Diss. Stockholm : Stockholms universitet, 2008.

Den moderna filosofiska analysen av kausalitet utarbetades under 1700-talet av den skotskefilosofen David Hume. Under beteckningen regularitetsteorin har Humes analys varit utgångspunkten för alla senare empiriska analyser av orsaksförhållanden. Men Humes ståndpunkt om kausalitet tolkas olika och åsikterna varierar om vad hans orsaksteori utgörs av. En samtida tolkning av Hume som kausal realist gör gällande att Hume tror på existensen av objekt i tid och rum som är oberoende av våra sinnen och som uttrycker kausala relationer, vilka upprätthålls av icke–reducerbara kausala krafter. Dessa kausala relationer är sådana att om idén om dem vore tillgänglig för vårt medvetande, kunde effekten härledas a priori från orsaken. Detta arbete avser att argumentera mot den realistiska tolkningen av Hume, och visa på att Hume utvecklade en särskilt rigorös empirisk metodik för att undvika att gå längre än erfarenheten. Detta realiseras i första hand av Humes idéteori, dvs. uppfattningen att varje enkel idé härrör från erfarenheten som en kopia av ett enkelt intryck. Idéer står enligt Hume i bestämda relationer till varandra, varav några är naturliga associationer, medan andra är filosofiska relationer. Hume gör ytterligare en åtskillnad i fråga om filosofiska relationer: sådana som endast beror på idéerna och vars motsats är otänkbar, och sådana som kan förändras utan att idéerna undergår någon förändring och vars negation inte resulterar i en kontradiktion. Till den senare hör orsaksförhållanden. På detta sätt betraktat är kausalitet ett kontingent förhållande och något vi får kunskap om a posteriori. Givet Humes begreppsempirism, hörnstenen för båda hans resoluta antimetafysiska hållning och hans naturalistiska projekt, är det inte ens begripligt att tala om kausala krafter såsom en kvalitet hos orsaken. Hume påstår att vi felaktigt projicerar en idé om nödvändighet, något som endast existerar i sinnet, på yttre objekt, som i sin tur påverkar kausalitetens fenomenologi. Humes modus operandi i dettasammanhang är att göra våra idéer klara och tydliga genom att urskilja intrycken från vilka de kopierats. För Hume fungerar oklara idéer som analysandum och sökandet efter dess motsvarande intryck syftar till att ge klarhet åt idén. Mot bakgrund av Humes idéteori är den relevanta betydelsen av intryck för Hume perceptuell, och således förutsätter att de aktuellarepresentationerna är adekvata. Härigenom får distinkta perceptioner en framträdande roll i Humes filosofiska system.

L'idée de transcendantal, selon son inventeur E. Kant, doit être conçue comme la condition pure et préalable de toute expérience possible. Mais, pour G. Deleuze, une telle idée de transcendantal implique deux défauts fondamentaux : d'une part, elle n'est pas susceptible de rendre compte de la singularité de l'expérience réelle et sensible ; d'autre part, elle présuppose illégitimement qu'il existe un rapport de ressemblance entre le transcendantal qui est la condition et l'empirique qui est le conditionné. Ayant l'ambition de renouveler l'idée de transcendantal en dépassant ces deux limites foncières du transcendantalisme kantien, Deleuze élabore son propre empirisme transcendantal qui détermine le principe générateur du sensible singulier comme la différence d'intensité et définit la condition transcendantale non-semblable comme la différence de virtualité. La différence d'intensité et la différence de virtualité sont respectivement les objets des deux parties de l'empirisme transcendantal qui sont l'esthétique impliquante et la dialectique problématique. De plus, la différence d'intensité et la différence de virtualité, toutes les deux sont les multiplicités qui s'opposent à la simplicité de l'essence de la métaphysique traditionnelle. Et la théorie deleuzienne de la multiplicité complètement différenciée et absolument infinie trouve son origine de la philosophie de Spinoza qui se déploie à travers trois moments qui sont la substance en tant que Multiplicité suprême, l'attribut en tant que multiplicité intensive, et le mode existant en tant que multiplicité extensive. / The idea of transcendental, according to its inventor I. Kant, should be conceived as the pure and priori condition of any possible experience. However, for G. Deleuze, such an idea of transcendental involves two fundamental flaws: on the one hand, it cannot explain the singularity of the real and sensible experience; on the other hand, it presupposes illegitimately that there exists a relation of resemblance between the transcendental qua condition and the empirical qua conditioned. Having the ambition of renewing the idea of transcendental by surpassing these two limits of the Kantian transcendentalism, Deleuze elaborates his own transcendental empiricism which determines the generic principal of singular sensible as the difference of intensity and defines the non-ressemblable transcendental condition as the difference of virtuality. The difference of intensity and the difference of virtuality are respectively the objects of the two parts of the transcendental empiricism that are the implicating aesthetics and the problematic dialectics. Furthermore, both the difference of intensity and the difference of virtuality are the multiplicities which oppose to the simplicity of the essence of the traditional metaphysics. And the Deleuzian theory of the completely differentiated and absolutely infinite multiplicity finds its origin in Spinoza's philosophy which extends itself through three moments that are the substance qua supreme Multiplicity, the attribute qua intensive multiplicity, and the existing mode qua extensive multiplicity.

