Inaug.-diss.--Handels-hochschule, Berlin. / Lebenslauf. "Literaturverzeichnis": p. 65-66.

Thesis (Ph.D.) -- University of Texas at Arlington, 2009.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Michigan, 1926. / Without thesis note.

M.Com. (Accounting) / This study sets out to suggest a method of accounting for goodwill and brands which is practically feasible, yet conceptually justifiable. Only positive, acquired goodwill is relevant for purposes of this study. Both acquired and internally generated brands are, however, investigated. In terms of historical cost accounting, both acquired goodwill and brands qualify as assets of the enterprise since they are controlled by the enterprise as a result of past transactions and future economic benefits are expected to flow therefrom. Goodwill arises as a balancing amount in terms of double entry accounting as a result of the fact that the purchase consideration applicable to a business take-over often exceeds the aggregate of the fair values of the acquired enterprise's net assets. Because goodwill can therefore effectively be seen as a function of two other figures, the potential exists that it can be manipulated. A number of possible alternative accounting treatments of goodwill are in existence. In spite of a historical background of divergence, international statements now display increasing agreement in favour of the amortisation option. The opposite is, however, true in respect of the financial statements of South African companies. The. preparers and users of financial interest in preventing goodwill as statements have a vested far as possible. As regards goodwill that does arise, an accounting treatment with the smallest possible detrimental effect on the financial position and results of the company will enjoy preference. Contrary to this is the fact that the amortisation of goodwill is the most justifiable alternative from a conceptual point of view. A number of accounting options have been developed over the years with the intention of either preventing goodwill, or at least limiting its extent. Included in this is merger accounting (also called pooling of interests accounting) in terms of which goodwill is effectively set off against the share premium account in the case of a take-over where the purchase consideration is settled by means of a share issue. Another method is the capitalisation of brands in the place of goodwill. Brands are therefore considered to be a mere substitute for goodwill on the balance sheet and is consequently of doubtful value from an accounting and financial analysis point of view. In spite of a variety of accounting alternatives, acquired brands should thus be accounted for in the same way as goodwill. Furthermore, internally generated brands should not be acknowledged on the balance sheet. The implementation of this will lead to the artificial distinction between goodwill and brands losing its prominence in the course of time

Thesis (doctoral)--Ruhr-Universität Bochum, 2004. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 283-322).

Thesis (M. Ec.)--University of Adelaide, Dept. of Commerce, 1986. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 212-217).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Sydney, 2005. / Title from title screen (viewed 22 May 2008). Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy to the Faculty of Economics and Business. Includes bibliographical references. Also available in print form.

This dissertation introduces a new method for evaluating mergers and acquisitions (M&As) and goodwill allocations associated with them. This method differs from Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), which estimate the sum of the fair value of net identifiable assets by focusing on balance sheet information, and recognizes the remainder of the purchase price as goodwill. The new method utilizes both balance sheet and income statement information to estimate the value of a target as a business, and treats the remainder of the purchase price as the uncertain growth expectation. Using the new approach, I document that uncertain growth expectations in M&A prices (1) are negatively related to acquirer's long-term returns, (2) predict future goodwill impairments, and (3) are superior to event-date market reactions and premiums as a predictor of acquirers' future performance.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Aberdeen University, 2009. / Title from web page (viewed on Dec 7, 2009). Includes bibliographical references.

This thesis examines the effect of IFRS No.3, <i>Business</i> <i>Combinations</i>, on managers’ accounting choices with respect to the goodwill impairment losses reported by the largest UK firms.  While IFRS No. 3 was issued to improve the accounting treatment of goodwill and provide users with more useful and value-relevant information regarding the underlying economic value of goodwill, it has been criticized by academics, practitioners, and dissenting IASB members on the grounds of the managerial discretion inherent in the process of testing goodwill for impairment.  It is unclear how IFRS No. 3 has affected the reporting of goodwill impairment losses, including the related managerial flexibility exercised in determining them. Results reveal managers are exercising discretion in the reporting of goodwill impairments following the adoption of IFRS No.3.  Specifically, goodwill impairments are more likely to be associated with recent CEO changes, income smoothing and “big bath” reporting behaviours.  However, results also indicate that goodwill impairments are strongly associated with economic indicators of impairment and have significant positive associations with effective governance mechanisms as measured by the percentage of independent directors on the board of directors, the number of board meetings, the percentage of shares owned by blockholders holding at least 10% of outstanding shares, and the percentage of shares owned by executive and non-executive directors, suggesting that managers are more likely to be using the discretion afforded by IFRS No.3 to convey their private information and expectations about the underlying performance of the firm rather than acting opportunistically in the write-off year.  These inferences are robust to a number of modelling specifications and variable definitions.  Further analysis and principal component aggregation of the corporate governance variables provide additional assurance that the perceived managerial reporting incentives are less likely to be opportunistic.