Thesis--Leyden. / With a Dutch summary. "Stellingen" ([3] p.) inserted. Includes bibliographical references (p. 249-263).

Thesis (doctoral)--Universität, Bonn, 2003.

Thèse (M.A.)--Université Laval, 1997. / Bibliogr.: f. 110-114. Publié aussi en version électronique.

Texte remanié de: Diss. / Bibliogr. p. 267-276. Index.

Zugl.: Pisa, Scuola Normale Superiore, Diss., 2004

El presente trabajo busca constituir una introducción al concepto de “intencionalidad de la conciencia” en la filosofía de E. Husserl. En la medida en que este concepto juega un rol principal en la filosofía de su autor, es posible comprender la tarea de este trabajo como la de una introducción a ciertos aspectos esenciales de la posición filosófica general que se expresa en la Filosofía Trascendental de Husserl. Con este objetivo, el trabajo se divide, en su parte principal, en cuatro capítulos, que pretenden abarcar los elementos decisivos de los fundamentos de la intencionalidad. Cada uno de ellos hace tema de un aspecto de esa trama de fundamentos. En el primer capítulo, se trata de una introducción general a la posición filosófica de Husserl. En él se busca aclarar el sentido general de la empresa husserliana, a luz de ciertos momentos esenciales y fundamentales de la misma. El segundo capítulo trata del concepto de intencionalidad en la filosofía de Brentano, en la medida en que representa el contexto desde donde Husserl recibe el concepto en cuestión. El capítulo tercero busca dar cuenta de la recepción por parte de Husserl del planteo brentaniano, trayendo a la luz tanto lo que rescata de dicho planteo, como lo que censura. Finalmente, el capítulo cuarto busca poder dibujar con precisión el concepto de intencionalidad desde el punto de vista propiamente fenomenológico. Sobre todo se intenta aquí poder mostrar en detalle cómo la intencionalidad constituye el concepto del campo fenomenológico auténtico. Hacia el final de este último capítulo se sintetiza lo dicho en torno a la concepción de Husserl, y se examinan las implicancias de ella para el panorama filosófico contemporáneo.

Made available in DSpace on 2015-07-21T02:04:18Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 000472472-Texto+Completo-0.pdf: 3406909 bytes, checksum: 4126643681246529dd6f034f5299eef7 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015 / This work deals with the issue of determining the position of Edmund Hesserl's philosophy in relation to the traditional philosophical opposition between realism and idealism. We argue that the German thinker, through the development of the phenomenological method, proposes a new kind of idealim that does not fit this antinomy as expressed by history in philosophy until the down of contemporaneity, which results in an original solution for the issue. In order to support this thesis we analyze focal concepts developed by Husserk after the so-called "idealist turn" of this ideas, among which we wmphasize the nations of phenomenological reduction, noesis, noema, lifeworld, body, and inter-subjectivity. Throughout this study we also aimed to show how Husserlian philosophy, especially during its later phases, was the precurso of many of the themes which are dear to other phenomenilogists, like Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, who are usually seen as thinkers who radically broke with the method proposed by Husserl. Thus, we position ourselves against interpretations which see Phenomenology as a philosophy qhich represents idealism similar to those by Kant or Berkeley, and we also deny that the innovation put forward by Husserl is due to the lack of ontology in his ideas. Besides, we critically analyse the Husserlian philosophy, briefly pointing the main difficulties we find in his project. / Este trabalho trata do problema de determinar a posição da filosofia de Edmund Husserl em relação à tradicional oposição filosófica entre realismo e idealismo. Defendemos que o pensador alemão, através do desenvolvimento do método fenomenológico, propõe um novo tipo de idealismo que não se encaixa nessa antinomia tal como formulada pela história na filosofia até o começo da contemporaneidade, resultando em uma solução original para a questão. Para sustentar tal tese, analisamos conceitos centrais desenvolvidos por Husserl a partir da chamada “virada idealista” de seu pensamento, entre os quais destacam-se as noções de redução fenomenológica, noese, noema, mundo da vida, corpo e intersubjetividade. Ao longo desse estudo, também procuramos demonstrar como a filosofia husserliana, sobretudo em sua fase tardia, foi precursora de muitos dos temas caros a outros fenomenólogos, como Heidegger e Merleau-Ponty, os quais são usualmente compreendidos como pensadores que romperam radicalmente com o método proposto por Husserl. Desse modo, nos posicionamos contra interpretações que tomam a Fenomenologia como uma filosofia representante de idealismos semelhantes aos de Kant ou Berkeley, assim como negamos que a novidade trazida por Husserl se deva à falta de ontologia em seu pensamento. Além disso, analisamos criticamente o pensamento husserliano, apontando brevemente as principais dificuldades que identificamos em seu projeto.