Desde sua primeira obra, David Hume anuncia ao leitor o projeto de constituição de uma ciência da natureza humana. O principal objetivo deste trabalho consiste em examinar os argumentos utilizados por Hume para construir as condições de possibilidade desse saber. / Since his first work David Hume announces his intentions to constitute a science of human nature. The main target of this thesis is to examine the arguments used by Hume to build the conditions of possibility of this field of knowledge.

O intuito desta pesquisa é encontrar o vínculo entre percepção e relações contingentes na filosofia de David Hume. Uma vez que o autor nos diz que tudo o que há são percepções, surge a tarefa de precisar o modo segundo o qual relações como espaço e tempo - relações filosóficas e contingentes - se constituem. Afinal, a noção chave desta filosofia, a de causalidade, traz já a necessidade de certa percepção de tais idéias abstratas (espaço e tempo): elas devem ser derivadas de alguma experiência sensível (impressão), mesmo sendo exteriores às qualidades da experiência sensível. Será possível, assim, vislumbrar a imbricação entre o atomismo e o associacionismo humiano, delimitando o sentido da experiência para este pensamento e apontando as conseqüências dessa perspectiva em relação à problemática da época - o conhecimento - ou àquela que nascia como conseqüência - a subjetividade. / The aim of the present research is to find the connexion between perception and contingent relations in David Hume\'s philosophy. Since the author himself tells us that everything that exists are perceptions, the task arises of precisely circumscribing the way in which relations such as time and space - philosophical and contingent relations - are constituted. After all, the key concept of this philosophy, the one of causality, already implies the need of some perception of such abstract ideas (time and space): they should be derived from some sensitive experience (impression), even if they are exterior to the qualities of sensitive experience. It will be thus possible to have an insight into the interrelation of Hume\'s atomism and associationism, thereby defining the meaning of experience in his philosophy and pointing out the consequences of his view to the set of problems of his epoch - knowledge - or of the one then upraising - subjectivity.

En 1955, Luciano Berio obtient de la R.A.I. l’autorisation de créer, dans les locaux milanais de la radio, le Studio di Fonologia, premier studio européen mêlant musique concrète et musique électronique. Ce lieu, dont il définira tout autant les statuts que les différents appareillages, va devenir pour lui durant six ans un lieu de production effrénée de radiodrames pour la R.A.I., mais également un laboratoire de recherches personnelles. Entouré par un cercle d’avant-garde, très au fait des publications scientifiques de son temps - notamment dans le domaine de la linguistique, de la théorie musicale, et du structuralisme - il va plonger de façon empirique au cœur la matière vocale. La situation acousmatique du studio, l’absence d’interprètes, la dimension poétique et théâtrale du langage vont l’amener à se questionner sur l’écoute, et, dans une pensée brechtienne, sur l’écoute de l’écoute. Nous tentons de dégager, dans notre travail, en partant de la réalité du travail en studio, les éléments qui ultérieurement ont fusionné pour devenir le style bérien et qui sont déjà en germe ou même parfaitement identifiables durant cette période qui va de Chamber Music à Laborintus II. / In 1955 the R.A.I. granted Luciano Berio permission to create the Studio di Fonologia in their Milan radio studios, the first European studio to combine “musique concrète” and purely electronic music. He was able to choose the equipment and define the usage of the studio so that it became a place where he would produce radio dramas for the R.A.I. at a furious pace for six years as well as a laboratory for personal research. Surrounded by a circle of avant-garde personalities, very aware of scientific publications of his time - notably in the domains of linguistics, musical theory and structuralism - he will dive in an empirical way into the heart of vocal material. The acousmatic nature of the studio, the absence of live performers, and the poetic and theatrical dimension of language will lead him to ask himself about the notion of listening, and in a Brechtian way, about listening to listening. We will attempt in our work to reveal - from his actual studio work - the elements which later merged to become the Berian style and which were already germinating or even perfectly recognizable during the period from Chamber Music to Laborintus II.

