No description available.

What explains the creation and strengthening of international securities market standards through the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO)? This thesis addresses this question by analyzing the creation and strengthening of four of IOSCO’s international securities market standards between 1991 and 2010 relating to the following issues: the governance of cross-border financial crime, the objectives and principles of domestic securities market regulation, the regulation of credit rating agencies, and the regulation of hedge funds. This thesis argues that the creation and strengthening of these standards is derived from the role and influence of three different political actors: the transgovernmental network of securities market regulators, domestic legislatures, and states. The role and influence of these different political actors differs across issue areas and across time. To account for the differentiated sources of international securities market standards, this thesis proposes a Principal-Agent (PA) analytical framework. Domestic legislatures (the principal) delegate to securities regulators (the agent) the authority to oversee and regulate domestic securities markets by granting regulators specific forms of statutory authority. Exercising discretion within this act of delegation, domestic securities regulators act together in a transgovernmental network to create and strengthen international securities market standards. They are prompted to act by threats to the integrity and stability of developed financial centers from under-regulated or ineffectively regulated foreign financial centers, as well as by new policy preferences of domestic legislatures seeking to regulate previously unregulated financial market actors. Domestic legislatures also use multiple agents to ensure that agents act consistent with their policy preferences: their concerns about the costs of under-regulated foreign jurisdictions can generate direct pressure from states on international financial regulatory institutions to strengthen the implementation of international financial standards. This thesis makes an empirical contribution to existing literature by analyzing previously understudied international securities market standards. This thesis also makes a theoretical contribution to both IPE literature and PA theory within International Organization (IO) literature. For IPE literature, this thesis establishes a theoretical framework that accounts for the differentiated role and influence of the transgovernmental network of securities market regulators, domestic legislatures, and states in the creation and strengthening of international securities market standards. For PA theory within IO literature, this thesis highlights the role of the principled professional interests of the transgovernmental network of securities market regulators in creating and strengthening international securities market standards.

What explains the creation and strengthening of international securities market standards through the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO)? This thesis addresses this question by analyzing the creation and strengthening of four of IOSCO’s international securities market standards between 1991 and 2010 relating to the following issues: the governance of cross-border financial crime, the objectives and principles of domestic securities market regulation, the regulation of credit rating agencies, and the regulation of hedge funds. This thesis argues that the creation and strengthening of these standards is derived from the role and influence of three different political actors: the transgovernmental network of securities market regulators, domestic legislatures, and states. The role and influence of these different political actors differs across issue areas and across time. To account for the differentiated sources of international securities market standards, this thesis proposes a Principal-Agent (PA) analytical framework. Domestic legislatures (the principal) delegate to securities regulators (the agent) the authority to oversee and regulate domestic securities markets by granting regulators specific forms of statutory authority. Exercising discretion within this act of delegation, domestic securities regulators act together in a transgovernmental network to create and strengthen international securities market standards. They are prompted to act by threats to the integrity and stability of developed financial centers from under-regulated or ineffectively regulated foreign financial centers, as well as by new policy preferences of domestic legislatures seeking to regulate previously unregulated financial market actors. Domestic legislatures also use multiple agents to ensure that agents act consistent with their policy preferences: their concerns about the costs of under-regulated foreign jurisdictions can generate direct pressure from states on international financial regulatory institutions to strengthen the implementation of international financial standards. This thesis makes an empirical contribution to existing literature by analyzing previously understudied international securities market standards. This thesis also makes a theoretical contribution to both IPE literature and PA theory within International Organization (IO) literature. For IPE literature, this thesis establishes a theoretical framework that accounts for the differentiated role and influence of the transgovernmental network of securities market regulators, domestic legislatures, and states in the creation and strengthening of international securities market standards. For PA theory within IO literature, this thesis highlights the role of the principled professional interests of the transgovernmental network of securities market regulators in creating and strengthening international securities market standards.

