Women's rights have been a historically controversial issue. This is no exception in Iran, where the struggle between modernization and keeping with traditional Islamic values has been a topic of constant disagreement between political leaders. Women in Iran have experienced many changes in their personal rights and freedoms throughout the decades. This research focuses on religion and culture, the policies of the main leaders of Iran in the past decades, and the role of non-governmental organizations as factors that expand or limit the rights and freedoms of women. It attempts to identify which factor is mostly responsible for the position that women have been historically placed in. The intent of this thesis is to research the rights and conditions of women in Iran.In general the question could be proposed as "are the lives of women in Iran better off today than in the past?" In the western world there are many stereotypes that are oftentimes attached to women, such as the notions that they are not allowed to pursue an education or career and that they do not have any legal rights. Evidence shows that these notions are not accurate in contemporary Iran, and that women have made significant strides in gaining their rights and freedoms. Through the analysis of several case studies, literature reviews, and statistical evidence, this thesis seeks to identify the factors that most affect women's rights and freedoms. By analyzing the factors that have historically placed women at a disadvantage in Iranian society, and better understanding their lives, this thesis aims to fight the stereotypes placed upon them as well as raise awareness for the continuing plight of women in Iran today.

The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), also known as the Pasdaran, is a unique military institution created to secure the ideals of Iran's revolution as well its territory. Since the end of the Iran-Iraq War, however, the IRGC's role in Iran's political economy has increased significantly beyond that mandate. Unfortunately, the leadership in the United States has demonstrated neither the aptitude nor the desire to understand Iran. Given the IRGC's command of Iran's nuclear development program and encroachment into its foreign policy, it is more important than ever to understand Iran's leadership structure. This study attempts to explain an important part of that structure by considering the influence of the leadership dynamics of Iran along with its economic and religious/social conditions on the IRGC's position within the state, using an historical analysis consisting of secondary sources. Accordingly, the IRGC's rise to power can be traced back to the dual sovereignty written into the constitution of the Islamic Republic. Though the divine sovereignty, embodied by the velayat-e faqih (Supreme Leader), is supposed to take precedence over popular sovereignty, embodied by the directly elected President, when the two conflict, Khomeini's successor, Khamenei, a junior cleric, was unable to manage then President Hashemi Rafsanjani. So he empowered the IRGC to compensate, but that choice set into motion a sequence of events that has enabled it to become powerful enough to be a threat to the velayat-e faqih himself.

自2002年秘密運作的核能設施曝光後，伊朗的核能政策一直是國際爭點且令人費解。若要討論伊朗核能政策是如何產出及其未來的走勢，本文認為伊朗本身的動機才是決定核能政策的關鍵。 本文以「個人－國內政治－國際政治」三層次作為分析架構，首先討論核能政策的發展歷程及其對伊朗的意義；其次分析伊朗最高宗教領袖Khamenei及伊朗政治派系如何影響核能政策；最後聚焦於2009年綠色運動後至2015年JCPOA簽訂這段期間，伊朗最高宗教領袖Khamenei與核能政策演變的關係。 本文發現伊朗的政治菁英對核能政策有高度共識，認為發展核能政策代表著實踐伊朗的大國意識與民族尊嚴、經濟與能源多元化的自主發展以及安全上的保障。另外，從政治派系角度出發，核能政策也被視為派系鬥爭中的槓桿，是政治菁英獲得權力的工具。同時，基於伊朗特殊的政治體制－－教法學家體系，最高宗教領袖Khamenei為伊朗權力體系中的第一人，其態度與政治取向決定了核能政策的走向。而在最高宗教領袖Khamenei決定核能政策的走向時，其必須將國內外政經局勢納入考量，並時時權衡當前的局勢是否會影響其作為最高宗教領袖的合法性。本文認為，若能繼續對最高宗教領袖Khamenei加以觀察，並分析其與國內政治派系的互動，將有助於未來對伊朗核能政策的了解並對伊朗政治帶來更全面的研究。

