while paying particular attention to paratextual materials, such as dedications, prefaces and title pages. By investigating assumptions about individual authors, and also authorship in general, I hope to shed some light on a promising new area of early modern scholarship and direct greater scrutiny towards the assumptions brought into literary biography.

The aim of this research is to present an important but forgotten Tiffany interior, that of All Saints Episcopal Church, and focuses on the source for the Saunders memorial window, Christ Resurrection. After portraying the Saunders Family and the context of the window and church interior as an important part of Richmond’s history, this thesis sets up a number of inquiries regarding Christ Resurrection. What are the literary sources; what are the formal sources, from the Renaissance to the late nineteenth century; and what is the meaning of the composition? This thesis utilizes an art historical method of archival, connoisseurial, and iconological research. The analysis of the third chapter illustrates that Frederick Wilson’s composition of Christ Resurrection does not follow any one of the Evangelists. Rather it comes from an extensive pictorial tradition from Resurrection scenes of the 14th century leading into the 17th.

本文旨在闡明史賓塞如何架構出一則阿諦構和布烈特瑪間的完美愛情故事並鼓勵那些活在真實世界中的讀者跟隨這對戀人的腳蹤。本文首先介紹基督教中的愛論如何建基於神人之間完美的愛，並介紹史賓塞如何以神聖之愛為典範，寫出一對完美的愛人。藉此典範,史賓塞拆毀了兩座巨牆:他不但使人可以有完美的愛情，也使他的人物同時具有寓言和寫實兩大特性.此外、本文亦說明基督教愛論和其實現間的環狀關係如和使史賓塞的愛情故事和基督教的愛論亦產生環狀關係。第二、本文細探阿諦構和布烈特瑪間關係的發展、將之分為三個階段:為愛人、為夫妻、為朋友。在這三階段中、此愛情故事皆和基督教的愛論有環狀關係:此故事反映了神聖之愛的光華、釋明了神聖之愛的迷團、並藉著神聖之愛的特異處將此愛情故事中似乎不完美處解釋為完美。藉著探討史賓塞的愛情故事和基督教愛論彼此間的環狀關係、本文終能釐清史賓塞如何促使讀者基督教中認為人可以行出的貞潔。本文最後呈現史賓塞的環狀辯論如何鼓勵讀者不僅閱讀阿諦構和布烈特瑪的經驗、並能親身嘗試實行這對愛人的信念。 / This thesis aims at explaining how Spenser builds his love story of Artegall and Britomart as a perfect love model for all his readers in the real world to follow. The thesis first introduces how the Christian theory of love is modeled on the perfect love relation between God and human beings and how Spenser emulates that divine model and creates a pair of perfect human lovers. By his emulation of the divine model, he not only breaks down the middle wall between the perfect and the human, but also shapes his characters as both allegorical and realistic. Besides, the thesis also explains how the circular relationship between the Christian theory of love and its practice renders Spenser's artistic love model to have a circular relatioinship with theChristian love theory, too. Second, the argument of the thesis follows closely the development of Artegall and Britomart's relationship and divides it into three phases: their relationship as lovers, as husband and wife, as friends. In all the three phases, the love story has a circular relationship with the Christian theory oflove. It reflects the glory of a divine love model, explains the mystery of Christian love, and is justified of its seeming defects by the harshness andother-worldliness of the divine love. By laying bare of the circularrelationship between Spenser's love story and the Christian theory of love, the thesis finally comes to unravel Spenser's art of inviting the readers toperform chastity that human beings in Christian theory is supposed perform. Thethesis concludes by showing how the circular argument encourages the readers to join in Artegall and Britomart's experience and to practice their belief about love rather than simply to read it.

The 1980s witnessed a judicial “rights revolution” in Canada characterized by the Supreme Court of Canada striking down both federal and provincial legislation which violated the rights guaranteed by the 1982 Charter of Rights. The lack of a similar judicial “rights revolution” in the wake of the 1960 Canadian Bill of Rights has largely been attributed to the structural difference between the two instruments with the latter – as a “mere” statute of the federal parliament – providing little more than a canon of construction and (unlike the Charter) not empowering the courts to engage in judicial review of legislation. Yet this view contrasts starkly with how the Bill was portrayed by the Diefenbaker government, which argued that it provided for judicial review and would “prevail” over other federal legislation. Many modern scholars have dismissed the idea that the Bill could prevail over other federal statutes as being incompatible with the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. That is, a bill of rights could only prevail over legislation if incorporated into the British North America Act. As such, they argue that the Diefenbaker government could not have intended the Bill of Rights to operate as anything more than a canon of construction. However, such a view ignores the turbulence in constitutional thinking on parliamentary sovereignty in the 1930s through 1960s provoked by the Statute of Westminster. This era produced the doctrine of “self-embracing” sovereignty – in contrast to traditional “Dicey” sovereignty – where parliament could limit itself through “ordinary” legislation. The effective author of the Canadian Bill of Rights, Elmer Driedger, was an adherent of this doctrine as well as an advocate of a “purposive” approach to statutory interpretation. Driedger, thus, drafted the Bill based upon the doctrine of self-embracing sovereignty and believed it would enjoy a “purposive” interpretation by the courts, with the Bill designed to be as effective at guaranteeing rights as the Statute of Westminster was at liberating Canada from Imperial legislation.

