Thesis (M.F.A.)--Montana State University--Bozeman, 2007. / Typescript. Chairperson, Graduate Committee: Theo Lipfert. Includes DVD. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 23-24).

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Pennsylvania State University, 2007. / Mode of access: World Wide Web.

Thesis (M.A.)--University of North Carolina Wilmington, 2008. / Title from PDF title page (viewed September 29, 2008) Includes bibliographical references (p. [64]-71)

This dissertation critiques and rejects Elliott Sober's dismissal of intelligent design as a scientific hypothesis. Sober builds the case for this dismissal in chapter 2 of his 2008 book Evidence and Evolution. Sober's case against intelligent design as science is a philosophical one, emerging from a Bayesian likelihood approach. Sober claims that unlike neo-Darwinian processes, intelligent design cannot supply independent evidence to support the claim that it is a measurably likely cause responsible for the emergence of biological organisms and the structures or processes of which they are composed. Without an assessable likelihood, Sober asserts that intelligent design (again, unlike neo-Darwinian mechanisms) is not testable, and since it is not testable, it does not qualify as a scientific hypothesis. This dissertation argues however, that according to Sober's own standards in Evidence, because intelligent design and the neo-Darwinian hypothesis both address unrepeated, major biological changes in the unobservable past, and because they both depend upon crucial analogies in order to support either inductive arguments or likelihood assessments, the two hypotheses stand on equivalent evidential and logical grounds. Either Sober must reject both neo-Darwinism and intelligent design, or he must allow them both as equivalent, rival hypotheses based upon a fair application of his argumentation requirements. In addition, after explaining important basics of analogy theory, and its crucial, even unavoidable role in the historical (or "origins") sciences, the dissertation goes on to show how intelligent design's empirical support, based upon analogy with humanly designed artifacts, machines and increasingly cell-like creations in the laboratory, is continuing to grow stronger by the year in both likelihood and in explanatory power. The dissertation thus concludes that intelligent design should be treated as a viable scientific explanation for the dramatic examples of specified complexity being discovered in biology, and indeed should be regarded as an increasingly vigorous rival to the neo-Darwinian explanation of such complexity.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Duquesne University, 2007. / Title from document title page. Abstract included in electronic submission form. Includes bibliographical references (p. 329-354).

Thesis (Ph. D. in Religion)--Vanderbilt University, May 2008. / Title from title screen. Includes bibliographical references.

This dissertation is a critical evaluation of two modern thinkers debating the idea of intelligent design (ID), William Dembski and Francisco Ayala. Specifically, it focuses on Ayala's major theological critique of intelligent design, namely, the problem of dysteleology. Chapter 1 provides an introduction to the problem of dysteleology as it relates to biology and offers a methodology for evaluating each thinker’s resolution to this problem. Chapter 2 examines Ayala's scientific critique of ID, and chapter 3 looks at Ayala's theological critique of ID. Chapter 4 summarizes Dembski's method for detecting design, and chapter 5 outlines Dembski's critiques of naturalism and materialism as well as his information-theoretic account of reality. Finally, chapter 6 analyzes the strengths and weaknesses of Ayala’s proposal that Darwin is a gift to theology in light of Dembski’s information-theoretic account of reality.

No description available.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Hong Kong Baptist University, 2006. / Thesis submitted to the Dept. of Religion and Philosophy. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 192-217)

This dissertation argues that philosophers Barbara Forrest and Robert T. Pennock fail to discredit William A. Dembski's Design Inference as a legitimate scientific program. Chapter 1 is the introduction, explaining the problem and the research methodology used in the dissertation to ascertain a conclusion. Chapter 2 is a background survey and analysis of contemporary Intelligent Design (ID) theory and Dembski's part within the overall schemata of the Intelligent Design enterprise. Particular aspects of Dembski's Design Inference framework and its corresponding "explanatory filter" are explained in Chapter 3. Both Forrest and Pennock had significant influence on the judge's final opinion in the Kitzmiller v. Dover trial, which brought serious scrutiny against ID's scientific merit. Criticism against Dembski was an important part of Forrest and Pennock's respective expert testimony against ID. Based on this trial testimony and their respective academic writings, Chapter 4 therefore argues for the legitimacy of Forrest and Pennock as influential critics when considering Dembski's scientific relevance. The chapter also surveys their substantive arguments against Dembski. Dembski's own response to the categorical criticisms by Forrest and Pennock are addressed in Chapter 5. The concluding analysis is in Chapter 6, arguing that Dembski's Design Inference maintains as viable science, despite the critiques by Forrest and Pennock. / This item is only available to students and faculty of the Southern Baptist Theological Seminary. If you are not associated with SBTS, this dissertation may be purchased from <a href="http://disexpress.umi.com/dxweb">http://disexpress.umi.com/dxweb</a> or downloaded through ProQuest's Dissertation and Theses database if your institution subscribes to that service.