No / The widespread protests of November 2019 may be marked as the bloodiest recent chapter of the Islamic Republic of Iran's history in terms of popular dissent. The two major protests in December 2017 and November 2019, followed by the public reaction to the shooting down of the Ukrainian International Airlines Flight 752 by the IRGC over Tehran after the US killing of General Soleimani, suggest that the prevailing dynamics of political protest in Iran are changing. There is an increasing sense of radicalisation among protesters, while the state is prepared to resort to extreme violence to maintain control. The geography of political protest has changed. The declining economic situation has had a profound impact on the more vulnerable segments of the society who are now increasingly playing a more proactive role in challenging the state. The methods of protest have been evolving over the last four decades, especially in the cultural arena. Last but not least, the willingness of the protesters both to endure and inflict violence is precipitously transforming state-society relations beyond recognition. This article begins by providing a brief overview of protest in the history of the Islamic Republic, up to the public reaction to the 2020 downing of the Ukrainian airline over Tehran. This provides a historical context to assess the ways in which both the political climate and protests have changed over the last four decades. A section identifying and analysing the factors which have created the current political cul-de-sac then follows. The changing dynamics of the protests are the result of the existing political gridlock and the economic crisis, and it is thus important to evaluate the prevailing conditions which have paved the way for the radicalisation of political climate in Iran. The final section examines the changing dynamics of political protest.

Since the early days of 1979, the Islamic Revolution of Iran has been seen as a phenomenon unique in history, one which must be viewed as somehow separate from other political Islamic movements in the 20th century. In chapter 1, this thesis problematizes this interpretation of the Revolution by analyzing it through the lens of an earlier ideological movement, pan-Islamism, and applying methods from the study of conceptual history to draw linkages between this movement and the Islamic Revolution, rooting it more deeply in the region’s political and intellectual history, and casting light on the poorly-understood pan-Islamic aspects of Iran’s Revolutionary ideology. In chapter 2, it applies methodological innovations from the digital humanities, more specifically corpus linguistics, in carrying out a series of five case studies to examine the transformation of Iranian ideology over time, by analyzing a set of five text corpora comprised of individual leaders’ writings and speeches. It further illustrates how theoretical advances in discourse analysis and history seem to be moving towards the same point, and how the application of corpus linguistic methods advances these bodies of theory. Chapters 3 through 7 comprise the case studies, which are, in order: Ruhollah Khomeini and Ali Khamenei, the two Supreme Leaders; Ali Akbar Hashemi Rasfanjani, Mohammad Khatami, and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the three Presidents since 1989. These chapters illustrate through analysis of the textual data how each political leader has adapted the received political discourse to the exigencies of their times, and how pan-Islamism itself has remained a consistent, albeit dynamic, linking thread running through the period 1979-2009. By studying pan-Islamism in the Iranian context, we can explain several features of Iranian political discourse which otherwise seem incomprehensible, and better situate the Islamic Republic within the political and discursive transformations taking place at the regional level of the Middle East, and the global level of the Muslim umma.

Iran's foreign policy is consistent and is fundamentally realist with a revolutionist vision while the means are rationalist is the central argument of this dissertation. I make use of the English Schools three traditions of realism, rationalism and revolutionism in analyzing the speeches of Iranian statesmen to identify the ways in which the dynamics of the three traditions have evolved since 1997 and what it means for interpreting the developments of Iran's foreign policy ventures. I utilize both quantitative and qualitative methods of analysis in examining the speeches of the supreme leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, the presidents since 1997. The quantitative method employs a customized software generating figures that represent the recurrence of realist, rationalist and revolutionist terminologies in all the documents downloaded from the official websites of the Iranian statesmen as well as the United Nations and select news agencies and affiliates. The quantitative phase of the analysis, meanwhile, carefully examined selected statements of the supreme leader and the presidents uncovering the foreign policy argumentations and justifications, which were studied alongside foreign policy actions and classified under the three traditions. The findings suggest that Iran's foreign policy is the same as in the other states of international society – it is consistent and dynamic. It is simultaneously realist, rationalist and revolutionist with each tradition serving a specific purpose, which cannot be disentangled from the other two.