The United States is and will continue to be engaged in a form of warfare in which the enemy finds shelter among and gains intelligence from the population. This is not a new form of warfare, but, given the advances in technology and increased globalization of the modern age, it has become an exponentially more lethal form of conflict. This thesis examines current U.S. unconventional warfare doctrine to determine its origins and assess its feasibility in different environments. Drawing upon the military theories of Clausewitz, this paper attempts to lay out a new approach and broaden the spectrum of American unconventional doctrine and irregular response. An examination of the American â hearts and mindsâ approach to unconventional warfare, based largely upon British colonial experience, suggests that current doctrine could be based on a faulty interpretation of history. Newly emerging knowledge points to the need to adopt an unconventional strategy focused more on establishing authority than gaining popularity. This approach, dubbed â authoritative control,â has both a historically successful track record and is fairly easy to implement. For the United States to be successful in future unconventional conflict, an expansion of doctrine must occur immediately.

Thesis (M.S.)--Naval Postgraduate School, 2002. / Thesis advisor(s): Thomas Lucas, Saverio Manago. Includes bibliographical references (p. 147-149). Also available online.

Thesis--School of Advanced Airpower Studies. / Title from title screen (viewed Oct. 27, 2003). "June 2000." Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (M.S. in Security Studies (Middle East, South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa))--Naval Postgraduate School, March 2009. / Thesis Advisor(s): Kadhim, Abbas ; Baylouny, Anne Marie. "March 2009." Description based on title screen as viewed on April 23, 2009. Author(s) subject terms: Hezbollah, Israel, psychological warfare, information operations, strategic communications, guerrilla warfare, fourth generation warfare, terrorism, Islamic. Includes bibliographical references (p. 81-84). Also available in print.

Thesis (M.S. in Defense Analysis)--Naval Postgraduate School, March 2009. / Thesis Advisor(s): McCormick, Gordon. "March 2009." Description based on title screen as viewed on May 6, 2009. Author(s) subject terms: Improvised Explosive Device, IED, Insurgency, Guerrilla Warfare, Counterinsurgency, Strategy, Strategic Influence Includes bibliographical references (p. 87-91). Also available in print.

Thesis (M.S. in Information Systems)--Naval Postgraduate School, September 1990. / Thesis Advisor(s): Bui, Tung Xuan. Second Reader: Kennedy-Minott, Rodney. "September 1990." Description based on title screen as viewed on March 19, 2010. DTIC Identifier(s): Identification Systems, Insurgency, Expert Systems, Enemy Personnel, Theses, Computer Applications, Counterinsurgency. Author(s) subject terms: Expert Systems, Insurgency, Insurgent Identification. Includes bibliographical references (p. 67-69). Also available in print.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Chicago, Dept. of Political Science, December 1998. / Includes bibliographical references. Also available on the Internet.

No description available.

Thesis (M.A. in National Security Affairs) Naval Postgraduate School, December 1994. / "December 1994." Thesis advisor(s): Jan Breemer. Includes bibliographical references. Also available online.

This thesis argues that while there are various contending notions of how a government can improve its chances of success in a small war, few strategies will be effective without the application of a comprehensive program of population control measures. For this study, small wars are conflicts in which a government uses limited means to secure national objectives against an adversary who uses primarily the tactics of guerrilla warfare. Population control measures are defined as those restrictions imposed on movement, on choice of residence, and on the availability of food that protect the population from the insurgents while simultaneously denying the insurgents access to critical resources. This work examines the vital importance of population control measures in overcoming guerrilla forces lacking external sponsors in small wars during the period 1870 to 1960. Five examples are used to determine their importance: the treatment of prairie Amerindians in the Canadian West (1870 – 1890); the guerrilla phase of the Philippine-American War (1898 – 1902); the guerrilla phase of the South African War (1899 – 1902); the Malayan Emergency (1948 – 1960); and the Kenyan Emergency (1952 – 1960). Within the broad strategies used to prosecute these campaigns, population control measures were a consistent feature and were instrumental in contributing to the termination of the conflicts. Despite their importance, these measures are typically overlooked or only treated superficially when discussed by historians. Therefore, to understand more fully the outcome of small wars, greater attention needs to be applied to the study of these measures. In small wars the primary contest between the belligerents is for control of the people. For the government, the strategic value of population control measures is in how they separate the population from the guerrillas. This denies a wide range of critical resources to the guerrillas and additionally allows the government to both prosecute its campaign more effectively and protect the population better. Population control measures need to be a key component of a government’s strategy in a small war as their proper application may be the tipping-point between success and failure. / Thesis (Ph.D, History) -- Queen's University, 2013-11-29 16:13:52.31