O intuito desta pesquisa é encontrar o vínculo entre percepção e relações contingentes na filosofia de David Hume. Uma vez que o autor nos diz que tudo o que há são percepções, surge a tarefa de precisar o modo segundo o qual relações como espaço e tempo - relações filosóficas e contingentes - se constituem. Afinal, a noção chave desta filosofia, a de causalidade, traz já a necessidade de certa percepção de tais idéias abstratas (espaço e tempo): elas devem ser derivadas de alguma experiência sensível (impressão), mesmo sendo exteriores às qualidades da experiência sensível. Será possível, assim, vislumbrar a imbricação entre o atomismo e o associacionismo humiano, delimitando o sentido da experiência para este pensamento e apontando as conseqüências dessa perspectiva em relação à problemática da época - o conhecimento - ou àquela que nascia como conseqüência - a subjetividade. / The aim of the present research is to find the connexion between perception and contingent relations in David Hume\'s philosophy. Since the author himself tells us that everything that exists are perceptions, the task arises of precisely circumscribing the way in which relations such as time and space - philosophical and contingent relations - are constituted. After all, the key concept of this philosophy, the one of causality, already implies the need of some perception of such abstract ideas (time and space): they should be derived from some sensitive experience (impression), even if they are exterior to the qualities of sensitive experience. It will be thus possible to have an insight into the interrelation of Hume\'s atomism and associationism, thereby defining the meaning of experience in his philosophy and pointing out the consequences of his view to the set of problems of his epoch - knowledge - or of the one then upraising - subjectivity.

Desde sua primeira obra, David Hume anuncia ao leitor o projeto de constituição de uma ciência da natureza humana. O principal objetivo deste trabalho consiste em examinar os argumentos utilizados por Hume para construir as condições de possibilidade desse saber. / Since his first work David Hume announces his intentions to constitute a science of human nature. The main target of this thesis is to examine the arguments used by Hume to build the conditions of possibility of this field of knowledge.

Orientador: José Oscar de Almeida Marques / Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-20T23:24:04Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Silva_LailaT.Correae_M.pdf: 649829 bytes, checksum: bf737501bf46eebb811b3721472034fe (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012 / Resumo: David Hume, no Tratado da Natureza Humana, livro 1, parte 4, seção 2, "Do ceticismo quanto aos sentidos", pretende explicar a causa de nossa crença na existência do mundo exterior, isto é, a crença em existências contínuas e distintas da mente e da percepção. Ele inicia a seção com a seguinte afirmação: devemos dar nosso assentimento ao princípio referente à existência dos corpos, embora não possamos ter a pretensão de sustentar a sua veracidade por meio de argumentos filosóficos (T 1.4.2.1). Mas, ao final da seção, sua postura diante da crença na existência do mundo exterior muda totalmente, como Hume mesmo diz, em T 1.4.2.56, penúltimo parágrafo: "iniciei este tema com a premissa de que deveria ter uma fé implícita em nossos sentidos, e que essa é a conclusão que extrairia da totalidade de meu raciocínio", contudo, argumenta ele, "sinto-me neste momento possuído pelo sentimento contrário", ou seja, Hume não deposita mais nenhuma confiança nos sentidos, ou antes, imaginação. Por que Hume chega a tal conclusão? Hume argumenta que essas existências contínuas e distintas são ficções da imaginação e, como tais, não merecem nosso assentimento e confiança. Essa situação embaraçosa conduz Hume a um ceticismo radical que, segundo o próprio filósofo, somente pode ser curado por meio do "descuido e desatenção". Mas, como poderíamos interpretar essa declaração de Hume? Minha proposta de interpretação defende que através do conceito humeano de ceticismo mitigado presente no Tratado, livro 1, parte 4, seção 7, "Conclusão deste livro", e na Investigação sobre o Entendimento Humano, seção 12, "Da filosofia acadêmica ou cética", somos capazes de compreendê-la. Nas duas obras mencionadas Hume apresenta o modo de investigação filosófica que é, para ele, o mais adequado, a saber: o método cético. Contudo, o ceticismo de Hume não é o ceticismo radical que impede toda a ação, mas sim um ceticismo mais mitigado que combina consigo uma parcela da "mistura bruta e terrena" (T 1.4.7.14), constituinte da vida comum e afazeres cotidianos / Abstract: David Hume, in the Treatise of Human Nature, book 1, part 4, section 2, "Of scepticism with regard to the senses", wants to explain the cause of our belief in the existence of external world, i.e., the belief in existence continued and distinct of the mind and perception. He begins the section with the following affirmation: we might give our assentiment to the principle regarding the existence of external world, even though we cannot pretend to sustain its veracity through philosophical arguments (T 1.4.2.1). But, at the end of section, Hume's position as regards of the belief of external world changes completely, as Hume says, in T 1.4.2.56: "I begun this subject with premising, that we ought to have an implicit faith in our senses, and that this wou'd be the conclusion, I shou'd draw from the whole of my reasoning", however, he says, "I feel myself at present of quite contrary sentiment", i.e., Hume didn't deposit any more trust in the senses, or first, imagination. Why Hume concluded that? Hume says that these continued and distinct existences are fictions of imagination, and in this way, don't diserve our trust and assentiment. This complicated situation brings Hume to the radical scepticism that, according to himself, can only be cured by "carelessness and in-attention". But how can we interpret Hume's declaration? My proposal is that by means of the humean concept of mitigate scepticism present in the Treatise, book 1, part 4, section 7, and in Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, section 12, we can comprehended Hume's situation. In both books, he presented for us a way of philosophical investigation that is, for him, more adequate: the sceptical method. However, humean scepticism is not the radical one that obstructed all action, instead, more mitigated humean scepticism brings with itself one part of the "gross earthy mixture, as an ingredient" (T 1.4.7.14), that constitutes common life / Mestrado / Filosofia / Mestre em Filosofia

