Britain's foreign relations formed a crucial component of the political nation during the eighteenth century. Foreign affairs were a key issue of state, and perceived failure within European power politics could cause the fall of government ministries. Britain's foreign relations with the main European powers, and especially France and Spain, have been extensively recorded. Britain's unique relationship with Corsica has been neglected. Corsica can appear to be insignificant compared to other European states. Many British writers, however, government officials, naval and military officers, considered Corsica to be of the highest importance within eighteenth-century foreign affairs. Corsica was especially important within the larger sphere of Anglo-French rivalry. Corsica was one of the few territories that was ruled by both nations during the eighteenth century. This thesis reveals that Britain's relations with Corsica were far more significant than has been previously realised. Britain's relations and interactions with Corsica remained relatively consistent throughout the period from 1728 up until 1796. The two main developments to occur between Britain and Corsica during the eighteenth century were, firstly, the ‘Corsican crisis' (1768-1769) and, secondly, the establishment of an Anglo-Corsican Kingdom (1794-1796). These are discussed in chapter 2 and chapter 4 of the thesis respectively. Both of these ‘events' have been studied as being separate from each other and as confined to their respective periods of time. This thesis aims to link and to compare these two key developments for the first time, and to show that the Corsican crisis directly influenced the Anglo-Corsican constitution in 1794.Corsica was the largest European territory to be ruled by Britain during the eighteenth century. The Anglo-Corsican Kingdom provides a unique insight into how Britain might rule conquered territories in Europe. The thesis charts and explains Britain's relations with Corsica against the background of the second hundred years war against France.

Given the potential political, economic and reputational costs for violating international norms of sovereignty, we should expect to only rarely observe the adoption by states of risky foreign policies like destabilization (which is defined as the policy of changing the balance of power between a target government and its domestic opposition, with the aim of effecting the downfall of that target government.) Yet, history demonstrates that states regularly adopt destabilization as a foreign policy. My research addresses this puzzle: Why, given the high potential costs of violation of international norms, do policymakers opt to do so anyway? I argue that the answer lies in the breadth and intensity of conflicts of interest between destabilizing states and their targets. To illustrate my theoretical argument, I hypothesize the following: When policy makers perceive a broad and intense conflict of security, economic and ideological interests, they will adopt destabilization as a policy. In this dissertation, I look at US relations with Latin American states during the Cold War. To demonstrate my hypothesis, I perform three comparative case studies. Each comparison examines two cases which are similar in most ways except, notably, the breadth of conflict of interest perceived by the US. In each negative case, I demonstrate that two, but not three types of conflicts were present and the US did not destabilize the target government, but instead chose different policy options. In the affirmative case, I demonstrate that all three types of conflicts were present, and the US destabilized the target government. I then briefly explore South African policy toward its neighbors, to illustrate that my theoretical explanation is plausible outside of the context of US-Latin American relations. I conclude with a brief discussion on extension of the theory and implications of this study for foreign policy analysis.

This dissertation is an examination of US-Guatemalan relations during the 1960's. At that time, the United States was promoting a major developmental program throughout Latin America: The Alliance for Progress. A "Marshall Plan for Latin America" the Alliance was meant to modernize the region by promoting democratic institutions, invigorating local economies, and expanding access to education and medical care. In Guatemala, however, anticommunist dogma prevailed over the lofty rhetoric of the Alliance for Progress. Instead of becoming the promised "showcase for democracy", Guatemala was transformed into a garrison-state engulfed in a long, violent civil war. This history will reconstruct these events and explain how even policies crafted with the best of intentions can end in tragedy.

Thesis (B.A.)--Boston University. University Professors Program Senior theses. / PLEASE NOTE: Boston University Libraries did not receive an Authorization To Manage form for this thesis. It is therefore not openly accessible, though it may be available by request. If you are the author or principal advisor of this work and would like to request open access for it, please contact us at open-help@bu.edu. Thank you. / 2031-01-02

In 1991, following its defeat in the Second Gulf War and as a response to the international humanitarian protectionist umbrella provided to the three Kurdish-population governorates in Northern Iraq, the Government of Iraq (GOI) under Saddam Hussein centrally seceded from the area. The vacuum that ensued was soon filled by the leadership of the Iraqi Kurdistan Front (KNA) and soon a de facto state resurrected from the ashes of destruction besieging Iraqi Kurdistan for many decades. Hence, the precarious existence of what came to be known as the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) in a highly challenging geopolitical environment and the strategic imperative of preserving the de facto independence of the entity forced the Kurdish leadership to give high priority to building foreign relations and pursuit of foreign policy. Foreign policy as a political activity is of paramount importance to all actors including sovereign states to preserve and promote their national interests. The practice of foreign policy, however, is particularly acute for de facto states. As internationally non-recognized entities, the international system of sovereign states is often skeptical if not hostile to engage in foreign relations with de facto states. Yet, projection of foreign policy and building foreign relations is extremely vital for the continued survival and consolidation of de facto states. By exploring the case of the KRI as a case of de facto statehood, this research argues that, mutatis mutandis, de facto states can pursue independent foreign policies. By identifying major transitions in the KRI, this thesis seeks to better explain foreign policy determinants, objectives and instruments of implementation of foreign policies of the KRI. In doing so, this thesis further seeks to contribute to the analysis of de facto statehood in general, and to contribute to the study of the KRI as the case of de facto statehood in the Middle East region.

