As a result of the Supreme Court’s broad definition for ‘best interests of the corporation’ in recent decisions, the author examines to whom managers ought to owe their fiduciary duties normatively and what role managerial discretion has in this debate. The author argues that the lack of clarity offered by the judiciary, in this area of corporate law, has led to the adoption of a wide discretion being afforded to managers. An examination of several rationales fails to justify this continued adoption of a broad discretion. The author argues that granting managers with wide discretionary powers is problematic because the interests of constituencies will not be adequately protected. At the very least, statutory reform is necessary to protect the most vulnerable stakeholders. The author recommends that the law be amended to require that managers, in performing their fiduciary duties, regard the interests of employees and shareholders.

As a result of the Supreme Court’s broad definition for ‘best interests of the corporation’ in recent decisions, the author examines to whom managers ought to owe their fiduciary duties normatively and what role managerial discretion has in this debate. The author argues that the lack of clarity offered by the judiciary, in this area of corporate law, has led to the adoption of a wide discretion being afforded to managers. An examination of several rationales fails to justify this continued adoption of a broad discretion. The author argues that granting managers with wide discretionary powers is problematic because the interests of constituencies will not be adequately protected. At the very least, statutory reform is necessary to protect the most vulnerable stakeholders. The author recommends that the law be amended to require that managers, in performing their fiduciary duties, regard the interests of employees and shareholders.

This paper argues that “enlightened shareholder value” (“ESV”) offers a “third way” between the shareholder primacy and stakeholder theories of the corporation; one that maintains the creation of shareholder value as the corporation’s primary function, but requires directors to take into account the environmental impact of the corporations’ operations. ESV requires directors to “have regard to”, among other things, “the impact of the company’s operations on…the environment.” The obligation to “have regard to” should be interpreted as a procedural duty requiring directors to inform themselves as to the environmental impact of the corporation’s operations, which may in itself cause directors to reallocate corporate resources to environmental protection. ESV may also improve corporations’ environmental disclosure and impact social norms of corporate behaviour with respect to the environment. Any negative impact of ESV on present shareholder returns is justified by the obligation to avoid imposing foreseeable severe or irreparable environmental harm on future generations.

This paper argues that “enlightened shareholder value” (“ESV”) offers a “third way” between the shareholder primacy and stakeholder theories of the corporation; one that maintains the creation of shareholder value as the corporation’s primary function, but requires directors to take into account the environmental impact of the corporations’ operations. ESV requires directors to “have regard to”, among other things, “the impact of the company’s operations on…the environment.” The obligation to “have regard to” should be interpreted as a procedural duty requiring directors to inform themselves as to the environmental impact of the corporation’s operations, which may in itself cause directors to reallocate corporate resources to environmental protection. ESV may also improve corporations’ environmental disclosure and impact social norms of corporate behaviour with respect to the environment. Any negative impact of ESV on present shareholder returns is justified by the obligation to avoid imposing foreseeable severe or irreparable environmental harm on future generations.

The traditional approach to corporate governance in Canada has centered on shareholders. This model of governance is commonly referred to as shareholder primacy. The shareholder primacy model has recently been rejected by the Supreme Court of Canada in Peoples v. Wise and BCE v. 1976 Debentureholders. This paper will be argued that directors should be required to focus exclusively on increasing shareholder value in the change of control context. It is within the change of control context that shareholders most require fiduciary protection. In addition, the shareholder primacy rule provides an enforceable standard for evaluating the actions of directors. As stakeholders have a variety of mechanisms to ensure that their interests are not disregarded, they are not in need of fiduciary protection. In contrast, shareholders face greater risks, which validate a need to be protected by an exclusive fiduciary duty in the change of control context.

The traditional approach to corporate governance in Canada has centered on shareholders. This model of governance is commonly referred to as shareholder primacy. The shareholder primacy model has recently been rejected by the Supreme Court of Canada in Peoples v. Wise and BCE v. 1976 Debentureholders. This paper will be argued that directors should be required to focus exclusively on increasing shareholder value in the change of control context. It is within the change of control context that shareholders most require fiduciary protection. In addition, the shareholder primacy rule provides an enforceable standard for evaluating the actions of directors. As stakeholders have a variety of mechanisms to ensure that their interests are not disregarded, they are not in need of fiduciary protection. In contrast, shareholders face greater risks, which validate a need to be protected by an exclusive fiduciary duty in the change of control context.

Since their creation in Europe in the seventeenth century, pension funds have grown to become one of the main sources of capital in the world. A number of role players ultimately manage the pension money of members on their behalf. Accordingly, the focus of this study is on the role players involved in the actual investment of pension fund money. For the purposes of the study, the key role players in the pension fund investment chain are identified as pension fund trustees, asset managers and asset consultants. These role players have a specific responsibility in terms of the service that they ought to provide. One of the key aspects of this dissertation is therefore determining whether their responsibility is a fiduciary responsibility. The main purpose of the study is, however, to answer one overarching research question: Does fiduciary responsibility create barriers to the implementation of responsible investment in the South African pension fund investment chain? Clearly, there are two key terms in this research question, fiduciary responsibility and responsible investment. It is suggested that responsible investment takes at least two forms: a “business case” form1 in which environmental, social and governance (ESG) issues are considered only in so far as they are financially material; and a social form in which ESG issues are considered over maximising risk adjusted financial returns. Three key questions were asked in order to find qualitative descriptions and interpretations of fiduciary responsibility: Question 1: Are the key role players in the pension fund investment chain fiduciaries? Question 2: If so, to whom do the key role players owe their fiduciary duty? Question 3: What are the fiduciary duties of the key role players in the pension fund investment chain? It is also suggested that the duty to act in the best interests of beneficiaries could be described as the all-encompassing fiduciary duty. Two main interpretations of the / Private Law / (LL.M.(Private Law))

