Marcella Althaus-Reid was a theologian who dared to imagine differently, a thinker whose inventive style brought striking originality to her writings on sexuality and gender, people and God. Her work is remembered most noticeably in theological academia for her conceptual phrase, ‘Indecent Theology’. In this thesis about questions of God, the innovative elements of Marcella’s literary corpus are developed in new ways by placing her academic theories alongside a practical research study undertaken in the alternative milieu of Church of Scotland congregations in Edinburgh. This primary material, which has been analysed through interview and focus group transcripts, together with questionnaire responses, brings revealing insights to frame the emerging tensions between churchgoers and Marcella across the dimensions of its four chapters. In each, the following themes are developed: the ambiguities surrounding questions of asking who God might be; the considerations involved in recognising God’s relationship with the Bible; the exploration of the extent to which sexuality and gender may influence God concepts; and the recognition of the role people play in evaluating their understandings of God in Christianity. Arranged in a rhythmical structure throughout, every chapter is first prefaced by a media-based report which contextualises relevant themes in a contemporary idiom, and is later concluded by a deconstructive postscript that, in fragmentary ways, invokes some critical concepts in the work of Jacques Derrida germane to the particular questions of God pursued in each.

Jacques Derrida's deconstruction of the metaphysical priority of the present simultaneously validates presence as the absolute form of meaning. In order to succeed, deconstruction is bound to offer the most robust defence of transcendental phenomenology's systematic articulation of the very constitution of experience in its absolute and irrecusably present form. Edmund Husserl's late philosophy of history accounts for the contradiction of atemporal truth—how it is created in time, and how it is possible for the historical investigation of this truth to determine its meaning with absolute certainty. Through the necessity of an ideal and phenomenologically reduced history—not only for the work of historical investigation in its own right, but as a constituent of the meaning of any truth— Derrida explains why Husserl devotes so much effort to explicating the structure and process of the formation of ideal objects in the course of what is ostensively an explanation of the origination of the geometrical science itself out of subjective experience. The purpose of this is only ever implied in Husserl's own work “The Origin of Geometry”, and the implications are subtle. The purpose of this thesis is to detail how the structures of Husserl's system serve the end clearly elucidated by Derrida. It first explains how objective truth is constituted and an ideal history made possible through Husserl's examination of their appearance in the living present, and following this it examines the problems raised by Derrida's deconstruction itself.

Thesis (S.M.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Architecture, 2005. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 120-124). / Introduction: Between the work and friendships of Jacques Martin, Michel Foucault and Louis Althusser there are moments, images and texts which tempt us to say, ah... 'that's he,' and furthermore, 'that is his work.' Yet, the textual collaborations of Foucault, Martin and Althusser can be seen as process of subjectivation, even cannibalism, which blurs the boundary between self and other. / by Nikki Moore. / S.M.

Le mémoire porte sur les stratégies de crédit et de recouvrement par deux importants marchands montréalais décédés en 1706, Jacques Leber et Charles de Couagne. Les réseaux de sociabilité des deux marchands démontrent qu’ils ont chacun un réseau propre. Cependant, ces réseaux ne sont pas un élément clé dans les stratégies de crédit et de recouvrement des marchands. Les inventaires après décès ainsi que les actes notariés démontrent que chaque marchand a une méthode qui leur est propre quant à accorder une créance envers un débiteur. Cette différence se retrouve également dans les stratégies judiciaires des deux marchands. Leber a très peu recours à la justice et Couagne l’utilise à répétition. Il faut donc déterminer si les recours plus fréquents de Couagne découlent d’une prise de risque plus grande de sa part en prêtant à des individus plus vulnérables.

