Ce mémoire propose d’analyser la place de la réflexion utopique au sein de la philosophie politique. En tant qu’idéal permettant de porter un regard critique sur la société ainsi qu’une mise en lumière des perspectives de transformation de celle-ci, l’utopie est un concept pertinent pour la réflexion politique. L’utilisation de l’utopie selon ces termes est toutefois critiquée. Pour justifier la réactualisation de l’utopie, nous analysons deux critiques qui ont été formulées à son égard avant de proposer une reconceptualisation de celle-ci. Le premier chapitre traite de la critique concernant l’incapacité de la réflexion idéale à être appliquée dans le monde. Nous mobilisons les apports théoriques du débat entre la théorie idéale et non idéale afin d’y répondre. Cette discussion nous fournit une meilleure compréhension du concept de faisabilité ainsi que de la capacité de la théorie idéale à guider l’action. Le deuxième chapitre se concentre sur l’autoritarisme inhérent aux idéaux utopiques. L’utopie serait la recherche d’un idéal de perfection absolue qui doit être imposé par la violence. Cette critique est partiellement répondue par des exemples d’utopies ne se conformant pas à cette définition. Le troisième chapitre propose de repenser le concept d’utopie. L’utopie réaliste de Rawls est analysée, mais elle s’avère inadéquate pour notre propos. Notre attention est tournée vers les perspectives de Böker et McKenna nous permettant de jeter les bases d’une nouvelle conception de l’utopie. Nous terminons par un retour positif sur notre question principale : l’utopie doit être réactualisée dans la philosophie politique comme une dimension essentielle. / The purpose of this master’s is to analyze the role of utopian thinking within political philosophy. Utopia, being an ideal used to criticize and transform present society is a useful concept for political thought. However, using utopia in these terms is criticized. To justify reintroducing this concept within political philosophy, we analyze two criticisms against utopia before reconceptualizing our main concept. The first chapter deals with the inability of ideal thought to address real world issues. To respond to this criticism, we analyze the recent debate between ideal and non-ideal theory. This discussion provides us with a renewed understanding of the role of feasibility and action-guiding in ideal theory. The second chapter deals with the authoritarian character of utopian ideals. Within this perspective, utopia is a pursuit of social perfection which can only be enforced through violence. This criticism is partially responded with examples of utopia which do not conform with this definition. The third chapter proposes to rethink the concept of utopia. The first perspective to be analyzed is Rawls’s realist utopia, but it does not adequately reintroduce utopian thought within political philosophy. In turn, the theories of Böker and McKenna enable us to think of utopia in a more open and dynamic perspective. To finish this master’s, we return to our first inquiry. Not only does utopia has a role within political philosophy, it should be seen as an essential part.

One of the most common goals of political theory is to inform just choice; with ‘just choice’ referring to the class of practical, political decisions that result in society becoming more just. However, important questions can be asked about the best way political theory can perform this informing function. In this thesis I look to answer some of these questions through my defence of an ideal theory approach to just choice. This approach claims that ideals, that is, conceptions of the rules that would govern a fully just society, are necessary in order to arrive at just choices. I look to show the conditions ideal theory and ideals have to satisfy in order to perform this just choice informing role. In doing this this thesis underlabours for ideal theory by providing theoretical support for future substantive work in this area. This thesis proceeds as follows. Chapter 1 provides an overview of the structure of the thesis, the main areas of debate, and the implications of my research. Chapter 2 addresses the fundamental question discussed above, seeking to demonstrate that it is only when our choices are informed by ideals that we are consistently able to make just choices. Chapter 3 considers the distinction between short-term choice, which aims to make society immediately more similar to an ideal, and long-term choice, which aims to ultimately realise an ideal in full. I look to show the conditions that ideals have to satisfy in order to inform each type of just choice. Particularly important here are the feasibility conditions that have to be met by ideals that are to inform long-term choice. Chapter 4 considers a conundrum confronting those aiming to make just choices. All other things being equal long-term choice offers greater rewards than short-term choice does; however short-term choice is lower risk, requiring less investment of political resources such as time, labour, and money, and promising more likely returns on these investments. In this chapter I look to show the conditions that have to hold for it to be defensible to favour a long-term approach over a short-term approach. Chapter 5 considers whether the methods required of ideal theory, particularly the feasible ideal theory required of long-term choice, may be inherently contradictory. This is due to possible tensions between fact-sensitive and fact-insensitive aspects of the theorising process. In this chapter I look to show that this is not the case and that the ideal theory process is not contradictory. Chapter 6 summarises my key arguments and reflects on some of the main themes of this thesis.