The 1980s witnessed a judicial “rights revolution” in Canada characterized by the Supreme Court of Canada striking down both federal and provincial legislation which violated the rights guaranteed by the 1982 Charter of Rights. The lack of a similar judicial “rights revolution” in the wake of the 1960 Canadian Bill of Rights has largely been attributed to the structural difference between the two instruments with the latter – as a “mere” statute of the federal parliament – providing little more than a canon of construction and (unlike the Charter) not empowering the courts to engage in judicial review of legislation. Yet this view contrasts starkly with how the Bill was portrayed by the Diefenbaker government, which argued that it provided for judicial review and would “prevail” over other federal legislation. Many modern scholars have dismissed the idea that the Bill could prevail over other federal statutes as being incompatible with the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. That is, a bill of rights could only prevail over legislation if incorporated into the British North America Act. As such, they argue that the Diefenbaker government could not have intended the Bill of Rights to operate as anything more than a canon of construction. However, such a view ignores the turbulence in constitutional thinking on parliamentary sovereignty in the 1930s through 1960s provoked by the Statute of Westminster. This era produced the doctrine of “self-embracing” sovereignty – in contrast to traditional “Dicey” sovereignty – where parliament could limit itself through “ordinary” legislation. The effective author of the Canadian Bill of Rights, Elmer Driedger, was an adherent of this doctrine as well as an advocate of a “purposive” approach to statutory interpretation. Driedger, thus, drafted the Bill based upon the doctrine of self-embracing sovereignty and believed it would enjoy a “purposive” interpretation by the courts, with the Bill designed to be as effective at guaranteeing rights as the Statute of Westminster was at liberating Canada from Imperial legislation.

Schlesische Modernität um 1930 wird an zwei Breslauer Komponisten untersucht: Hans Zielowsky und Edmund von Borck. Von ihrer Herkunft und Ausbildung her könnten sie kaum unterschiedlicher sein, und so stecken sie Endpunkte ab, zwischen denen sich das Komponieren Breslauer Musiker der Zeit abspielte. Der eine, Zielowsky, schreibt mit anrührendem Dilettantismus, der andere, von Borck, mit bewundernswerter stilistischer Unabhängigkeit und mit großem handwerklichen Geschick. Der eine gelangt mit den meist kleinen Besetzungen seiner Werke kaum übers Private hinaus, der andere konzentriert sich dagegen auf das Schreiben von Orchesterliteratur. Dennoch ist ihnen etwas gemeinsam: die Orientierung an einer auf je eigene Weise verstandenen Linearität und die Verehrung sowie das Maßnehmen an Bruckner. In dem Beitrag wird die spezifische Bruckner-Rezeption untersucht unter Bezugnahme auf die damals neuartige Musiktheorie.

The dissertation situates the Goethean sublime in an obscured countermovement of resistance to the aestheticization the concept underwent in the 18th century. Before the encounter with the English aesthetic concept of the sublime, the German notion of das Erhabene (the sublime) named not a category of aesthetic experience, but a social affect. In contrast to the Sublime of Edmund Burke's theory, which explicitly excludes melancholy from the sources of the Sublime, das Erhabene is an affect related to the self-overcoming of melancholic subjectivity. As the aestheticized notion of the sublime displaced das Erhabene, Goethe became one of the most radical innovators of the aesthetics of the sublime. But as is demonstrated in chapters on The Sorrows of Young Werther, Elective Affinities, Faust and Wilhelm Meister, he did so with the aim of recovering the displaced meaning of das Erhabene as social affect. Goethe's sublime aims to show at every turn that the so-called "aesthetic experience" of the sublime is really displaced social affect. His treatment of the sublime therefore constitutes a radical critique of the establishment of aesthetics as an independent sphere of inquiry. There is for Goethe no way to understand aesthetic experience independently of its social context. By reconnecting the sublime it to the original social meaning of das Erhabene, Goethe recovers the aesthetics of the sublime as a means of mediating and facilitating the movement of subjectivity from frustrated stasis to divine creativity; i.e., from exclusion to participation in the material creation of reality.