Ce travail – dont l´origine découle d´une question clinique – cherche, dans le champ de la théorie psychanalytique, établir une comparaison entre les concepts de vérité chez Freud et Lacan, ainsi que rechercher les conceptions de vérité qui peuvent être reconnues dans les deux oeuvres. Nous utilisons la formalisation lacanienne pour concevoir une “topologique” de la vérité, c´est à dire, le fondement du concept, pour ainsi mettre en question ses possibles impacts dans le champ de la technique psychanalytique. Avec le même objectif, à partir de la référence à la topologie des surfaces, on investigue le rapport entre le dispositf de coupure dans la situation clinique et la conception topologique de coupure, essentielle pour aborder l´interprétation (opération central à la technique). C´est ainsi que l´on débat le rapport de la vérité avec propositions comme mi-dire, acte, scansion, citation, énigme et ponctuation, afin d´exposer un possible fondement de la technique interprétative en la psychanalyse. On présente donc l´importance du concept lacanien de vérité pour le champ de la technique, ce que définirait la pratique psychanalytique comme une pratique de vérité. / Este trabalho origina-se de uma questão clínica e busca, no campo da teoria psicanalítica, estabelecer uma comparação entre os conceitos de verdade de Freud e Lacan, assim como pesquisar as concepções de verdade que podem ser reconhecidas em ambas obras. Utiliza-se a formalização lacaniana para conceber uma “topológica” da verdade, isto é, o fundamento do conceito, para assim questionar seus possíveis impactos no campo da técnica psicanalítica. Com a mesma finalidade, através da referência à topologia das superfícies, investiga-se a relação entre o dispositivo de corte na situação clínica e a concepção topológica de corte, essencial para a abordagem da interpretação (operação central à técnica). Dessa maneira coloca-se em debate a relação da verdade com propostas tais quais semi-dizer, ato, escansão, citação, enigma e pontuação, a fim de expor um possível fundamento da técnica interpretativa em psicanálise. Tendo isso em vista, apresenta-se a relevância do conceito de verdade de Lacan para o campo da técnica, o que definiria a prática psicanalítica como uma prática de verdade.

In this thesis, I use a close reading of the silent films of Charlie Chaplin to examine a question of listening posed by Jean-Luc Nancy, “Is listening something of which philosophy is capable” (Nancy 2007:1)? Drawing on the work of Nancy, Jacques Derrida and Gayatri Spivak, I consider a claim that philosophy has failed to address the topic of listening because a logocentric tradition claims speech as primary. In response to Derrida’s deconstruction of logocentrism, Nancy complicates the problem of listening by distinguishing between <em>l’e´coute</em> and <em>l’entente</em>. <em>L’e´coute </em>is an attending to and answering the demand of the other and <em>l’entente</em> is an understanding directed inward toward a subject. Nancy could deconstruct an undervalued position of <em>l’e´coute</em>, making listening essential to speech. I argue, Nancy rather asks what kind of listening philosophy is capable of. To examine this question, I focus on the peculiarly dialogical figure derived from Chaplin that communicates meaning without using speech. This discussion illustrates how Chaplin, in the role of a silent figure, listens to himself (<em>il s’e´coute</em>) as other. Chaplin’s listening is Nancean resonance, a movement in which a subject refers back to itself as another subject, in constant motion of spatial and temporal non-presence. For Nancy, listening is a self’s relationship to itself, but without immediate self-presence. Moving in resonance, Chaplin makes the subject as other as he refers back to himself as other. I argue that Chaplin, through silent dialogue with himself by way of the other, makes his listening listened to. Chaplin refused to make his character speak because he believed speech would change the way in which his work would be listened to. In this way, Chaplin makes people laugh by making himself understood (<em>se fait entendre</em>) as he makes himself listened to (<em>se fait e´couter</em>). In answer to Nancy’s question, I conclude philosophy is capable of meeting the demand of listening as both <em>l’entente</em> and <em>l’e´coute</em> when it listens as Chaplin listens.