Thesis advisor: David M. Rasmussen / This dissertation defines and defends the concept of ‘criminal oppression.’ Criminal oppression occurs when people are excluded from full participation in important social and political institutions because they are perceived to have violated certain community norms. Oppression is primarily a structural phenomenon, in which practices of formal and informal institutions unjustly harm people based on group membership. In structural oppression, there is rarely an individual who can be said to be responsible for the oppression, but I argue that at times, individuals may also be agents of oppression when they create, perpetuate, or exacerbate structural oppression. Applying this theory of oppression, the criminal justice system in the United States is an oppressive structure that unjustly harms those considered to be ‘criminals’ through a variety of practices. There are three categories of unjust practices: policing, adjudication and punishment, and collateral effects of arrest and conviction. These three categories of practices create the social group ‘criminals’ by subjecting certain people to these kinds of treatments. I use the word ‘criminal’ to describe those who are treated as criminals by police, the courts, and even private individuals like employers. To be a ‘criminal,’ it is not necessary that one has committed a crime or been convicted of a crime. Racial and criminal oppression deeply related historically and conceptually. Nevertheless, they are distinct kinds of oppression. In the United States, those who are not racially oppressed but are ‘criminals’ face many of the same unjust obstacles as those who are racially oppressed in addition to being ‘criminals.’ Some may argue that ‘criminals’ duly convicted of crimes deserve to be socially and politically excluded. But, I argue that the criminal justice system is not properly conceived of as an apolitical institution that can assess moral blameworthiness. Nor should it be able to offer punishments that amount to social and political exclusion. Instead, the criminal justice system is one political institution amongst many, and it ought to be governed by the same principles of liberty and equality that govern other political institutions. Criminal law’s proper function is to facilitate government as a system social cooperation. Therefore, it ought to respond to criminal acts with actions designed to promote inclusion rather than exclusion. Moreover, even if someone has committed a crime, that does not mean that they ought to be subject to violence or permanent second-class status. Finally, I address specific, feminism-driven arguments for using the criminal justice system to fight violence against women. Some feminists argue that the expressivist function of punishment—the ability of punishment to express disapproval and disavowal—makes it a perfect tool for fighting the normalization of violence against women. The problem, they contend, is that this violence is under-punished in the United States, and the solution to ending violence against women is to increase prosecutions and advocate for harsher punishments because punishment will change the social norms and make violence against women rarer. To this, I argue that those who create laws or mete out punishments do not have control over the social meaning of punishment with precision. The historical and present-day oppressive features of criminal law and punishment interfere with the ability of prosecution and punishment to condemn certain types of acts without also condemning people. Thus, feminists who try to use the criminal justice system to fight gender-based violence will find it to be ineffective and potentially harmful to the already oppressed group of ‘criminals.” Chapter 1argues that ‘criminals’ are oppressed using a structural model of oppression that focuses on how collections of institutional policies and practices can create and maintain unjust power relations between groups of people. I will also use an externalist theory of group identity to argue that being arrested or convicted of a crime is not necessary or sufficient for membership in the social group ‘criminal.’ Chapter 2 explains the relationship between racial oppression and the oppression of ‘criminals,’ noting the historical development of the modern prison system. Chapter 3 argues that the proper role of criminal law is to support systems of social cooperation, not to punish pre-political wrongs. I will suggest that criminal law is in essence part of the social contract, not a separate sphere of justice to which distinctive, retributive principles apply. Instead, the criminal law cannot determine moral blameworthiness and is only justified in sanctioning rule violations for the sake of supporting social cooperation in a society whose institutions are worth supporting. In Chapter 4, I propose a feminist, expressivist defense of the use of prosecution and harsh punishment as a response to rape and domestic violence that takes the structural nature of violence against women into account. Chapter 5, however, demonstrates why even this theory cannot justify incarceration in the non-ideal sphere because of the oppressive history and practice of the American criminal justice system. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2020. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Philosophy.

