Thesis (Ph. D.)--Auburn University. / Abstract. Vita. Includes bibliographical references (p. 178-202).

Background: Businesses today are transforming its financial and operative processes in order to survive on the market. The human interaction of the standardised work tasks is being replaced by Robotics Process Automation (RPA) in order to make the finance processes less costly and more time efficient. Thus, human employees are delegated more qualitative work tasks and their behaviour as well as knowledge are in need to be changed. In this process, barriers may occur, and managers need to make their employees adapt in a comprehensive way to overcome these.  Purpose: The purpose of this thesis is to find adaptation barriers that occur when the finance professionals are adapting to more qualitative work tasks, and how the managers will make their employees do so in a comprehensive way.  Method: In order to carry out relevant information for this thesis, an abductive single case study was used. The qualitative data was conducted through semi-structured interviews with finance professionals at Volvo Group to retrieve appropriate data and valid information.  Findings: What was found from this research is a lack of the helicopter view among finance professionals today, which becomes the main barrier when they adapt to more qualitative work tasks. There are several steps which can be acknowledged from the two models McKinsey 7S and ADKAR in order to make the employees attain the helicopter view. Summarising these steps, it is clear that the main purpose for a successful adaptation process is to keep the employees involved and updated.

A sociological approach is used to analyze incidences of extreme opportunism in financial markets. Through an analysis of arguably the most widely publicized "rogue" trader events in recent history, a determination is made of the validity of explaining these events as aberrations, attributable to the actions of "rogues". The primary focus is the role of structural factors underlying these incidences of extreme opportunism in financial markets. A diverse range of documentary and other sources is used to avoid any form of bias as far as possible. It was found that structural factors act as countervailing forces to inhibit such behavior or as motivators and facilitators acting as catalysts for extreme opportunism. The balance between these factors largely determines the level of opportunistic behavior in a particular environment. Extreme opportunism is therefore not an aberration or "rogue" occurrence but a manageable phenomenon intrinsic to the social structural context within which it occurs. By conceptualizing these factors as countervailing forces one is forced to view structural factors, like compensation structures and formal and informal restraints, relative to one another and no longer in isolation. This realization translates into the conclusion that restraints and oversight systems for example, should be designed relative to the relevant motivators and facilitators in its area of application. In an environment where traders of highly geared financial products are motivated with multimillion USD incentive packages, a low budget oversight system and inexperienced regulatory staff, is clearly not the appropriate tools to control and manage extreme opportunism. / Criminology / D.Phil. (Sociology)

A sociological approach is used to analyze incidences of extreme opportunism in financial markets. Through an analysis of arguably the most widely publicized "rogue" trader events in recent history, a determination is made of the validity of explaining these events as aberrations, attributable to the actions of "rogues". The primary focus is the role of structural factors underlying these incidences of extreme opportunism in financial markets. A diverse range of documentary and other sources is used to avoid any form of bias as far as possible. It was found that structural factors act as countervailing forces to inhibit such behavior or as motivators and facilitators acting as catalysts for extreme opportunism. The balance between these factors largely determines the level of opportunistic behavior in a particular environment. Extreme opportunism is therefore not an aberration or "rogue" occurrence but a manageable phenomenon intrinsic to the social structural context within which it occurs. By conceptualizing these factors as countervailing forces one is forced to view structural factors, like compensation structures and formal and informal restraints, relative to one another and no longer in isolation. This realization translates into the conclusion that restraints and oversight systems for example, should be designed relative to the relevant motivators and facilitators in its area of application. In an environment where traders of highly geared financial products are motivated with multimillion USD incentive packages, a low budget oversight system and inexperienced regulatory staff, is clearly not the appropriate tools to control and manage extreme opportunism. / Criminology and Security Science / D.Phil. (Sociology)