Submitted by Celso Magalhaes (celsomagalhaes@ufrrj.br) on 2018-07-26T13:11:17Z No. of bitstreams: 1 2017 - G?ssica Pimentel Reis.pdf: 1144585 bytes, checksum: 2423f8e98e171379e342c33d29c07929 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-07-26T13:11:17Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 2017 - G?ssica Pimentel Reis.pdf: 1144585 bytes, checksum: 2423f8e98e171379e342c33d29c07929 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-06-09 / Funda??o Carlos Chagas Filho de Amparo ? Pesquisa do Estado do RJ - FAPERJ / This research has as subject to justify the possibility of a cinema?s philosophy. Before we get the central problematization, which is given by the dialogue between the philosophers Gilles Deleuze and Jacques Ranci?re. We begin, therefore, from an analysis about the constitution of a Deleuze?s philosophy, so that we can better understand and argue his proposal of cinema?s philosophy that begins from the influence of the Bergson?s ontology. In order to understand the positions adopted by Ranci?re and, above all, his criticism of Deleuze, we search at his studies of the image and how he understands the cinema from that context. We privilege some concepts and ideas that influenced each of the two authors, so that we could become possible a new way to read the philosophy of cinema, in which it was possible to provoke the thought through the confrontation of concepts by means of the analysis of films and, hence, to raise new hypotheses for possible solutions of the problems posed by both philosophers. / La pr?sent recherche a comme sujet justifier la possibilit? de la philosophie de cin?ma. D?abord d?arriver ? la problematique centrale, dont elle est donn? ? trav?rs du dialogue entre les philosophes Gilles Deleuze et Jacques Ranci?re. Nous commen?ons donc d?une analyse de la constituition d?une philosophie selon Deleuze, afin de mieux comprendre et d?fendre sa proposition sur l?existance d?une philophie du cin?ma qui d?coule, ? son tour, de l?influence de l?ontologie propos?e par Bergson. Ensuite, pour comprendre les positions prises par Ranci?re, et surtout sa critique ? Deleuze, nous avons parcouru, alors, pour sa compr?heension de l?image et pour la fa?on dont il comprend le cin?ma, d?s ce contexte. Nous avons privil?gi? des concepts et des influences sur chaque auteur en vue de permettre une nouvelle lecture de la philosophie du cin?ma qui pourrait susciter la r?flexion ? travers de la confrontations des concepts de l?analyse des films et donc mettre de nouvelles hypoth?ses pour chercher des possibles solutions aux probl?mes propos?s chez tous les deux philosophes / A presente pesquisa tem como objetivo justificar a possibilidade da filosofia do cinema. Antes de chegarmos ? problematiza??o central, que ? dada em fun??o do di?logo entre os fil?sofos Gilles Deleuze e Jacques Ranci?re. Partimos, portanto, de uma an?lise da constitui??o de uma filosofia para Deleuze para podermos melhor entender e argumentar a sua proposta de filosofia do cinema que se origina da influ?ncia da ontologia bergsoniana. Para compreendermos as posi??es adotadas por Ranci?re e, sobretudo, sua cr?tica a Deleuze, n?s perscrutamos pelo seu entendimento acerca da imagem e de que forma ele compreende o cinema a partir desse contexto. Privilegiamos conceitos e influ?ncias em cada autor para que pud?ssemos viabilizar uma nova leitura da filosofia do cinema em que fosse poss?vel provocar o pensamento atrav?s do confronto de conceitos por meio da an?lise de filmes e, por conseguinte, levantar novas hip?teses para poss?veis solu??es dos problemas colocados por ambos os fil?sofos.

