My thesis focuses on the risk-taking behavior of financial agents, aiming particularlyat better understanding how risk attitudes can change over time. It alsoexplores the implications that these changes have on financial markets, and on theeconomy as a whole.The first paper, which is a joint work with Kim Oosterlinck and Andrey Ukhov,studies how risk aversion of financial markets’ participants is affected by the SecondWorld War. The literature links extreme events to changes in risk aversion but failsto find a consensus on the direction of this change. Moreover, due to data limitationsand difficulties in estimation of risk aversion, the speed of the change in risk aversionhas seldom been analyzed. This paper develops an original methodology to overcomethe latter limitation. To estimate changes in attitude toward risk, we rely on thedaily market prices of lottery bonds issued by Belgium. We provide evidence on thedynamic of risk attitude before, during and after the Second World War. We findsubstantial variations between 1938 and 1946. Risk aversion increased at the outbreakof the war, decreased dramatically during the occupation to increase again afterthe war. To our knowledge, this finding of reversal in risk attitude is unique in theliterature. We discuss several potential explanations to this pattern, namely changesin economic perspectives, mood, prospect theory, and background risk. While theymight all have played a role, we argue that habituation to background risk mostconsistently explains the observed behavior over the whole period. Living continuouslyexposed to war-related risks has gradually changed the risk-taking behavior ofinvestors.In the second paper, I derive a measure of risk aversion from asset prices andanalyze what are its main drivers. Given the complexity of eliciting risk aversionfrom asset prices, few papers provide empirical evidence on the dynamics of riskaversion in a long-term perspective. This paper tries to fill the gap. First, I providea measure of risk aversion that is original, both because of the length of its sampleperiod (1958- 1991) and the methodology used. I study the relationship betweenthis new measure of risk aversion and several key economic variables in a structuralvector autoregression. Results show that risk aversion varies over the period. Aworsening of economic conditions, a decrease in stock prices or a tighter monetarypolicy lead to an increase in risk aversion. On the other hand, an increase in riskaversion is linked to a larger corporate bond credit spread and has an adverse effecton stock prices.The third paper explores the impact of asset price bubbles on the riskiness offinancial institutions. I investigate the effect of a real estate boom on the financialstability of commercial banks in the United States using exogenous variations intheir exposure to real estate prices. I find that the direction of the effect dependson bank characteristics. Although higher real estate prices have a positive impacton bank stability on average, small banks and banks that operate in competitivebanking markets experience a negative effect. I reconcile these findings by providingevidence that higher real estate prices benefit commercial banks by raising the valueof collateral pledged by borrowers but at the cost of an increase in local bankingcompetition. This increase in competition affects banks that have a low marketpower more severely, which explains why small banks and banks facing a high degreeof competition display relatively lower stability during a real estate boom. / Doctorat en Sciences économiques et de gestion / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

Opaqueness is inherent to financial institutions but contributes to the fragility of the banking system. The archetypal assets held by banks, loans, have a value that cannot be properly communicated outside of a banking relationship (Sharpe 1990; Rajan 1992). Because they are relationship specific and raise adverse selection concerns, these assets are illiquid (Diamond and Rajan 2001). However, these assets are financed with liquid deposits; uncertainty about their value can cause depositors to withdraw their funds and banks to topple (Calomiris and Kahn 1991; Chen 1999). Additionally, the combination of opaqueness and leverage creates moral hazard incentives, exacerbated by government guarantees, as well as other agency conflicts that are detrimental to stability (Jensen and Meckling 1976).This dissertation presents three original contributions on the consequences of bank opaqueness. The first contribution concerns financial analysts. We show that, unlike in other industries, the most talented sell-side analysts are no more likely than their peers to issue recommendation revisions that influence bank stock prices. However, star analysts appear to maintain influence by uncovering firm-specific bad news that induces sharp negative revaluations of bank stock prices. In the second contribution, we find that the persistence of bank dividend policies increases with agency conflicts between shareholders and managers and decreases in the presence of large institutional shareholders who have an incentive to monitor banks and to mitigate agency conflicts. Our third contribution assesses the competitive distortions in bond markets since the recent reforms of the European Union bank safety net. We find that nationalized systemic banks, and those that benefit from high bailout expectations, do not benefit from funding advantages compared to their peers. Our findings also suggest that bailout expectations for these banks have diminished, consistent with new regulatory frameworks enacted after the financial crisis being effective.Overall, our findings suggest that opaqueness presents formidable challenges for public authorities but that its consequences can be mitigated by credible regulation. / Doctorat en Sciences économiques et de gestion / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

Dans la période actuelle, la gestion financière des établissements publics d'enseignement au Vietnam fait l'objet d'une profonde réforme ayant pour but la légalité, la régularité, l'efficacité et la transparence. Cette gestion financière portant sur le modèle de la gestion budgétaire axée sur les moyens fait face aujourd'hui à l'inefficacité et à l'opacité dans la gestion et l'utilisation des dépenses publiques, dans la prévision des ressources disponibles ainsi que dans la responsabilisation des gestionnaires et le contrôle a posteriori. Par ailleurs, il faut également relever qu'elle est inadaptée au mécanisme actuel de l'autonomie de gestion des établissements, à la recherche des motivations raisonnables des dirigeants, enseignants et des usagers et notamment au développement de ressources propres permettant aux établissements de répondre non seulement à une progression exceptionnelle des besoins éducatifs mais encore à leur processus de modernisation à venir. Il est proposé que la réforme de cette gestion financière doive s'aligner sur la réforme actuelle des finances publiques ainsi que sur celle de l'enseignement. En ce sens, il convient de mettre en place un modèle de la gestion budgétaire axée sur les résultats et accroître à la fois l'autonomie de gestion, notamment de gestion financière des établissements publics d'enseignement en cohérence étroite avec la responsabilité des gestionnaires et le contrôle financier. / In the current period, the financial management in public educational institutions in Vietnam has been the main target of the comprehensive reform for enhancement of legality, regularity, efficiency and transparency. Indeed, in the country, the model of input-based budgeting management now is not suitable, efficient and cleans enough for spending and auditing public expenditure. It also lacks of planning function for potential resources and supervising of managerial accountability and a posteriori control. Moreover, this financial management does not completely satisfy the today demand of managerial autonomy mechanism in public educational institutions. It can neither create a good motivation for managers, teachers and users nor mobilizing the development of their own resources which are very necessary to expanse their training needs as well as their modernization process in future. It is therefore proposed that the reform of the management must go in line with the current reform of public finances and that of education. For the purpose, in public educational institutions, a model of performance-based management should be implemented at the same time with the enhancement of managerial autonomy, especially in financial field as well as the responsibilities of managers in accountability and financial control.