[pt] Teorias ideais e teoria não-ideais da adjudicação são uma distinção metodológica dentro das teorias normativas da adjudicação. A última considera que a metodologia das teorias normativas deve ser adequada ao que podemos esperar de seres humanos ordinários. Autores do formalismo jurídico como Larry Alexander, Cass Sunstein e Adrian Vermeule estão associados a essa metodologia. O primeiro, por sua vez, considera que esta não é uma restrição normativamente relevante. Podemos defender teorias cujos padrões normativos violam o que podemos esperar de seres humanos ordinários. O particularismo de Dworkin é o principal expoente desse método. A pergunta central é se há um conflito genuíno entre esses dois métodos. Para responder essa pergunta, divido as teorias ideais em duas vertentes: teorias ideais não-orientador e teorias ideais orientadoras. Defendo que há um conflito metodológico apenas entre os métodos não-ideias e este último. Por fim, sugiro que a reflexão sobre esses métodos é importante para desenvolver novos projetos normativos, nomeadamente, do formalismo ideal e que tal empreitada é intelectualmente valiosa. / [en] Ideal theories and non-ideal theories of adjudication are a methodological distinction within normative theories of adjudication. The latter consider that the methodology of normative theories must be adequate to what we might expect from ordinary human beings. Legal formalist scholars such as Larry Alexander, Cass Sunstein e Adrian Vermeule are associated with this methodology. The latter, in turn, believe that this is not a normatively relevant constraint. We can defend theories whose normative standards violate what we might expect from ordinary human beings. Dworkin s particularism is the chief exponent of this method. The central question is whether there is a genuine conflict between these two methods. To answer this question, I divide ideal theories into two strands: non-orienting ideal theory and orienting ideal theory. I argue that there is a methodological conflict only between non-ideals and the latter. Finally, I suggest that reflection on these issues is important to developing new normative projects, namely, ideal formalism and that such enterprise is intellectually valuable.

This thesis conducts a theory comparison to determine which theory of social justice is best suited to address health inequalities. The theories used are the capability approach by Amartya Sen and Göran Therborn's theory on inequalities. Within the capability approach, two accounts specified on health capabilities will be regarded as well. These are the health capability approach by Ruger and the theory of health justice by Venkatapuram. The theory comparison is done by making use of a non-ideal theory framework, based on the theory by John Rawls and the critiques on it given by several authors, as well as the developments in the ideal/non-ideal theory debate. Non-ideal theory provides guidance towards reducing inequalities and enhancing justice and can therefore be useful for a theory on health inequalities. The developed non-ideal theory framework consists of five criteria to which the respective theories are compared to determine whether they fulfil the criteria. Comparing the theories to the framework will give an insight in which theory is best suited for reducing health inequalities. Therborn's theory on inequalities has proven to fulfil most of the criteria in the non-ideal theory framework and can therefore be regarded as best suited to reduce health inequalities.