Este trabalho busca analisar os diferentes enfoques da política externa da Nigéria, de sua independência, em 1960, até os dias atuais, na tentativa de avaliar mudanças e continuidades nas prioridades desta ao longo do período. Além disso, o trabalho busca, por meio de uma perspectiva histórico-descritiva, melhor compreender a posição ocupada pela Nigéria, um Estado semiperiférico (ou grande Estado periférico), no cenário internacional e também no continente africano. Para tanto, o trabalho divide-se em quatro capítulos, nos quais além de se fazer uma retomada histórica da evolução do sistema interafricano, são analisadas todas as décadas da política externa nigeriana. O que se percebe, através dessa análise, é que, ao longo da história nigeriana, o principal objetivo da política externa do país foi a sua consolidação como principal potência e liderança do continente africano. A busca desse objetivo, todavia, atravessou diferentes fases, fortemente vinculadas principalmente ao desempenho econômico nigeriano, mas também ao contexto vivido pelo sistema internacional e pelo sistema interafricano em cada período analisado, o que fez com que, em momentos distintos, a atuação nos âmbitos regional ou extracontinental fosse intensificada – em geral como uma forma de reforçar a posição ocupada pelo país no continente africano. / This work seeks to analyze Nigeria’s different foreign policy approaches, from its independence in 1960 to the present day, in an attempt to evaluate changes and continuities in its priorities over the period. In addition, the work aims to, through a historical descriptive perspective, better understand the position occupied by Nigeria, as a semi-peripheral State (or large peripheral State), in the international arena and also on the African continent. In order to do so, the work is divided into four chapters, in which we present a historical overview of the evolution of the inter-African system and then proceed to analyze every decade of Nigerian foreign policy. It becomes clear, through this analysis, that over the course of Nigerian history, the main goal of the country’s foreign policy was its consolidation as the main power and leader in Africa. The pursuit of that goal, however, went through different phases, strongly linked mainly to Nigerian economic performance, but also to the context of the international and inter-African systems in each period, which, at different times, caused Nigeria’s foreign policy to be intensified in the regional or extracontinental sphere – generally as a way to strengthen its position on the African continent.

This thesis examines US-Guatemalan relations during the first half of the 1960s. At a critical juncture in Guatemalan history, a relatively inexperienced US ambassador, John Bell, subverted democratic systems in Guatemala and helped install a military dictatorship that ruled the country for more than three decades. Ambassador Bell's policies undermined the Kennedy administration's idealistic modernization drive for the region, the Alliance for Progress, and contributed to one of the longest civil wars in the Western Hemisphere.

During the last four decades, precisely from the early 1970s, U.S. foreign policy has played a dominant role in the U.S. political landscape. The current political discourse is predominantly marked by divided government, polarized politics and gridlock. Such a contentious political environment has proved to be detrimental for efficient and effective policy-making in foreign policy. There are significant factors that profoundly complicate the process of decision making and congressional-presidential relations. Partisan and ideological differences under the conditions of divided government are dominant in the current political process and in turn affect the prospects of legislative-executive consensus and dissension. Other factors such as media salience, public opinion, and electoral imperatives also complicate the dynamics of legislative-executive relations. In an era in which heightened political brinkmanship has enveloped Washington politics, continuum of consensus and dissension between Congress and the president on strategic foreign policy issues has virtually become a norm. This dissertation examines the dynamics of legislative-executive relations in two high politics U.S. foreign policy issue areas of treaty process and war powers. It appears that in contemporary U.S. foreign policymaking the trajectory of a continuum of legislative-executive consensus and dissension is a new normal and potentially irreversible, as Congress and the president try ardently to preserve their respective constitutional prerogatives. Empirical investigation across these two issue areas demonstrates a new era of a resurgent Congress marked by its greater assertive role and acting as a consequential player in the foreign policy domain. The passage of the War Powers Resolution in 1973 by Congress, overriding a presidential veto, has profound implications in the modern political landscape. It was a pivotal moment that permanently transformed the future road map of congressional-presidential relations. Since then the U.S. political system has been relentlessly experiencing an institutional power struggle in the foreign policy domain. Findings suggest that when Congress determines to confront the president and exercise its constitutional responsibilities it becomes very difficult for the president to overcome such congressional resistance. Interbranch competition has virtually created a consistent trajectory of a continuum of legislative-executive consensus and dissension in the foreign policy decision-making process.

