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Intermediation costs and scale economies of banking under financial regulations in Honduras /Cuevas, Carlos E. January 1900 (has links)
Thesis (Ph. D.)--Ohio State University, 1984. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 229-237). Available online via OhioLINK's ETD Center.
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International financial centers under different political systems a study of financial center development in China /Cheung, Lo, January 2006 (has links)
Thesis (M. A.)--University of Hong Kong, 2006. / Title proper from title frame. Also available in printed format.
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Four essays on financial intermediationWilliamson, Stephen D. January 1984 (has links)
Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1984. / Typescript. Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 155-159).
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Financial intermediation and financial integration in developing nations the case of Mexico /Ortiz, Edgar. January 1900 (has links)
Thesis--Wisconsin. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 369-385).
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Essays on Financial Institutions:Zhao, Shiyu January 2022 (has links)
Thesis advisor: Rui Albuquerque / Thesis advisor: Philip Strahan / My dissertation aims to understand the economic determinants of the forbearance behavior of financial institutions and their cross section of equity returns. It contains three chapters. Chapter One shows that higher capital requirements create a regulatory arbitrage incentive for banks to forbear on loans suboptimally. I develop a dynamic bank model with a capital requirement, where a bank can roll over bad loans without reducing their face value. When the capital constraint binds, banks hold excess non-performing loans (NPLs) and reduce the credit supply. I solve the model globally with occasionally binding capital constraints and calibrate the model to the pre-crisis banking sector in both the US and Italy. The model quantitatively explains about two-thirds of the difference in NPL ratios in the two countries following a simulated recession. I provide direct causal evidence of the effects of the capital constraint channel on banks’ NPL holdings using the Euro Area crises, supporting the predictions the model generates. Chapter Two studies the information externality of banks’ forbearance behavior in a sequential game with incomplete information. Follower banks observe less liquidation in the market due to leader’s forbearance and take it as a false positive signal of the aggregate state, leading to more forbearance and zombie firms. This chapter shows that the size of the externality decreases with the prior belief of the aggregate state of the economy being good. In other words, my model predicts a higher probability of bank herding in suboptimal forbearance during bad times. Chapter Three constructs a dynamic disaster model with implicit government guarantee to explain the hump shape relation between bank size and stock returns. The model shows two opposing effects on the bank expected returns. Lower cost of debt induces more risk shifting behavior of larger banks while the safety net effect provides insurance to equity investors during market downturns. A size threshold increasing with disaster probability determines which effect dominates, thus contributing to the hump shape relation. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2022. / Submitted to: Boston College. Carroll School of Management. / Discipline: Finance.
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Intermediation costs and scale economies of banking under financial regulations in Honduras /Cuevas, Carlos E. January 1984 (has links)
No description available.
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An accounting study of performance and risk for financial firms during the credit crisisWebinger, Mariah. January 2009 (has links)
Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Nebraska-Lincoln, 2009. / Title from title screen (site viewed October 15, 2009). PDF text: ix, 71 p. : ill. (some col.) ; 2 Mb. UMI publication number: AAT 3358963. Includes bibliographical references.
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Operational risk management in financial institutionsSchönfeldt, Nicolette 04 June 2014 (has links)
M.Com. (Business Management) / Financial institutions and regulatory bodies of the financial services industry have, in the last decade of the 20th century, woken up to the realisation that the risk management procedures adopted and promoted by them did not take into account all the risks to which financial institutions were exposed. The one risk category, made up by an array of risks, that has been acknowledged by financial institutions and regulatory bodies for some time, but that has not received much recognition in the risk management procedures is operational risk. This is quite ironic, as operational risk is the only 'pure" risk, i.e. the only risk with only a downside potential. Credit, market and underwriting risk, on the other hand, could result in profits if managed properly. But the losses to which operational risk exposes a financial institution can be minimised through effective risk management. Purpose The greatest obstacle in the process of operational risk management is the fact that there is no universally accepted definition of operational risk. The main purpose of this study is to perform an empirical study of the discipline of operational risk management. This includes research on the subject of operational risk management, assessing the problems experienced in the operational risk management field, considering the different operational risk strategies that exist and evaluating qualitative operational risk methodologies as well as the problems experienced in quantifying operational risk. In conclusion, a definition for operational risk is suggested, based on the research conducted.
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Aktiwiteitsgebaseerde koste en -bestuur benadering in finansiële instellings01 September 2015 (has links)
M.Econ. / Please refer to full text to view abstract
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Joint liability and the structure of financial intermediaries /Bond, Phillip January 1999 (has links)
Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Chicago, Dept. of Economics, June 1999. / Includes bibliographical references. Also available on the Internet.
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