Thesis (M.A.)--University of North Carolina Wilmington, 2007. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves: [108]-116)

Thesis (M.A.)--University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2007. / "... in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Masters in American History in the Department of History." Includes bibliographical references (p. 88-103). Also available online.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Missouri-Columbia, 1999. / Typescript. Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 241-264). Also available on the Internet.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Missouri-Columbia, 1999. / Typescript. Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 241-264). Also available on the Internet.

Thesis (Ph.D) - University of Queensland, 2003. / Includes bibliography.

Diss.--Universität Stuttgart, 1990. / Contient de nombreuses citations, traduites en allemand. Bibliogr. p. 251-262.

The continuing diplomatic impasse between the United States and Iran dates back to the turbulent events of the late 1970s. Blame for the 'loss' of Iran, which had been one of the 'twin pillars' of US strategy in the Persian Gulf, has inevitably fallen on the White House incumbent at the time, President Jimmy Carter. This thesis offers a reassessment of Carter's decision making and his responses to the fall of the Shah, the Islamic Revolution and the US embassy hostage taking. It demonstrates that the breakdown of US-Iranian relations was not simply a one-president phenomenon and, more significantly, Carter's handling of Iran was not as dire as it is often portrayed. The research is based on a thorough examination of the available archive material, including newly released documents, as well as recent interviews with the major protagonists. When Carter took office in 1977 he inherited a badly creaking Iranian pillar that was soon to collapse altogether. The flawed policies of his predecessors placed strict limitations on his administration and unwittingly created a ticking time bomb in the form of the Shah. Despite these restrictions, Carter battled to reconcile the strategic necessities of Cold War containment with his moral principles in areas such as human rights and arms sales. In an administration seemingly dominated by the disagreements amongst his top two advisors, Carter remained the key decision maker at all times. He recognised the practical limits of American power and assumed sensible positions in response to an ever changing and uncontrollable crisis. Aside from its contemporary significance, Iran is therefore critical to Carter's disputed legacy and how he rates as a foreign policy president.

abstract: Time magazine called 1976 "the year of the evangelical" partly in response to the rapid political ascent of the previously little-known Georgia governor Jimmy Carter. A Sunday school teacher and deacon in his local church, Carter emphasized the important role of faith in his life in a way that no presidential candidate had done in recent memory. However, scholarly assessments of Carter's foreign policy have primarily focused on his management style or the bureaucratic politics in his administration. This study adds to the growing literature in American diplomatic history analyzing religion and foreign policy by focusing on how Carter's Christian beliefs and worldview shaped his policymaking and how his religious convictions affected his advisors. To better demonstrate this connection, this dissertation primarily discusses Carter's foreign policy vis-à-vis religious nationalist groups of the three Abrahamic faiths (Judaism, Christianity, Islam). By drawing on archival materials from the Jimmy Carter Presidential Library, Carter's own voluminous writings, and memoirs of other administration officials, this dissertation argues that Carter's religious values factored into policymaking decisions, although sometimes in a subtle fashion due to his strong Baptist doctrinal commitment to the separation of church and state. Moreover, Carter's initial success in using his religious beliefs in the Camp David negotiations raised expectations among administration officials and others when crises arose, such as the hostage taking in Iran and the electoral threat of the Christian Right. Despite his success at Camp David, invoking religious values can complicate situations already fraught with sacred symbolism. Ultimately, this dissertation points to the benefits and limits of foreign policy shaped by a president with strong public religious convictions as well as the advantages and pitfalls of scholars examining the impact of religion on presidential decision making. / Dissertation/Thesis / Ph.D. History 2013

No description available.

This study examines how the administrations of Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan responded to the widespread human rights abuses committed by the Argentine military during the country's Dirty War between 1977 and 1982. The objective is to gain a broader understanding of the policies pursued by both administrations. Under Carter, who brought human rights to the forefront of American foreign policy, Argentina was heavily targeted and sanctioned with the anticipation that such measures would enhance the human rights status in Argentina. Ultimately, such policies resulted in open hostility in bilateral relations, culminating in Argentina's refusal to support Carter's proposed grain embargo on the Soviet Union in 1980. Reagan moved to restore relations until Argentina's invasion of the Falklands in April, 1982. The works of many authors were consulted in conjunction with newspapers, journal articles, government proceedings and declassified documents obtained from the National Security Archives.