A inserção internacional de Moçambique é um processo que ocorreu em fases, tendo se iniciado com os esforços empreendidos na década de 1960 pelo Dr. Eduardo Chivambo Mondlane, Primeiro Presidente da Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO). Visando criar o isolamento internacional do regime colonial Português e obter o apoio necessário para a causa da independência de Moçambique, Mondlane estabeleceu contatos com governos de vários Estados do mundo incluindo países ocidentais, países progressistas africanos e países socialistas, projetando, deste modo, a imagem de Moçambique no mundo. Iniciada com as decisões tomadas no Segundo Congresso da FRELIMO realizado em 1968, a política externa de Moçambique tinha em vista “criar mais amigos e poucos inimigos”, num contexto de bipolaridade ideológica que caracterizava a guerra-fria. O novo contexto internacional emergente no período após o fim da guerra-fria viria a originar uma redefiniçao desta política que passou a ser definida como de “criar mais amigos e mais parceiras”. A nível da região da África Austral a FRELIMO considerou sempre que a independência de Moçambique só seria completa com a libertação de todos os países da região que ainda se encontravam sob a dominação de regimes coloniais e minoritários tendo dado o seu apoio incondicional à luta de libertação do Zimbábue, África do Sul e Namíbia, para além do seu grande empenho no processo de cooperação e integração regional. É neste contexto que se pode enquadrar esta tese cujo tema é “a política externa de Moçambique e sua inserção na região da África Austral” a qual procura, através de uma vasta revisão bibliográfica, analisar os contornos que estiveram à volta da afirmação de Moçambique como Estado reconhecido no concerto das nações tanto a nível regional como internacional. / The international insertion of Mozambique is a process that took place in phases, starting with the efforts made in the 1960s by Dr. Eduardo Chivambo Mondlane, First President of the Liberation Front of Mozambique (FRELIMO). In order to create the international isolation of the Portuguese colonial regime and obtain the necessary support for the cause of Mozambique's independence, Mondlane established contacts with governments in several states of the world including Western countries, progressive African countries and socialist countries, thus projecting the image of Mozambique in the world. Initiated by the decisions taken at the Second FRELIMO’s Congress held in 1968, Mozambique's foreign policy aimed to "create more friends and few enemies" in a context of ideological bipolarity that characterized the Cold War. The new emerging international context in the period after the end of the Cold War would lead to a redefinition of this policy, which was defined as "creating more friends and more partners". At the level of the southern African region FRELIMO always considered that Mozambique's independence would only be complete with the liberation of all the countries of the region that were still under the domination of colonial and minority regimes and gave its unconditional support to the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe, South Africa and Namibia, in addition to its strong commitment to regional cooperation and integration. It is in this context that one can frame this thesis whose theme is "the foreign policy of Mozambique and its insertion in the region of Southern Africa" which seeks, through a vast bibliographical review, to analyze the contours that were around the affirmation of Mozambique as State recognized in the concert of nations at both regional and international levels.

Deux évidences traversent le discours politique d'aujourd'hui. D'une part, la « démocratie » représenterait le forme de société la plus légitime ou la plus émancipatrice possible, et d'autre part, la guerre serait désormais le signe patent d’un échec dans le traitement des différends entres États souverains. La thèse s'efforce d'extraire de l'œuvre de Tocqueville, des éléments de réponse à une triple interrogation. Quels sont les éléments culturels et institutionnels qui permettent d'appuyer l'idée, et que ratifie l'auteur, selon laquelle, une société démocratique serait pacifique ? Quels sont ensuite les facteurs, les tendances, les intérêts qui, à l'intérieur de ce type de société, peuvent perturber ou annuler ce pacifisme de départ ? Enfin, peut-on être sûr que la paix que proposent les démocraties ne dissimulerait-elle pas un potentiel d'aliénation bien pire que celle que la guerre génère évidemment ? / Two obvious ideas cross the political speech of today. On one hand, the « democracy » would represent shape of the most justifiable society or most possible emancipator, and on the other hand, the war would be from now on the obvious sign of a failure in the treatment of the disputes enter sovereign States. The thesis tries hard to extract from the work of Tocqueville, from elements of answer to a triple interrogation. What are the cultural and institutional elements which allow to support the idea, and which ratifies the author, according to which, a democratic society would be paceful ? What are the factors, the trends, the interests chich, inside thos social structure, can disrupt or cancel this pacifism of departure ? Finally, we can be sure that the peace which propose the democracies it would note hide a potential of alienation much worse than the one that the war generates obvioulsy ?