Much neglected is Heidegger's latter work in favor of the fundamental ontology of Being and Time. Consequentially, conceptions of Heidegger's question of Being are oftentimes misconceived. Currently three main models have been proposed: (1) existential phenomenology, exemplified by Joseph Langan in the 1950s; (2) the popular thought of Being model in the 1960s as developed by William Richardson; (3) and in counter distinction to these unified models Joseph Kockelmans offers in the 1970s the many ways model, touting the end of systems. These misconstruals have spawned much Heideggerian dialogue, and in recent years, has had its effect upon Western continental scholarship from structuralism to post-structuralism. <br>Rather than usual conceptual models, this dissertation proposes a new model of Heideggerian scholarship seen through the lens of "Being as Saying." Neither mystical nor incomprehensible Heidegger's; unique linguistic turn negotiates the inadequacies of modern conceptions of the subject, object and cognition. Through a careful reading of Heidegger's work from 1949-1976, I trace Heidegger's utter reliance upon language as the way-making of Being, "Sprache als Be-wëgen." More originary than ordinary language, Heidegger's Being as Saying arises from Nietzsche's insights on nihilism. For Heidegger Being is no-thing, and as such reveals itself as unconcealment. We hear it as a deep, unsettling silence. From Being's two-fold character of concealing and revealing and humanity's subsequent discomfit, we derive all forms of communication, including thought and logic, even our world as a response to, and evasion from this pervasive silence. <br>Most notably Heidegger unseats the preeminent stature of thought and subject, only to reincorporate them within language. To achieve this he develops notions of Ereignis and Geviert, at once simple and complex, by which Being manifests itself, no longer through Dasein as prime discloser, but through a crossing of four regions. What emerges is a dynamic gathering-as-separated dialogue, a far richer, relational understanding of the world and the person. Heidegger's new way can best be described as a phenomenology of the inapparent, wherein Being and humanity are in a relational dialogue of unconcealing and revealing. With this insight we can reengage the Western philosophical tradition meditatively. / McAnulty College and Graduate School of Liberal Arts / Philosophy / PhD / Dissertation

The thesis deals with daseinsanalysis as a psychotherapeutic direction, which is based (among other things) on philosophy. The topic is approached in the sense of caring of the soul, which has appeared in the European tradition since Plato, and it was the overlap of philosophy into psychology, that gave rise to daseinsanalysis. This thesis focuses on the interconnection of psychology and philosophy. Based on the studied literature, the work contains the basis of daseisnanalysis from phenomenology, philosophy of Martin Heidegger and psychoanalysis. The thesis deals with the reflection of the origin of daseinsanalysis in work od Ludwig Binswanger and Medard Boss, the founders of daseinsanalysis. The work of Ludwig Bisnwanger discusses the concept of freedom, love and other topics that have been taken over and persisted in daseinsanalysis. This thesis is also about Medard Boss's relationship with Martin Heidegger and his interpretation of dreams, which he focused on. Furthermore, the thesis sets out the main principles of daseinsanalysis, which have developed over the years and link them to their foundations. The main principles include being able to work with existentials, work with freedom and respect for listening and receiving. All these form a mutual relationship between the patient and the...

Our world is a world of technology, and technology is part of what has made human beings so adept at survival. Yet, the 21st century has seen a new type of technology that is unlike anything ever seen before. This new information technology is known as social media (including such things as Facebook, Twitter, MySpace, etc.), and it has the power to influence our very being. However, we are seemingly uncritical and unconcerned about social media in relation to society. This project attempts to analyze social media and its relationship to human beings from an ontological standpoint. I do so by exploring both the ontic and the ontological aspects of social media. In order to do so, I use a method of hermeneutical inquiry and phenomenological exploration. By using the works of several different thinkers, I attempt to get at the essence of the relationship between humans and social media. First, using the works of Martin Heidegger, I argue that there is an ethical dimension contained within the concept of authenticity. Then, using the works of psychologists, phenomenologists, and cognitive scientists, I show that social media has just as much control over us as we think we have over it. Lastly, I return to Heidegger's work in order to understand what the very essence of social media is, and I then explain what our relationship to social media ought to be in order to live authentically. In doing so, I attempt to explain how we can gain a free relation to social media in order to establish the ways in which it can be most helpful to us.

This thesis argues that Heidegger’s thought offers crucial insights into the structural challenges that modernity poses to being an ethical and religious person. I argue that these difficulties come down to an instrumentalist conception of truth, a denial or repression of finitude as the condition of meaningfulness, and a philosophical anthropology that is both too subjectivistic and too objectivistic. Yet while Heidegger was good on the diagnosis, he was reluctant to give more than digressive and opaque prescriptions to these problems. My thesis seeks to respond to this lacuna by putting Heidegger’s critical observations in the service of articulating a positive religious ethics. To that end, it seeks to locate—as well as redefine from an ontological perspective—the human dispositions and practices that expose truth in a non-instrumental light, that show finitude as a positive condition of meaningfulness, and that reveal the essence of the human being in non-subjectivist and non- objectivist terms. I argue that these include listening and gratitude—dispositions and practices I claim should form the backbone of any religious ethics, and yet which I also claim should not be limited to those who believe in a personal, theistic God. My thesis contributes to the fields of modern theology and Heidegger Studies in four ways. First, it shows that Heidegger’s critics (such as Levinas and Adorno) are wrong to oppose ontology to ethics. Second, it shows that Heidegger’s critics (such as Marion and Jonas) are wrong to oppose ontology to theology. Third, it shows that Heidegger’s own ambivalence about the ethical and theological relevance of his thought allows for the development of a deeply ethical and theological posture. And fourth, it offers a unique, post-Heideggerian interpretation of gratitude, one in which it is understood as a structure of Dasein that is both “always already” and “not yet” operative.

Title: Silently listen to one's own being: Relationship of bodily sensations and sense in the early philosophy of M. Heidegger Author: Bc. Filip Žitník Department: Department of general anthropology, FHS - UK Supervisor: Mgr. Ing. arch. Marie Pětová, Ph.D. Abstract: Master thesis Silently listen to one's own being: Relationship of bodily sensations and sense in the early philosophy of M. Heidegger deals with the question of possibility of discussing the motive of body and bodily sensations within the framework of M. Heidegger's fundamental ontology and finding a relationship between bodily sensations and sense within this conception. The first part of the thesis demonstrates through the exposition of worldhood as the existential trait of Dasein that Dasein as ,being in the world' is necessarily bodily being, otherwise the world which is the whole of references would disintegrate. The second part reveals the necessity to conceive the bodily sensations in relation to state-of-mind (Befindlichkheit) as a fundamental trait of this being and not as the mere concomitant phenomenon. Thus the bodily sensation is via state-of-mind (Befindlichkheit) co-constitutive trait of original phenomenon "there" which is in its nature a temporal unity of the traits state-of mind, speech and understanding. In this way the bodily...