A research report presented to the Department of Speech Pathology and Audiology, Faculty of Arts, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the degree Master of Arts in Speech- Language Pathology by Coursework / Health care professionals are expected to apply ethical principles such as nonmaleficence, beneficence, autonomy and justice in their teaching of students and treatment of clients. Speech Pathologists and Audiologists (SPAs) in South Africa are responsible not only for educating members of their profession, but are often also involved in the training of Community Rehabilitation Workers (CRWs). Hence the aim of the present study was to explore the experiences, opinions and attitudes of a group of SPAs and CRW co-ordinators with particular reference to ethical issues related to CRW training. In order to investigate this aim. an interview schedule followed by a questionnaire were administered to SPA and CRW co-ordinators who had been involved in CRW training at The Wits/Tinstwalo CRW Training Programme in Gazankulu and at The Institute Of Urban Primary Health Care in Alexandra Township. Data elicited from the interview were analysed using content analysis and responses categorized according to respondents' background in ethics and knowledge regarding ethical principles. Results are discussed in terms of their implications for SPA and CRW co-ordinators. / Andrew Chakane 2018

by Pong Wai-Ip. / Bibliography: leaves 106-110 / Thesis (M.Ph.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1986

論文(碩士)--香港中文大學,1978. / Manuscript. / Includes bibliographical references: (leaves 185-188). / Thesis (M.A.)--Xianggang Zhong wen da xue. / 前言 --- p.1-5 / Chapter 第一章 --- 畧論道德問題思考的幾種進路 --- p.6-28 / Chapter 第二章 --- 休謨的道德哲學 --- p.29-86 / Chapter 第三章 --- 休謨道德理論之困難 --- p.87-127 / Chapter 第四章 --- 休謨理論進路之限制 --- p.127-148 / Chapter 第五章 --- 先秦儒家(孔孟)對道德的形上意義之啟示 --- p.149-179 / Chapter 第六章 --- 總結 --- p.180-184 / 參考書目

Surely, moral education is not merely intended to result in theoretical knowledge, but instead attempts to change people's behavior. However, when examining and evaluating current trends in moral education, it appears that hitherto moral education has fallen short of its goal to make people better. In this paper, I try to determine what has caused this perceived failure of moral education and conclude that approaches that focus on teaching moral reasoning skills rather than on teaching actual moral content, i.e., values and virtues, are generally ineffective for moral improvement. However, a more traditional form of moral education, namely character education, appears to be a viable alternative to the moral reasoning methods. Since character education can be regarded as the practical application of virtue ethics, I first describe and evaluate virtue ethics and defend it against potential criticisms. I then examine what methods are effective for teaching virtues, and how such methods can potentially be incorporated into the curriculum. Since virtues cannot be taught through theoretical instruction, the acquisition of good habits constitutes the necessary foundation for the establishment of good moral character. Some methods that have been suggested for laying the foundation for virtue are the use of stories, role play, as well as the inclusion of physical and outdoor activities, etc. Furthermore, habituation constitutes the basis for the acquisition of good habits, and as such it requires the application of rewards and punishment by a caring tutor, who at the same time can serve as a role model for virtuous behavior. Finally, I extrapolate if and how character education can be employed to make people more environmentally conscious citizens. I conclude that environmental virtue or character education is the most effective method of environmental education, since it affects how an individual understands, views, and subsequently interacts with the natural environment.