This study is concerned with the spiritual impetus and the lived dimension of the philosophy of the French Thomist Jacques Maritain in light of John Caputo's Heideggerian critique of Thomist metaphysics. In Heidegger and Aquinas: An Essay on Overcoming Metaphysics, Caputo argues that the thought of Thomas Aquinas, probably the most important and most representative figure of orthodox Catholic thinking, is a paradigmatic case of what Martin Heidegger calls 'ontotheology'. This is the dominating tendency of Western philosophy and theology to view Being not as a mystery, but metaphysically as a mere collection of things which are simply present- external to the human being and the value of which is use. For Aquinas, according to Caputo, God is the highest 'being' that creates other 'beings', and it is in virtue of this relationship that human beings, allegedly made in God's image, view the world simply as a collection of things to be manipulated. The first question constituting this study's point of departure, then, is: if Aquinas is indeed an exemplar of ontotheological thinking, is the same true of Jacques Maritain, perhaps the twentieth century's most influential follower and interpreter of Thomas Aquinas? Yet in the same work Caputo also proclaims that what has been said is not the whole truth about Aquinas, and the argument that his thought is an instance of ontotheology is in fact what Caputo sets out to respond to-for the sake of recovering an Aquinas who was not a 'cold rationalist', but a spiritually gifted contemplative, a Catholic saint. Caputo makes the case that we can, by employing a method of 'retrieval' or 'deconstruction'-inspired by Heidegger and Jacques Derrida-find that which is hidden or left 'unthought' in Aquinas but which nevertheless determines his entire philosophical and religious life. This, Caputo argues, is a pre-metaphysical, mystical tendency directed towards the mystery of being, which overcomes metaphysics and escapes ontotheology. Here I apply this Heideggerian critique and retrieval to Maritain, and I argue that while there is in Maritain the same 'ontotheological' tendency to view reality as a collection of things and God as paradigmatic maker of things-the prima causa so richly expressed in Thomistic doctrines of the 'transcendentals' and participative being-there is in him a deep pre-metaphysical, mystical tendency which is, in fact, far more explicit than in Aquinas. In the first part of the study, I compare the philosophical doctrines and projects of Maritain and his first teacher and guide, Henri Bergson, and then of Heidegger in relation to Maritain. I also give a sketch of Maritain's religious and intellectual development, identifying the key religious and artistic figures involved: the novelist Léon Bloy and the painter Georges Rouault. In light of the philosophical analyses and what can be gleaned from Maritain's biographical notes, his correspondence, and the biographical insights provided by those close to him, I argue that we can see in Maritain the same concern for the question of the meaning of being in relation to human life that we find in Heidegger, and that, like Heidegger, this concern underlies his philosophical thought and serves as the impetus for something beyond philosophy. I show that from his Bergsonian beginnings to his later days as a Little Brother of Jesus, Maritain has a profound sense of the pre-conceptual and intuitive kinds of knowledge that we find in existentialist thinkers such as Heidegger, and also artists and mystics. I posit that while Maritain claims what he calls the 'intuition of being' is the most primordial experience human beings can have of ultimate reality, there is, in fact, an experience, or aspiration to have such an experience, which is even more basic, with greater implications for overcoming metaphysics and ontotheology: mystical communion with ultimate reality. The aspiration for such communion is, I claim, the 'unthought' in Maritain that must be sought out for the purpose of retrieving a Maritain who goes beyond metaphysics. Mapping out the main branches of Maritain's thinking about being in terms of the classical doctrine of the 'transcendentals' and corresponding instances of connatural knowledge, the second part of the study is devoted to finding where, in Maritain's thought, a retrieval might be possible. Examining Maritain's conceptions of the connatural experience-knowledge of the moral good and mystical experience, I conclude that we cannot discover any overcoming of metaphysics and ontotheology in either when they are taken on their own terms. For underlying both conceptions, I claim, is Maritain's 'master concept' of the 'act of existence', or esse, the metaphysical principle which makes it possible for the human being to take hold of their own existence and participate in the moral and divine life. The distinction between esse and the essence of beings (essentia) and a stress on the former, as Caputo argues with regard to Aquinas, in fact only supports Heidegger's thesis on the ontotheological character of Thomist thought. For a stress on esse, the principle by which God creates and sustains things in existence is only the outcome of a preoccupation with conceiving God primarily as the 'maker' of things. And what of esse when it comes to mystical experience? Mystical experience, Maritain says, is that of which metaphysical wisdom 'awakens a desire' even while it is unable to attain it, such that the testimony of it, such as that provided by St. John of the Cross, 'no philosophical commentary will ever efface'. Yet here, too, esse only serves to make an unbridgeable ontological and cognitive divide between God as viewed in terms of His causal transcendence and as an intentional object of consciousness, as presence- something or someone external to oneself. This is so even as one is, in virtue of the connatural experience-knowledge of love, united with Him in 'one spirit', as Maritain says, following St. John of the Cross. Given this, I seek a retrieval of Maritain elsewhere, in the richest and most original areas of his thought: the connatural experience-knowledge of the artist and the relationship between the artist and the mystic. For Maritain, true artists and mystics are not concerned with reducing reality to manageable chunks but with expressing the mystery of reality, and, as I demonstrate in the final two chapters, it is when the vocations of the Catholic artist and the Catholic mystic converge in Maritain's reflections-in the cases of Léon Bloy, St. John of the Cross, and Maritain's wife Raïssa-that we are able to retrieve a Maritain that, while very much remaining a Catholic philosopher, is also a mystic. I claim that it is when his thought is situated in its wider existential and religious context that Maritain as both thinker and contemplative escapes the charge of ontotheology because there exists in him a primordial and utterly determining mystical aspiration to experience a communion in love with ultimate reality, best expressed in terms of poetic and mystical language, rather than the metaphysical language of Thomist philosophy. Essential in demonstrating this are events in Maritain's life as well as people-artists and mystics-who reveal the mystery of Being to him. Toward the end of the study, I claim that this immanent mysticism in Maritain-which, unlike that of Caputo's retrieved Aquinas-balances apophatic and cataphatic elements and, as such, is complex and profound enough to render the categories of contemporary debate on the nature of mysticism and mystical experience in need of revision.

