Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:30:06Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Fernanda Garcez Lopes de Souza.pdf: 766701 bytes, checksum: 3bcfa3c2cb40235d1ea5e5d5ea86af12 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010-05-10 / This master dissertation is intended to spark the reader‟s interest how officers of joint-stock companies and of limited liability companies are legally classified. Are officers actual employees governed by labor law, do the concepts contained in the Consolidated Labor Laws apply to them, or are the officers legal personalities under the corporate law, so that in relation to them exclusively the terms of the laws that govern company activities must be observed? The reason for the approach of that topic lies in the need for the books of authority and precedents to position themselves regarding what position is held by the officer, in order to instruct companies to give those professionals the correct treatment and to set up guidelines for court decisions that nowadays are handed down without any legal backing. The main result obtained, in our opinion, was to spark the attention of the labor jurists regarding the existence of a legal personality that, as a rule, is not under the protection of the labor law, but subject to corporate law. With the extension of the material competence of the Labor Justice brought about by Constitutional Amendment nº 45/2004, the labor lawyers need to extend their point of view and accept the existence of other legal personalities that are not governed by the Consolidated Labor Laws, but are neither left out of the legal system. On the other hand, the labor law should remain alert towards the cases in which the corporate law is used only as a form of disguising a true employment relationship and defrauding the rights set forth by the Consolidated Labor Laws for subordinate employees / A presente dissertação de mestrado possui como objetivo despertar o interesse do leitor pela forma de regulamentação jurídica dos diretores das sociedades anônimas e limitadas. Seriam os diretores verdadeiros empregados regulados pelo direito do trabalho, aplicando-se lhes os preceitos contidos na Consolidação das Leis do Trabalho ou seriam os diretores figuras jurídicas próprias do direito societário, devendo ser observadas, em relação a eles, exclusivamente os termos das leis que regulam as atividades empresariais? A justificativa para a abordagem deste tema repousa no fato da necessidade de posicionamento, por parte da doutrina e jurisprudência, de qual a posição ocupada pelo do diretor, no intuito de orientar as empresas a outorgar o correto tratamento a tais profissionais, além de orientar as decisões judiciais que hoje são proferidas sem qualquer respaldo legal. O principal resultado obtido, a nosso ver, foi o de chamar a atenção dos juslaboralistas acerca da existência de uma figura que, em regra, não está albergada pela proteção do direito do trabalho e sim pelo direito societário. Com a ampliação da competência material da Justiça do Trabalho trazida pela Emenda Constitucional nº 45/2004, os operadores do direito do trabalho precisam ampliar seus pontos de vista e aceitar a existência de outras figuras jurídicas que não estão sob a égide da CLT e nem por isso cairão, necessariamente, na marginalidade. Por outro lado, o direito do trabalho deve continuar atento às hipóteses em que o direito societário é utilizado apenas como forma de mascarar uma verdadeira relação de emprego e fraudar a aplicação dos direitos consagrados pela CLT aos empregados subordinados

Corporate governance practice differs regionally and nationally, depending on how each legal environment protects minority investors, capital markets and company ownership structure. Governance can also change spectacularly in regions or countries with comparatively high levels of institutional investment. The notion of institutional investors' activism is increasingly important in developed markets as the ideal corporate governance mechanism to monitor corporate managers and overcome agency problems arising from dispersed corporate ownership in modern companies. These institutions can work together on an improved corporate governance framework more effectively than individual investors, monitoring corporate controllers of listed companies in emerging and developing markets, using their influence more vigorously and in ways more fitting to a concentrated ownership environment such as that in Saudi Arabia. Consequently, the role of institutional investors in emerging and developing markets will depend strongly on institutional investors' activism and the arrangements determined and undertaken by the corporate governance regulatory framework in these markets. In considering the influential role of institutional investors to improve corporate governance practice, a high level of minority shareholder protection thus remains an indicator of good corporate governance and regulatory pressure of rights and incentives, which are necessary to empower non-controlling shareholders in these concentrated ownership markets to exert a strong activist influence in monitoring corporate activities, thus improving the corporate governance practices of investee companies. In this context, this thesis contends that in Saudi Arabia in particular, shareholder involvement in corporate governance is inadequate, as a result of a variety of economic and regulatory obstacles. It goes on to identify what improvements are necessary and where, to ensure a sound framework for effective institutional investor activism and to improve the level of minority shareholder protection. It also cautions Saudi legislators against erecting hurdles to the future engagement of Saudi and foreign institutional investors in monitoring corporate activities which may affect the conditions for access, allocation and monitoring of equity, which is so important for value creation and sustainable economic growth. The main benefit to be derived from this research is that it facilitates a fuller understanding of the Saudi approach to corporate governance, the corporate ownership environment and trends in the capital market. The analysis also deepens knowledge of corporate governance regimes, including the role of institutional investors, and of their characteristics and investment behaviours. In short, it considers whether institutional investors are willing or have been encouraged to use their power to engage in the companies in which they invest and whether they are qualified to solve the agency problem.