This is a normative research on how best to structure financial regulatory agencies and principles consistently with the core objectives of financial regulation in such a manner that can yield an effective regulatory framework for Nigeria. It moves forward the debate on what an effective financial regulatory ought to be relative to a country's national context, its developmental stage and how international financial regulatory best practice principles can be 'woven' into the design of an enduring regulatory architecture in a developing economy such as Nigeria. The thesis contributes to three areas namely: the literature on comparative financial regulation, financial legal transplantation, and financial regulatory reform. On comparative financial regulation, it contributes a developing world perspective on the legal and institutional challenges of financial regulation and how to deal with these challenges. On financial regulatory transplantation, it contributes to the debate on how best to conceptualise a financial regulatory architecture that mirror contemporary international best practices and that fits into the Nigerian context. In relation to financial regulatory reform, the thesis makes two major sub-contributions. First, it links financial regulation in Nigeria with robust and multi-layered regulatory accountability mechanisms including judicial and democratic accountability. Second, it generates principles that can be transformed into laws and policies to achieve the following: (a) the imposition of mandatory inter-agency co-ordination among financial regulators; (b) imposition of a statutory duty on financial regulators to prevent regulatory failure; (c) the imposition of liability for a supervisory failure induced collapse of a financial institution and (or) a financial crisis; (d) the use of irreversible convertible debentures as a corporate governance disciplinary mechanism to deter imprudent business model and to serve as a forward looking strategy to address the 'historical inevitability of financial crises' in the unlikely event that the financial regulatory system fails.

Conventional financial theory has played an important – and yet largely unexamined – role in shaping how we regulate modern financial markets. This thesis explores the influence of conventional financial theory on the regulation of over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives markets in the U.S. and U.K. prior to the global financial crisis. More specifically, it explores how conventional financial theory failed to adequately account for both the complexity of OTC derivatives markets and the nature and pace of financial innovation and, ultimately, how these blind spots became reflected in a ‘non-interventionist’ approach toward their regulation now widely viewed as suboptimal. This thesis yields three important contributions to the scholarly and public policy debates surrounding the regulation of modern financial markets. First, it articulates a more robust theoretical framework for understanding complexity, financial innovation, and the relationship between these powerful market dynamics. This, in turn, facilitates an examination of the implications of complexity and financial innovation in terms of the ongoing debates respecting the optimal source, form and scope of financial regulation. It also facilitates an examination of both the shortcomings of the pre-crisis regulatory regimes governing OTC derivatives markets and, looking forward, the prospective strengths and weaknesses of embryonic post-crisis reforms. Finally, and more broadly, this thesis enhances our understanding of the relationship between the important insights of financial theory and how we conceptualize and pursue the objectives of financial regulation.

La concurrence des normativités :le cas des régulations bancaires La crise financière mondiale de 2007 a conduit à un regain d’intérêt pour la question de la régulation mondiale de la finance et des banques. Cette crise a, en effet, mis en lumière les interdépendances d’un système devenu mondial au vu, d’une part, de l’internationalisation des établissements financiers (ouverture de filiales, branches à l’étranger ou joint-venture avec un établissement étranger), et d’autre part, du flux important de transactions transfrontalières. Par ces interdépendances, des prêts consentis à des personnes peu solvables aux Etats-Unis ont été à la source d’une crise mondiale. Ces interdépendances et les risques « mondiaux » qu’elles suscitent pose le problème de la régulation globale des banques et de la finance en l’absence d’un gouvernement mondial et d’un régulateur mondial. L’intuition du juriste serait sans doute de penser que cette question fut résolue par le biais de solutions de droit international public. Cependant, notre thèse démontrera que ce problème d’échelle fut dépassé au moyen d’une extension du domaine d’action des autorités de surveillance à travers laquelle celles-ci ont peu à peu investi le champ de la création, de la mise en œuvre et du respect des normes utilisées à des fins de stabilité et ont progressivement interféré avec les systèmes juridiques qui leur étaient préexistants. En d’autres termes, la question de la mondialisation du secteur bancaire et de la stabilité de celui-ci ne pose pas au droit qu’une difficulté d’échelle mais est également de nature à transformer le droit en profondeur. / Doctorat en Sciences juridiques / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

Magister Legum - LLM / There is a lot of speculation regarding potential benefits that the adoption of cryptocurrency use and cryptocurrency intermediation may have for the African continent due to the macro-economic instability of African financial markets caused by hyperinflation; high rate of unbanked populations; and the need for an alternative currency to the weak; and sometimes unavailable and unreliable African fiat money. Preiss notes that the intangible nature of cryptocurrency means that governments have no access to such cryptocurrency and cannot physically remove wealth from the citizens. He further notes that cryptocurrency not only provides a solution to the unbanked but is also a method of allowing economically and politically subjugated populations to control their wealth. Cryptocurrency intermediation in the form of cryptocurrency remittance services have been established in Africa as an alternative to Western Union, MoneyGram and many others. Examples include cryptocurrency remittance and transfer services provided by cryptocurrency-based intermediaries, which are third parties facilitating cryptocurrency related transactions, and in some cases provide storage of cryptocurrency to their users. In Africa, examples of such cryptocurrency-based intermediaries include, such as BTCGhana; BitPesa and Belfrics.

The Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive ("AIFMD"), adopted by the European Union on 11 November 2010, has introduced a harmonized set of rules for alternative investment funds (“AIFs”) in Europe. This thesis discusses potential financial risks for the AIFs industry arising from the European regulatory reform, which started before the current financial crisis, and compares relevant European, Canadian and US rules governing AIFs. This comparative analysis is based on four main criteria: i) registration and authorization requirements, ii) general financial transparency requirements, iii) capital requirements, and iv) remuneration restrictions. The analysis of AIFs regulatory reform in Europe leads to three main conclusions. First, the AIFMD requirements are much stricter than analogue regimes in Canada and the United States. Second, as a consequence of this regulation, European AIFs may be in disadvantage. Third, the complexity of the present European institutional framework is not able to fully implement the European regulatory reform.

The Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive ("AIFMD"), adopted by the European Union on 11 November 2010, has introduced a harmonized set of rules for alternative investment funds (“AIFs”) in Europe. This thesis discusses potential financial risks for the AIFs industry arising from the European regulatory reform, which started before the current financial crisis, and compares relevant European, Canadian and US rules governing AIFs. This comparative analysis is based on four main criteria: i) registration and authorization requirements, ii) general financial transparency requirements, iii) capital requirements, and iv) remuneration restrictions. The analysis of AIFs regulatory reform in Europe leads to three main conclusions. First, the AIFMD requirements are much stricter than analogue regimes in Canada and the United States. Second, as a consequence of this regulation, European AIFs may be in disadvantage. Third, the complexity of the present European institutional framework is not able to fully implement the European regulatory reform.

This thesis examines the regulation of 'mobile money'. This is an electronic payment and storage service provided by phone companies ('mobile money firms' or 'MM firms'). The first mobile money service, M-Pesa, was launched in Kenya in 2007. Since then, mobile money has spread rapidly throughout the developing world, particularly across Africa. A novel feature of mobile money is its ability to serve large numbers of people who do not have bank accounts, commonly labelled 'the unbanked'. The thesis offers a framework, based on a functional approach, to analyse the key regulatory and policy issues that arise when customers’ funds are stored and transferred within mobile money platforms. The objectives of this framework are drawn from traditional financial regulation, such as financial stability and consumer protection, and 'financial inclusion', which involves connecting the unbanked to formal, electronic payment and storage functions. The thesis makes three main claims. First, mobile money operates as a shadow retail deposit system. Mobile money is 'shadow' because a customer contracts with a non-banking firm. It is 'retail' because the system meets the payment needs of individuals for ordinary transactions. And the service is a 'deposit' system because a mobile money account provides payment and storage functions which are functionally equivalent to a bank deposit. Second, mobile money provides these payment and storage functions, functionally equivalent to a bank deposit, through a different legal structure to that used by a bank to provide deposit account services. This structure, which is established through private ordering, comprises a set of mechanisms by which the MM firm (the 'agent' in the service) and its associates credibly commit to safeguard the funds of the mobile money customers (the 'principals') for the purposes of providing payment and storage functions. Collectively, these commitments require the MM firm to maintain a 1:1 relationship between cash received from customers, which is stored within the system as highly liquid assets, and 'e-money' which customers use in the mobile money service. As a result, mobile money customers face primarily operational risks, usually without the credit and liquidity risks associated with banking. Third, public ordering can increase the efficiency of MM firms' commitments in addressing risks in mobile money platforms through adopting an 'active' approach to regulation. In this approach, the policymaker monitors a greater range of risks and more closely than what might be expected in other comparable principal-agent relationships, such as retail investors and financial intermediaries, and depositors and banks. This approach is appropriate because unbanked customers are likely to face significant information asymmetries with MM firms and coordination problems amongst themselves. This means they are unlikely to effectively monitor a range of risks to the service caused by the MM firm and its associates.