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Some aspects of the politics of Australian federal fiscal relations, with special reference to South Australia 1959-1969 /Lundberg, David Bruce. January 1969 (has links) (PDF)
Thesis (B.A.(Hons.))--University of Adelaide, 1969. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 133-140).
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The politics of intergovernmental relations : the case of road funding /Radbone, Ian Geoffrey. January 1981 (has links) (PDF)
Thesis (M.A.) - Department of Politics, University of Adelaide, 1982. / Typescript (photocopy).
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Die Matrikularbeiträge nach Reichsrecht /Hahn, Carl. January 1914 (has links)
Thesis (doctoral)--Universität Greifswald.
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Three essays on policy function assignment in a federationDelage, Benoit 11 1900 (has links)
The first essay explores the nature of the equilibria obtained when state governments
conduct industrial policies to affect firms' location choices. The model differs from
existing ones by considering industrial policy targeted at small firms. In a simple two-region,
two-industry model with imperfection information, it is shown how regions
attempt to attract firms from the neighbouring one, either by making cash or in-kind
transfers. The model rationalizes the use of in-kind subsidies for incentive-compatibility
reasons, even though they are valued less by firms than what they cost
to provide. It allows to understand why regions with a smaller industrial base may
pursue a more aggressive industrial policy. The model sheds some light on which
industries are likely to be targeted by industrial policy, and how the means of income
transfers could be selected.
The objective of the second paper is to determine under which circumstances an
industrial policy that seeks to increase the number of new technologically-based firms
in the economy is best assigned to the central or regional governments in a federation.
Even though a decentralized industrial policy may be more flexible, it has the drawback
that regions compete against each other to acquire successful firms. Because this
margin is closed to a central government, it is likely to achieve a better outcome even
if operating under "uniformity" constraints. The public policy implication is that this
type of industrial policy should be transferred to the federal government.
The third essay presents a new rationale for intergovernmental grants in a federation that arises strictly from the income redistribution concerns of the federal government.
The central government seeks to redistribute income across agents, and behaves as
a Stackelberg leader with respect to regional governments. Intergovernmental grants
are needed to effect income redistribution while maintaining appropriate expenditure
levels. Differentiated grants allow in some circumstances to implement a "third-best"
solution when nominal prices differ across regions. They allow the federal government
to affect provincial tax rate and public good provision, thus complementing the income
redistribution done directly through the federal income tax system.
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Federal-Regional financial relationships in Nigeria.Schultz, Lancelot Francis. January 1970 (has links) (PDF)
Thesis (M.A.) -- University of Adelaide, Dept. of Politics, 1970.
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Interjurisdictional competition with an application to international equity markets /Sun, Jeanne-Mey. January 1999 (has links)
Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Chicago, Dept. of Economics, June 1999. / Includes bibliographical references. Also available on the Internet.
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Essays on Mexican fiscal federalism a positive analysis /Camacho Gutiérrez, Pablo, Stahl, Dale O. January 2005 (has links) (PDF)
Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Texas at Austin, 2005. / Supervisor: Dale O. Stahl. Vita. Includes bibliographical references.
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Three essays on policy function assignment in a federationDelage, Benoit 11 1900 (has links)
The first essay explores the nature of the equilibria obtained when state governments
conduct industrial policies to affect firms' location choices. The model differs from
existing ones by considering industrial policy targeted at small firms. In a simple two-region,
two-industry model with imperfection information, it is shown how regions
attempt to attract firms from the neighbouring one, either by making cash or in-kind
transfers. The model rationalizes the use of in-kind subsidies for incentive-compatibility
reasons, even though they are valued less by firms than what they cost
to provide. It allows to understand why regions with a smaller industrial base may
pursue a more aggressive industrial policy. The model sheds some light on which
industries are likely to be targeted by industrial policy, and how the means of income
transfers could be selected.
The objective of the second paper is to determine under which circumstances an
industrial policy that seeks to increase the number of new technologically-based firms
in the economy is best assigned to the central or regional governments in a federation.
Even though a decentralized industrial policy may be more flexible, it has the drawback
that regions compete against each other to acquire successful firms. Because this
margin is closed to a central government, it is likely to achieve a better outcome even
if operating under "uniformity" constraints. The public policy implication is that this
type of industrial policy should be transferred to the federal government.
The third essay presents a new rationale for intergovernmental grants in a federation that arises strictly from the income redistribution concerns of the federal government.
The central government seeks to redistribute income across agents, and behaves as
a Stackelberg leader with respect to regional governments. Intergovernmental grants
are needed to effect income redistribution while maintaining appropriate expenditure
levels. Differentiated grants allow in some circumstances to implement a "third-best"
solution when nominal prices differ across regions. They allow the federal government
to affect provincial tax rate and public good provision, thus complementing the income
redistribution done directly through the federal income tax system. / Arts, Faculty of / Vancouver School of Economics / Graduate
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A critical evaluation of the South African intergovernmental grant systemMathane, Tlou Phillemon 16 August 2012 (has links)
M.Comm. / That there has been a revolution in intergovernmental fiscal relations system is undeniable. The political and constitutional transformation that took place in South Africa has not gone unnoticed in the civil society, and certainly not in the international world affairs. After a period close to a decade of democratic system of governance in South Africa, the time is more than ripe to do a comprehensive review of intergovernmental fiscal relations. Given the variety of demands and pressures on the system, both from policy and from a constitutional point of view, it is important to reflect on the performance of the system in a manner that prepares it for future challenges. Provinces are no longer merely spending agencies for central government. Instead, they have been empowered by the Constitution to fashion their own policy priorities in certain areas and to translate these into resource allocations that will support these policy objectives. The focus of this study is to critically evaluate the South African intergovernmental grant system since 1994, noting the changes, successes and challenges that constitute future areas of improvement. The results can be used by other policy analysts, managers and can also constitute the basis for future research.
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Protecting economic reform by seeking membership in liberal international organizationsSteen-Sprang, Louise Marie, January 2003 (has links)
Thesis (Ph. D.)--Ohio State University, 2003. / Title from first page of PDF file. Document formatted into pages; contains ix, 315 p.; also includes graphics. Includes abstract and vita. Advisor: Brian M. Pollins, Dept. of Political Science. Includes bibliographical references (p. 342-381).
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