The aim of this thesis is to contribute to analytical Jurisprudence by studying in depth a concept that is characteristically legal and, at the same time, both a traditional term of descriptive political analyses and familiar in ordinary non-technical usage. The concept selected for study is "judicial power". The intended point of the study is fourfold: (1) to illustrate a useful method of analytical jurisprudential enquiry: (2) to discover and illustrate the types of features, problems and lessons connected with the use of legal concepts, or of theoretical or commonsense concepts in a legal context: (3) to compare the approaches of descriptive theorists and of lawyers to those problems and features , and (4) to provide thereby some concrete evidence of the distinction (or absence of distinction) between legal thought, method and system, and the thought, method and system of commonsense and the purified commonsense no of descriptive theory. A long introductory chapter seeks to explicate these particular aims, and to place them in the context of contemporary analytical jurisprudence. In the first place, it argues that the sharp distinction, drawn by Prof. H. L. A. Hart, between descruotive statements or "statements of fact", and legal statements or "conclusions from rules", is misleading and ought to be abandoned as a solution for the puzzle it was put forward to resolve. This argument, if correct, clears the ground for a more-or-less straightforward comparison between the "descriptive" use of the term "judicial power" by political analyst from Aristotle to modern times, and the use of the same term in "conclusions of law" arrived at by Justices if the High Court of Australia in interpreting the Australian federal Constitution. Moreover, in the course of the argument it is suggested that the general criterion of the correctness of statements, legal or otherwise, is the absence of further relevant questions that would lead to a revision of the statement, so that an analysis of the special feature of legal language should not rely on the simple distinction put forward by Hart, but should seek to identify the general and special conditions surrounding the making of correct statements in legal as compared with other realms of discourse. Several such conditions are suggested a priori; legal discourse is distinguished from commonsense discourse by (1) the desire for a system in affairs; (2) the need to resolve disputes by giving final answers; (3) the consequent definition of terms, and limitation on further questions; (4) the consequent possibility of authority and precedent, further limiting questions, and providing (5) an actual system of definite terms and relations on which to base a transition to more abstract concepts expressing generically various systematic relationships possible between definite terms. A conclusion of the whole thesis is that such features or conditions of legal discourse may readily be identified in the history of the Australian discussions of judicial power.

No description available.

Thesis (M.S.)--Taiwan da xue. / Reproduced from typescript with hand written t.p. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Bibliography: p. 241-247.

Thesis (M.S.)--Taiwan da xue. / Reproduced from typescript with hand written t.p. Bibliography: p. 241-247. Also issued in print.

Thesis (doctoral)--Universidad Javeriana.

Thesis (M.A.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1966. / eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Houston, 2003. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 197-208).

Thesis (S. J. D.)--University of Hong Kong, 2005. / Title proper from title frame. Also available in printed format.

The courts are recognised as playing an increasingly important role in the realisation and concretisation of socio-economic rights. However, the implications of these activities for notions of voice, engagement and access to decision-makers and those in power, are largely not understood. This study seeks to address key questions around what type of platform for engagement the courts are providing for more marginalised groups beyond sites of redress, as well as to consider the impacts of court cases, decisions and remedies on policy, practice and the everyday life of urban residents. The study utilises a comparative approach between India and South Africa, and examines two seminal court cases - one in Delhi, the Sealings Case, and the other in Johannesburg, the Olivia Road Case. The case studies demonstrate that the litigants’ decision to go to court is, in part, closely linked to the failure of representative democracy and is influenced by the coalitions and alliances of urban actors. Furthermore, the case studies look at the court as a site of engagement between citizens, residents and the state in order to see what benefits or dangers exist when engaging in litigation. The case studies further provide some insights into the implications of being denied access to the courts and how alternative modes of power-seeking and voicing issues come to the fore. Lastly, the case studies offer an account of the consequences of litigation and looks at the impact of court cases on policy, policy-making process, practice and the lives of citizens and notes that these are not only highly differentiated but also extremely unpredictable. In making sense of the role of the court in urban governance, the study argues for a conceptualisation of courts as institutions of hegemony, and pushes Gramsci’s notion to explain courts and court cases as platforms on which litigants can promote their own hegemonic or counter-hegemonic project. However, courts are not neutral containers in which these politics unfold; rather they are engaged actors with their own agendas and hegemonic visions, which they seek to enforce through the decisions that they make and the roles that they carve out for themselves within the urban governance terrain.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Brandeis University, 2010. / "UMI no: 3390523." MICROFILM COPY ALSO AVAILABLE IN THE UNIVERSITY ARCHIVES. Includes bibliographical references.