This master thesis examines the Swedish part of the UN-operation after the October war, UNEF II, and how they portrait the local cultures and ethnic groups, both belligerent and the civilian population. The thesis uses two battalion newspapers. Sandpappret which was published ones a month between November 1973 and December 1979 and Ökenkuriren which was published semi-daily between November 27th 1978 and June 18th 1979. The thesis also uses two books written by participants of the operation, Eld upphör! By Hallqvist and Ökenvägen by Agrell. The thesis reaches the conclusion that both newspapers and books use a very orientalistic language and while positive comments do exist, like comments about the mysterious and wise orient, negative comments are more prevalent. This applies to both the belligerent and the civilian population. The books are more negative, and can be more negative, because they do not have a UN led editorial staff and the UN rules to think about. The arab culture is a lot more prevalent in the texts than the culture in Israel. The culture in Israel does not get the same orientalistic treatment as the arab culture. Time does not seem to affect the opinions shown neither does most big events. The only big event that seems to have a lasting effect on the written opinions are when the buffer zone was extended and a lot of bedouins suddenly found themselves in the Swedish part of the zone.

Recent aggressions and geopolitical insecurities in the Baltic region have made it necessary for the Swedish armed forces to change their focus from an international defense policy to a territorial defense strategy. This change focuses mainly on strengthening the defensive capabilities of the Swedish armed Forces by reshaping the brigade structures with a focus on combined arms warfare in conjunction to maneuver warfare. Current doctrine and manuals show a lack in combined arms concerning its contribution to tactical success as well as its origin. As such a question whether tactical success can be explained with combined arms has been raised. This thesis aims to examine if Robert R Leonhard’s theory on combined arms can explain success at a tactical level during Operation Desert Storm and the Yom Kippur war and the analysis focuses on Robert Leonhards three principles of combined arms. The result of the study shows that the theory can partly explain success at a tactical level in both cases. But further studies must be conducted on the subject in order to increase the theories explanatory power.

I den övergripande luftmaktsteoretiska debatten framkommer kritik mot att små nationers specifika förutsättningar i krig tenderar att exkluderas. Konsekvensen blir att små nationer i allt för stor utsträckning kopierar stora nationers doktrinära tänk istället för att generera egna idéer. Shaun Clarke försöker genom sin luftmaktsteoretiska ansats vända denna trend och har närmare undersökt små nationers möjlighet att genom strategisk attack nå framgång mot större motståndare.   Genom sin originalitet anses Clarkes luftmaktsteori vara ett viktigt tillskott i den övergripande luftmaktsteoretiska debatten, men kritiseras samtidigt för att inte vara tillräckligt empiriskt underbyggd. Syftet med denna undersökning är att möta denna kritik och genom en teoriprövande ansats empiriskt undersöka förklaringskraften hos Clarkes teori. Därigenom även bidra till ett trovärdigare vetenskapsteoretiskt underlag, med fokus på den lilla nationen och dess ambition att utveckla förmågan strategisk attack. Forskningsstrategin representeras av en tvåfallstudie av Yom Kippur kriget 1973, samt Falklandskriget 1982, där Israel respektive Argentina utgör de huvudsakliga analysperspektiven. Resultatet påvisar att såväl Israel som Argentina tillämpat luftmakt utifrån Clarkes teoretiska beskrivning. Undersökningen stärker därmed Clarkes luftmaktsteori rent empiriskt. För små nationer, med ambition att utveckla sin förmåga till ett mer strategiskt nyttjande av luftmakt, så är den viktigaste slutsatsen från denna undersökning att strategisk attack inte primärt handlar om kinetisk energi som appliceras på strategiska mål. Utan det är istället de mänskliga reaktionerna och besluten bakom tillämpningen av strategisk attack som står i centrum.

The principles of war are appreciated as guidelines in doctrines and theorist Robert R. Leonhard states that surprise is more vital than ever in combat, but criticism is equally distributed. The principles might not even be valid since they lack examination systematically and empirically.  The purpose of this study is to examine the principle of surprise through a case study based upon naval operations during the Yom Kippur and Falklands War.  This tentative study is based on the thoughts of classical theorists. These thoughts are operationalized and subsequently investigated in literature in order to evaluate the validity.  The results show that the principle of surprise is valid to some extent in modern combat, but the factors validity may vary. The principle of surprise also becomes more nuanced in this study, as indicators and examples became connected to the principle.  It can be concluded that the study identifies a need for further empirical research as well as investigation on whether new factors can be discovered in modern combat.

Israel have been a particularly war-ridden state, since its inception in 1948 the Israelis had already fought five different wars in its first 30 years of existence. This essay aims to investigate the cause of two of these wars that had both been fought with Egypt. The 1967 six-days war and the Yom-Kippur war of 1973.To try and answer this question this essay uses Stephen Van Everas stability theory which tries to explain how states act when presented with a first move advantage. The study concludes that the main causes of these wars was hasty and truncated diplomacy combined with a lucrative first-strike advantage. The six-day war started as a result of Egyptian posturing turned to dreams of conquest and the Yom-kippur as a result of bitter resentment for the new status quo and total lack of diplomatic negotiations.