Voltaire a-t-il été rénovateur ou défenseur du classicisme ? Bien qu’il l’appréciât, il s’opposait à l’introduction de la galanterie qui était la tradition classique. Car, pour lui, la puissance de la tragédie, c’était d’inspirer la crainte et la pitié afin d’instruire les hommes. À ses yeux, la galanterie ne pouvait qu’affaiblir le rôle éducatif de la tragédie. Ainsi, il a tenté d’instruire dans le théâtre français des scènes qui inspirent la terreur, tout en respectant la bienséance du classicisme. Pour ce qui est de la pitié, il a mis en avant l’importance des liens familiaux ; les liens du sang font entendre la voix de la nature. Cela nous amène à la question de la nature humaine. En réalité, Voltaire avait confiance en la nature de l’homme, tout en soutenant l’empirisme. De là, une contradiction apparaît. Si l’homme est façonné par son environnement, il y a des cas où il se dénature et commet un crime. Voltaire pensait plutôt que l’homme était originellement l’être faible qui commit la faute. Alors, le crime s’unit à la nature humaine. Cependant, il croyait malgré tout à la bonté de l’homme car ce dernier possède la capacité de se régénérer. C’est là qu’intervient la force du remords. Pour Voltaire, ce sentiment est une des composantes de la vertu gravée dans la nature humaine. Même si un mortel commet un crime, il peut se régénérer grâce au remords. L’être humain, selon lui, résulte de sa nature bonne et l’empirisme. Voltaire a tenté jusqu’à sa mort d’être à la fois dramaturge et philosophe afin de mettre en lumière le rapport de la vertu et de la régénération. Pensant toujours à éduquer l’homme, tantôt il défend la tradition classique, tantôt il introduit de la modernité dans le classicisme. Toutefois, pour lui, moderniser la tradition classique était un moyen de la conserver, non pas de la détruire. En effet, il pensait que la tragédie classique était la plus efficace manière d’éduquer les hommes. La tragédie voltairienne, c’est donc l’intégration de la modernité à la tradition du classicisme. / Was Voltaire the refomer or the guardian of the classicism ? Although he appreciated it, he opposed the insertion of the coquettish story which was the classical tradition. For him, the power of the tragedy that was to inspire fear and pity in order to educate humain being. In his eyes the coquettish story weakens the educational role of the tragedy. And so, for fear, he tried to introduce the spectacle of terror in the French theatre. But at the same time he minded the reserve of the classicism. In terms of pity, he highlighted the importance of family ties. He emphasized the voice of the nature in the same blood. This brings us to the problem of human nature. He trusted actually the nature of man, whereas he supported the empiricism. That so, the contradiction happens inside him. If human being is shaped according to his environment, there are cases where he is corrupted and commits a crime. Rather, he thought that man was originally the weak creature who committed the fault. In this thought, the crime joins human nature. However, Voltaire still believed in the goodness of human nature, because man has also the ability to regenerate : it is the power of remorse. For Voltaire, that feeling is one of the components of virtue engaved in human nature. Even if he commits crime, man has the possibility of regeneration, thanks to the felling of remorse. Such a fusion of the human nature and of empiricism was his thought about man. Voltaire tried until his death to be both playwright and philosopher in order to highlight importance of the relation between virtue and regeneration. Always thinking to educate man, sometimes Voltaire defends the classical tradition, sometimes he introduces modernity in classicism. However, for him, modernizing the classical tradition was a way to conserve it, not to destoy it. Indeed, he thought that the classical tragedy was the most effective manner to educate man. So, Voltaire’s tragedy is characterized by the integration of modernity into the classical tradition.