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El artículo constituye una breve investigación histórica y teórica en torno a  los principales nexos entre el pensamiento temprano de William James y el  trabajo desplegado por Edmund Husserl en las Investigaciones lógicas. A través  de un examen preliminar de las relaciones personales entre ambos autores,  pasaremos a un estudio sobre el aparato conceptual desarrollado por James,  sobre todo en Principios de psicología, con el objetivo de contrastarlo con el  planteado por Husserl, mostrando cómo el primer autor esbozó, entre otros,  los conceptos fenomenológicos de intencionalidad y objetividad ideal.

This dissertation is a contribution to the contemporary field of phenomenological psychopathology, or the phenomenological study of psychiatric disorders. The work proceeds with two major aims. The first is to show how a phenomenological approach can clarify and illuminate the nature of psychopathology—specifically those conditions typically labeled as major depressive disorder and bipolar disorder. The second is to show how engaging with psychopathological conditions can challenge and undermine many phenomenological presuppositions, especially phenomenology’s status as a transcendental philosophy and its corresponding anti-naturalistic outlook. In the opening chapter, I articulate the three layers of the subject matter of phenomenological research—what I refer to as “existentials,” “modes,” and “prejudices.” As I argue, while each layer contributes to what we might call the “structure” of human existence, they do not do so in the same way, or to the same degree. Because phenomenological psychopathology—and applied phenomenology in general—aims to characterize how the structure of human existence can change and alter, it is paramount that these layers be adequately delineated and defined before investigating these changes. In chapters two through five, I conduct hermeneutic and phenomenological investigations of psychopathological phenomena typically labeled as major depressive disorder or bipolar disorder. These investigations address the affective aspects of depression and mania, and the embodied aspects of depression. In addition to clearly articulating the nature of these phenomena, I show how certain psychopathological conditions involve changes in the deepest or most fundamental layer of human existence—what I refer to as existentials. As I argue, many of the classical phenomenologists (including Husserl and Heidegger) believed that these structural features were necessary, unchanging, and universal. However, this presupposition is challenged through the examination of psychopathological and neuropathological conditions, undermining the status of phenomenology as a transcendental philosophy. While this challenge to classical phenomenology is only sketched in the early chapters, in chapters six and seven I develop it in more detail in order to achieve two distinct ends. In chapter six I argue that psychopathology and neuropathology not only challenge phenomenology’s status as a transcendental philosophy, but also supply a key to developing a phenomenological naturalism (which I contrast with a naturalized phenomenology). Phenomenological naturalism, as I articulate it, is a position in which phenomenology is not subsumed by the metaphysical and methodological framework of the natural sciences, but nonetheless maintains the capacity to investigate how the natural world stands independent of human subjectivity (and how events in the natural world can bring about changes in the most fundamental structures of human existence). In the seventh chapter I argue that a phenomenology in which existentials are contingent and variable rather than necessary and unchanging allows phenomenologists to contribute to new dimensional approaches to psychiatric classification. Rather than begin from distinct categories of disorder, these approaches begin from distinct core features of human existence. These features, referred to as either dimensions or constructs, can vary in degree and are studied in both normal and pathological forms.