Disqualification of a governing body member and other persons from their positions in a business corporation Abstract The master thesis analyses the regulation of disqualification of directors and other persons from the management of a business corporation. The purpose of this study is to introduce in detail the grounds for disqualification and to define persons who might be disqualified based on each particular ground, moreover, to describe a scale of effects of a disqualification order and to deal with the consequences of acting while being disqualified. The attention is also drawn to several interpretative problems, which are construed. Additionally, the thesis reflects the regulation of the English Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 and the relevant English case-law. Except for the introductory part and the conclusion, the thesis is divided into six chapters. The first chapter looks briefly at the disqualification as such and its purpose. Additionally, it is generally described, who might be disqualified. Special attention is paid to the person that is in a similar position as a director and to the influential and controlling persons. The second and the third chapters deal with particular grounds for disqualification. Firstly, it is focused on the disqualification which is pre-conditioned by...

Every corporate director is under the obligation to perform his duties with reasonable care and loyalty. In connection with re-codification of the Czech private law, the Business Corporations Act brought a new institute to the Czech legal system - the business judgment rule. This rule provides corporate directors with a special protection against the liability for the breach of their duties. The aim of this thesis is to focus on this institute, to analyse the Czech version of business judgment rule, to compare it with its foreign models and provide the most likely judicial interpretation of it. The thesis consists of three main chapters. Chapter One deals with the issue of directors duties of care and loyalty and describes the grounds for existence of business judgment rule with a broaded context of law and economics knowledge. It explains the role of capital companies in business in order to define leading requirements for company regulation. Author focuses on the necessity of taking a risk in process of making entrepreneurial decisions. Chapter Two provides a description of two foreign models of business judgment rule. First, it deals with the business judgment rule originated from the practise of the courts in USA and two possible interpretations given by them - a standard of review and an...

Šiuolaikinėse teisinėse sistemose įtvirtintų įmonės vadovo fiduciarinių pareigų instituto tikslas - apsaugoti įmonės (akcininkų) interesus nuo įmonės vadovo veiksmų. Vadovaudamasis fiduciarinėmis pareigomis, įmonės vadovas privalo veikti išimtinai įmonės interesams. Šio darbo problema yra ta, kad įmonės vadovas veikdamas išimtinai įmonės (akcininkų) interesams įmonės nemokumo laikotarpiu, pažeistų įmonės kreditorių teises bei interesus. Šiam darbui keliami šie uždaviniai : (1) išsiaiškinti privataus juridinio asmens vaidmenį teisinėje sistemoje; (2) pateikti įmonės vadovo fiduciarinių pareigų sampratą ir reglamentavimą tarptautiniame kontekste; (3) atskleisti įmonės nemokumo atsiradimo momentą bei teisines pasekmes; (4) išsiaiškinti, kokį poveikį daro įmonės nemokumas privataus juridinio asmens vadovo fiduciarinėms pareigoms. Šio darbo tikslas – išsiaiškinti įmonės vadovo fiduciarines pareigas bei atsakyti į klausimą, ar keičiasi įmonės vadovo fiduciarinės pareigos įmonei esant nemokiai. Šio darbo objektas – privataus juridinio asmens fiduciarinės pareigos. Įgyvendinant darbo tikslą, daugiausia dėmesio buvo skiriama įmonės vadovo fiduciarinių pareigų ir įmonės nemokumo sąvokų sampratoms bei įmonės vadovo fiduciarinių pareigų pasikeitimo nustatymui ryšium su įmonės nemokumu. Šis iškeltas tikslas darbe sėkmingai įgyvendintas – vadovaujantis Lietuvos bei tarptautine teismų praktika, įstatymais bei moksline literatūra. Vadovaujantis JAV (išskyrus Šiaurės Karolinos valstiją) ir... [toliau žr. visą tekstą] / The title of this work is: do the fiduciary duties of director of the company change during the period of insolvency? The problem of this work is that lots of directors of companies uses creditors funds and deepens the company insolvency. It’s because they have a fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of their company, so they are trying to get back their company to solvency. The actuality. The main purpose of every company is to get the bigger profit in what their work. Often, profit enforces the director of the company to take untenable, risky business decisions independently of other subjects’ interests. In modern law countries, the fiduciary duties of director of the company are the main protector for other subjects (most often shareholders) from useless, conflicting business decisions. According to the statistics department of Lithuania and data of Lithuanian courts, there were 957 company bankruptcy cases in 2008 and 1409 company bankruptcy case in 2009. Constantly rising numbers of bankruptcy procedures in Lithuania show that more and more companies faces the insolvency financial stage during the economical crisis in the world, so proper regulation of directors fiduciary duties become more and more important question in every countries legal system. Insolvency of the company establishes specific relationships between company and the creditors of the company. In the financial period of insolvency, company starts to use creditors’ resources, to get back to the... [to full text]