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In der Dissertation habe ich versucht eine Theorie der globalen Gerechtigkeit darzustellen. Diese Theorie hat als ihre Basis das Denken von John Rawls. Rawls hat sich in seinem letzten Buch „Das Recht der Völker“ zu dem Thema geäußert. Ich erläutere seine Gedanken und zugleich kritisiere ich sie. Meine Kritikpunkte an Rawls: 1. Keine detaillierte Erläuterung der Aufteilung in ideale und nichtideale Theorie 2. Unvollkommenheit der Prinzipien für die ideale Theorie der globalen Gerechtigkeit Ich verweise auf die mögliche Verbesserung des Rawlschen Standpunktes über globale Gerechtigkeit durch: 1. eine Unterscheidung der normativen und deskriptiven idealen bzw. nichtidealen Theorie (damit wird die Struktur von Rawls‘s Arguments klarer) 2. Durch die Darstellung von drei Prinzipien die Rawlssche Prinzipien hätten sein könnten (damit bekommt seine Theorie inhaltlich mehr Wert) 3. Durch die Erläuterung des Prinzips der Solidarität als das, was an Rawls‘s Theorie besonders gewesen sein könnte. / In my disertation I have tried to present a theory of global justice. This theory has for its basis the thought of John Rawls. Rawls expressed his thaughts about the topic in his last book „The Law of Peoples.“ On the one hand I explain his theory while on the other I criticize it. My critique on Rawls goes accoring the following lines: 1. No elaborated disitiniction betwen the ideal and nonideal theory 2. Unfinished principles for the ideal theory of global justice I point to the possible amelioration of Rawls´ theory of global justice through: 1. Differentiation of the normative and descriptive ideal and nonideal theory (through this disticition is the stucture of Rawls´ argument clearer) 2. Introduction of three prinicples that should have been Rawls´s (through these three principles the content of his theory becomes more valuable) 3. Eplaning the principle of solidarity as the principle that could have been the specific for Rawls´ theory

One of the fundamental problems in commutative algebra and algebraic geometry is to understand the nature of the solution space of a system of multivariate polynomial equations over a field k, such as real or complex numbers. An important algorithmic tool in this study is the notion of Groebner bases (Buchberger (1965)). Given a system of polynomial equations, f1= 0,..., fm = 0, Groebner basis is a “canonical" generating set of the ideal generated by f1,...., fm, that can answer, constructively, many questions in computational ideal theory. It generalizes several concepts of univariate polynomials like resultants to the multivariate case, and answers decisively the ideal membership problem. The dimension of the solution set of an ideal I called the affine variety, an important concept in algebraic geometry, is equal to the Krull dimension of the corresponding coordinate ring, k[x1,...,xn]/I. Groebner bases were first introduced to compute k-vector space bases of k[x1,....,xn]/I and use that to characterize zero-dimensional solution sets. Since then, Groebner basis techniques have provided a generic algorithmic framework for computations in control theory, cryptography, formal verification, robotics, etc, that involve multivariate polynomials over fields. The main aim of this thesis is to study problems related to computational ideal theory over Noetherian commutative rings (e.g: the ring of integers, Z, the polynomial ring over a field, k[y1,…., ym], etc) using the theory of Groebner bases. These problems surface in many domains including lattice based cryptography, control systems, system-on-chip design, etc. Although, formal and standard techniques are available for polynomial rings over fields, the presence of zero divisors and non units make developing similar techniques for polynomial rings over rings challenging. Given a polynomial ring over a Noetherian commutative ring, A and an ideal I in A[x1,..., xn], the first fundamental problem that we study is whether the residue class polynomial ring, A[x1,..., xn]/I is a free A-module or not. Note that when A=k, the answer is always ‘yes’ and the k-vector space basis of k[x1,..., xn]/I plays an important role in computational ideal theory over fields. In our work, we give a Groebner basis characterization for A[x1,...,xn]/I to have a free A-module representation w.r.t. a monomial ordering. For such A-algebras, we give an algorithm to compute its A-module basis. This extends the Macaulay-Buchberger basis theorem to polynomial rings over Noetherian commutative rings. These results help us develop a theory of border bases in A[x1,...,xn] when the residue class polynomial ring is finitely generated. The theory of border bases is handled as two separate cases: (i) A[x1,...,xn]/I is free and (ii) A[x1,...,xn]/I has torsion submodules. For the special case of A = Z, we show how short reduced Groebner bases and the characterization for a free A-module representation help identify the cases when Z[x1,...,xn]/I is isomorphic to ZN for some positive integer