Submitted by Cleide Dantas (cleidedantas@ufpa.br) on 2014-10-10T12:27:38Z No. of bitstreams: 2 license_rdf: 23898 bytes, checksum: e363e809996cf46ada20da1accfcd9c7 (MD5) Dissertacao_SentimentoSubjetividadeRousseau.pdf: 808046 bytes, checksum: 89d1c76b65db755b76b6343794b32016 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Ana Rosa Silva (arosa@ufpa.br) on 2014-10-10T12:41:20Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 2 license_rdf: 23898 bytes, checksum: e363e809996cf46ada20da1accfcd9c7 (MD5) Dissertacao_SentimentoSubjetividadeRousseau.pdf: 808046 bytes, checksum: 89d1c76b65db755b76b6343794b32016 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2014-10-10T12:41:20Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 license_rdf: 23898 bytes, checksum: e363e809996cf46ada20da1accfcd9c7 (MD5) Dissertacao_SentimentoSubjetividadeRousseau.pdf: 808046 bytes, checksum: 89d1c76b65db755b76b6343794b32016 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013 / O objetivo desta dissertação é estabelecer as relações existentes entre Rousseau, Kant e os primeiros românticos alemães. A partir da perspectiva estabelecida pela Terceira Crítica, de Kant, nos voltaremos para as obras de Rousseau e do Romantismo (particularmente, as de Novalis e Schlegel) para extrair delas dois conceitos fundamentais, o de sentimento e o de subjetividade. Acreditamos, assim, poder esclarecer, por meio das próprias obras de Rousseau e dos primeiros românticos, o autêntico significado das noções de sentimento e de subjetividade, de modo a não só recuperar o verdadeiro valor filosófico de tais obras, mas, sobretudo, para mostrar o uso consciente delas na determinação de suas posturas frente ao pretenso “racionalismo” dominante no pensamento moderno. / The objective of this thesis is to establish the relationship between Rousseau, Kant and the early German Romantics. From the perspective established by the Third Critique, Kant, we will turn to the works of Rousseau and Romanticism( particularly those of Novalis and Schlegel) to extract these two fundamental concepts, and the feeling of subjectivity. We believe, therefore, to elucidate, through their own works of Rousseau and the early romantics, the true meaning of the notions of sentiment and subjectivity in order to not only recover the true value of such philosophical works, but mainly to show the conscious use of them in determining their positions against the alleged “rationalism” dominant in modern thought.

This paper examines certain theoretical underpinnings of the historical processes by which Shakespeare's history plays became the de facto collective memory of the events they depict, even when those events are misrepresented. The scholarly conversation about this misrepresentation has heretofore centered on Shakespeare's potential political motivations. I argue that this focus on a political, authorial intent has largely ignored the impact these historical distortions have had over the subsequent 400 years. I propose that, due to Shakespeare's unique place in the historical timeline of the development of collective memory, Shakespeare's historical misrepresentation in the history plays is a byproduct of the emerging ability to access historical sources while also shaping the nascent collective memory. Shakespeare became an archon, in the Derridian sense, of English history. As such he exercised the archon's hermeneutic right to interpret English history. Tracing the methods by which the public experienced Shakespeare's plays, this project shows that in the 20th century film became the dominant medium by which audiences experienced Shakespeare for the first time. Using Orson Welles' Chimes at Midnight as the principle example, I show that the hermeneutic right shifted away from Shakespeare and was instead taken on by directors reinterpreting Shakespeare's version of history. Welles' knowing manipulation of the archontic function empowers his film, affecting subsequent interpretation and placing it squarely in the Shakespearean film canon.