Reasons fundamentalists assert that normative reality is constituted by exemplifications of the normative reasons relation: an irreducible, sui generis relation that strongly supervenes on non-normative reality. In this dissertation, I argue that reasons fundamentalists cannot explain why exemplifications of the normative reasons relation strongly supervene on non-normative reality. Irreduciblists about normativity can avoid this problem by asserting, contra the reasons fundamentalist, that normative reality is constituted by exemplifications of thick properties, which provide material for a conceptual analysis of normative reasons. The theory that results analyzes normative reasons for action as answers to questions why an action promotes a thick property. Nearly every normative theorist affirms what I call Additive Normative Supervenience (ANS): Normatively discernible worlds must be non-normatively discernible. ANS asserts that, if Edward Snowden is morally good, then Snowden's counterparts in worlds that are indiscernible in all non-normative respects must be good. Reasons fundamentalists struggle to explain why ANS is true. I consider and reject potential explanations of ANS that appeal to conceptual entailment and a posteriori necessity. Rosen has recently offered an argument against ANS. Rejecting ANS, however, problematizes irreduciblist accounts of normative explanation and normative epistemology. Irreduciblists can avoid this dilemma by arguing that ANS is either incoherent or false and adopting an alternative formulation of normative supervenience. Bilgrami's arguments against the intelligibility of normative supervenience doctrines purport to show that ANS is in fact unintelligible, and Merricks' arguments against the supervenience of consciousness on microphysical properties can be extended to show that ANS is false. Neither argument, however, establishes the falsity or unintelligibility of a modified formulation of normative supervenience, Transformative Normative Supervenience (TNS): Normatively discernible worlds must be descriptively discernible, where descriptive discernibility is just discernibility with respect to non-normative properties or thick normative properties. Irreduciblists can explain the truth of TNS by adopting non-centralism about normative reasons--that is to say, by maintaining, contra the reasons fundamentalist, that normative reality is constituted most fundamentally by exemplifications of thick properties. This allows the irreduciblist to provide an account of normative explanation and normative epistemology, analyze normative reasons in terms of thick properties, and preserve buck-passing accounts of thin normative properties. Scanlon has argued that the reasons relation is a four-place relation, relating the facts that are reasons for an agent to perform an action in a given circumstance. I argue that facts are also reasons for an action with respect to a thick property that that action will promote, in contrast to sets of distinct actions that the agent could perform instead. The resulting six-place relation turns out to be an instance of the relation that holds between why-questions and answers. What it is to be a normative reason for an agent to do something is to be a correct answer to a question why that agent's doing that action will promote a thick property. Decades ago, Anscombe had also suggested that reasons were answers to why-questions of a certain kind. The attractiveness of this position has been relatively underappreciated in the philosophy of normative reasons, in part because Anscombe had offered the reasons- as-answers thesis as a thesis about motivating reasons rather than normative reasons. The reasons-as-answers thesis also provides resources for those irreduciblists about reasons who reject my non-centralist conclusions to avoid the wrong kind of reason problem for buck- passing accounts of normativity: they can distinguish between right and wrong kinds of reasons by distinguishing between answers to distinct kinds of why-questions.

Unethical behavior is prominent in the business world and typically leads to negative consequences for people and the environment. Business ethics education acknowledges that ethics teaching has a positive effect on business decisions; however, the problem was the lack of information that is specific to the factors and strategies required to best educate students in business ethics. This lack of information is demonstrated by continued ethical lapses. The purpose of this phenomenological study was to research what is known and unknown on the subject of teaching business ethics through a design intended to understand the lived experiences of ethics instructors. The ethical framework for this study was based on the virtue and justice approaches as a technique for analyzing ethical aspects of a decision, with the goal of improving ethical outcomes. Data collection was completed via interview questions regarding a successful strategy of teaching business ethics. To accomplish this goal, 15 business ethics instructors were interviewed individually to record their lived experiences relating to teaching ethics. Information relating to ethics course design, along with missing components, was the topic of questions. Data analysis using open and axial coding generated 7 major theme clusters that include highlighting character and virtue ethics, increasing concern for stakeholders, and employing the teachings of Socrates and other classic scholars as a basis. The implications for positive social change point to an opportunity for business schools to produce socially conscious leaders who engage in ethical conduct.

No description available.

Thesis (M.A.)--Southern California College, 1987. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 156-167).

<p>Respect for autonomy is the foundation of modern bioethics, even (or especially) where bioethics is attentive to the problem of suffering caused by the practice of medicine itself. It provides guidance in the midst of therapeutic and moral uncertainty, justification for morally problematic enterprises, and the promise of protection against self-serving or predatory medical personnel. Yet bioethical arguments that appeal to the injustice or the horror of suffering depend on an instinctual and uncomplicated association of suffering, especially imposed suffering, with evil. This uncomplicated association, this flattening of the complexities of the moral landscape, must lead to a diminished capacity to navigate the very difficulties that define the field of bioethics. This dissertation explores the relationship, particularly, of autonomy, suffering, and happiness in modern bioethics, as represented by three key theorists (James Childress, Tom Beauchamp, and H. Tristram Engelhardt). It then contrasts these findings with resources from the Christian tradition: Luke-Acts, the letters of Paul, and the theologians Thomas Aquinas, Catherine of Genoa, and Margaret Ebner. Their accounts of the meaning and experience of suffering within well-lived lives makes for a more robust account of the moral life, one in which suffering plays a formative part.</p> / Dissertation

This paper explores the nonidentity problem, an influential puzzle in modern ethics which addresses the nature of our moral responsibilities towards future generations. I begin by laying out the two conflicting intuitions comprising the problem and providing several examples to illustrate how we conceive of the moral status of future people. I then examine two versions of consequentialism, averagism and totalism, which circumvent the nonidentity problem. However, these two solutions each pose their own respective problems; thus, I argue that a modification of totalism – the critical level view – is the most viable consequentialist answer to the nonidentity problem.