N. Ideals in such Z-algebras are called ideal lattices. These structures are interesting since this means we can use the algebraic structure, Z[x1,...,xn]/I as a representation for point lattices and extend all the computationally hard problems in point lattice theory to Z[x1,...,xn]/I . Univariate ideal lattices are widely used in lattice based cryptography for they are a more compact representation for lattices than matrices. In this thesis, we give a characterization for multivariate ideal lattices and construct collision resistant hash functions based on them using Groebner basis techniques. For the construction of hash functions, we define a worst case problem, shortest substitution problem w.r.t. an ideal in Z[x1,...,xn], and establish hardness results for this problem. Finally, we develop an approach to compute the Krull dimension of A[x1,...,xn]/I using Groebner bases, when A is a Noetherian integral domain. When A is a field, the Krull dimension of A[x1,...,xn]/I has several equivalent algorithmic definitions by which it can be computed. But this is not true in the case of arbitrary Noetherian rings. We introduce the notion of combinatorial dimension of A[x1,...,xn]/I and give a Groebner basis method to compute it for residue class polynomial rings that have a free A-module representation w.r.t. a lexicographic ordering. For such A-algebras, we derive a relation between Krull dimension and combinatorial dimension of A[x1,...,xn]/I. For A-algebras that have a free A-module representation w.r.t. degree compatible monomial orderings, we introduce the concepts of Hilbert function, Hilbert series and Hilbert polynomials and show that Groebner basis methods can be used to compute these quantities. We then proceed to show that the combinatorial dimension of such A-algebras is equal to the degree of the Hilbert polynomial. This enables us to extend the relation between Krull dimension and combinatorial dimension to A-algebras with a free A-module representation w.r.t. a degree compatible ordering as well.

L’objectif général de ce travail est d’étudier certains problèmes d’éthique et de philosophie politique soulevés par le changement climatique et de proposer des politiques susceptibles de réduire les injustices climatiques. La première partie vise à justifier les devoirs majeurs de justice climatique à partir d’une approche centrée sur les droits humains menacés par le changement climatique. Les données des sciences du climat et des œuvres de fiction littéraires et cinématographiques servent comme fondement de la réflexion philosophique. La deuxième partie explore certaines pistes de réformes institutionnelles à même de réaliser ces devoirs de justice globale et intergénérationnelle. Il s’agit d’exclure certaines réponses proposées au changement climatique, comme la géoingénierie et la compensation, mais aussi et surtout de développer des politiques justes, efficaces et faisables de réduction des émissions de gaz à effet de serre, comme un cadre normatif pour évaluer les engagements des pays, un mécanisme de marché hybride et un rôle politique accru accordé à la société civile. Si ce travail s’inspire des recherches des scientifiques, des écrivains, des économistes et des spécialistes des relations internationales, il dialogue principalement avec les auteurs les plus influents en justice et en éthique climatiques. Au final, bien que les défis moraux et politiques posés par le changement climatique soient sans précédent, l’approche non idéale de la justice climatique développée ici montre qu’il est encore temps d’agir pour éviter les scénarios les plus nuisibles pour les pauvres du monde et les générations futures. / The main objective of this work is to highlight key philosophical problems raised by climate change and to propose policies that could reduce climate injustices. In the first part, I justify major duties of climate justice by constructing a normative approach focusing on basic human rights threatened by climate change. My philosophical reflections draw on data provided by climate sciences as well as works of literary and cinematographic fiction. In the second part, I explore possible institutional reforms that could realize these duties of global and intergenerational justice. My point is to reject false solutions such as geoengineering and offsetting, but also and mostly to develop just, efficient and feasible policies such as a normative framework to assess the equity of countries’ pledges, a hybrid market mechanism and an increased political role given to civil society. While this work draws on researches made by scientists, writers, economists and international relations scholars, it also critically engages with the theories of the most influent authors in climate justice and climate ethics. The non-ideal approach of climate justice I develop explains that even if the moral and political challenges raised by climate change are unprecedented, it is not too late to prevent the realization of the most harmful scenarios for the global poor and future generations.