<p dir="ltr">Title IX is a law for federally funded educational institutions created to prevent discrimination based on sex. While Title IX has been helpful in some respects, there are still astronomically high rates of sexual violence on college campuses - despite ongoing and/or required sexual violence education programs for first year students. Unfortunately, the current state of educational programming around Title IX or sexual violence issues on US college and university campuses is focused almost solely on prevention – with very little if any education about what the Title IX process is for reporting acts of violence. The educational program developed here aims to close the gap of knowledge and give college students a reasonable expectation of the standard procedures and processes; and provide resources through an in-person presentation.</p>

<p>This thesis advances a number of claims, some conceptual, some empirical, some normative. The conceptual claims are concentrated in chapters 1 and 2, where a general account of the notion of a source of law is provided. Roughly, sources of law are documents or practices (e.g. statutes, judicial decisions, official customs) from which norms can be derived that function as sources of content-independent reasons for judges to decide legal cases one way or another. The remainder of the thesis is dedicated to discussing whether legal scholarship – or, more precisely, a particular type of legal scholarship that can be described as standard or doctrinal – is used as a source of law (as the concept is defined in chapters 1 and 2) in modern municipal legal systems. The conclusion that legal scholarship is used as a source of law (and thus as a source of content-independent reasons for action) may come as a surprise to those who associate recourse to legal scholarship by judges with judicial activism. It will be argued, however, that legal scholarship can plausibly be used to mitigate discretion. Indeed, it is precisely because it can be used in this way that judges sometimes refer to scholarship deceptively and suggest that it limits discretion in situations in which it in fact does not.</p> / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

Cette thèse interroge l’idée, fondamentale dans la philosophie juridique française, qui consiste à opposer formellement le droit et la science du droit. Cette opposition est l'application à la recherche en droit du dualisme sujet/objet, importée de la philosophie scientifique. Elle a conduit l'épistémologie juridique positiviste à déterminer des règles strictes en vue d'accéder à une véritable recherche scientifique sur le droit. Cependant, les théories sémantiques qui poursuivent les lignes de l'opposition du droit et de la science du droit reposent sur des bases fragiles et contestables. En particulier, la dissociation entre le langage juridique et le langage de la science du droit semble avoir été forcée par l'épistémologie juridique en vue d’entretenir l'idée d'une science du droit. Il semble toutefois possible de concevoir la recherche en droit autrement qu'en ayant recours aux fondamentaux de la philosophie scientifique. La philosophie herméneutique, fondée sur le rapport sujet/sujet, a été approfondie pour concevoir l'idée que le droit, pour les chercheurs en droit, consiste en une discussion à laquelle il leur importe de participer. Dans ce cadre, les prétentions à la scientificité par les chercheurs en droit doivent être interrogées, ainsi que les règles épistémologiques qui encouragent à la dissimulation d'un engagement dans la discussion juridique. Il importe au contraire de reconnaître la liberté des chercheurs en droit dans leur participation à la résolution de problèmes juridiques, ainsi que de saisir l’éclectisme de la recherche en droit au sein d’une épistémologie juridique démocratique. L’idée de science du droit est un obstacle à ces interrogations / The broad questions this work is addressing focus on the stringent opposition between law and legal science. Such a distinguishing is crucial for french philosophy. It assume the application to legal research of a subject/object dualism imported from scientific philosophy. It has led legal positivist epistemology to determine strict rules in order to access a genuine scientific legal scholarship. But the semantic theories which justifie the opposition of law and the science of law are based on tenuous and questionable bases. The dissociation between legal language and the language of legal science seems to have been forced by legal epistemology in order to preserve and maintain the idea of a legal science. It seems possible, however, to conceive of legal scholarship without any help from the fundamentals of scientific philosophy. The hermeneutic philosophy, based on the subject/subject relationship, has been helpful to conceive that the legal scholars’ law is a discussion, and not an object, and that they participate in. In this context, claims to scientificity from legal scholars must be questioned, as well as epistemological rules that encourage the concealment of commitment in legal discussion. On the contrary, it is important to recognize the freedom of legal scholars to participate in the resolution of legal issues, as well as to conceive this participation through a democratic legal epistemology. It seems that the idea of the science of law is an obstacle to these questions

Le droit privé européen se construit progressivement, à la fois en tant que branche du droit, notamment à travers les instruments du droit de l’Union européenne, et en tant que discipline juridique, c’est-à-dire comme savoir juridique. Le rôle de la doctrine apparaît primordial dans cette construction (ou reconstruction dès lors que le jus commune médiéval est considéré comme un précédent). Au caractère fragmentaire et sectoriel des instruments du droit de l’Union européenne touchant au droit privé, la doctrine a répondu en élaborant des instruments de droit prospectif qui ambitionnent de construire le droit privé européen comme une branche du droit complète et cohérente. Les projets publiés couvrent par exemple la théorie générale des contrats (Principes du droit européen des contrats, dirigés par O. Lando), le droit de la responsabilité civile (Principles of European Tort Law), voire tout le droit patrimonial (Draft Common Frame of Reference, dirigé par C. von Bar). La doctrine joue aussi un rôle dans la diffusion des concepts dans les différents systèmes juridiques (estoppel, intérêts négatif et positif, incombance,…). Cette diffusion est favorisée par l’apparition de manuels, de cours, de diplômes consacrés au droit privé européen, alors même que celui-ci demeure très incomplet. Quelle que soit la manière dont est envisagé le droit privé européen, la doctrine tient un rôle essentiel. L’omniprésence de la doctrine impose donc de s’interroger sur son rôle dans la construction, ou selon certains dans la reconstruction, d’un droit privé européen. / European private law is gradually built, both as a branch of law, especially through EU legal instruments, and as a legal discipline, i.e. as a legal knowledge, a jurisprudence. Legal scholarship plays a fundamental part in this construction (or reconstruction when medieval jus commune is regarded as a precedent). In response to the fragmentary and sectorial approach of EU legal instruments concerning private law, legal scholarship has drawn up several legal drafts; these drafts aim to build the European private law as a complete and consistent branch of law. The published drafts include general contract law (Principles of European Contract Law, edited by O. Lando), tort law (Principles of European Tort Law), and even the whole patrimonial law (Draft Common Frame of Reference, edited by C. von Bar). The legal scholarship also plays a part in the diffusion of concepts in different legal systems (estoppel, reliance and expectation interests, Obliegenheit, …). This diffusion is enhanced by the emergence of books, lectures, degrees in European private law, even if this law remains very incomplete. Whichever way European private law is understood, legal scholarship contributes in an essential manner. The omnipresence of the legal scholarship leads to question its role in the construction, or according to some authors the reconstruction, of a European private law.

O presente trabalho pretende sistematizar e analisar a doutrina brasileira dos direitos sociais (direito à saúde, educação e moradia) produzida entre os anos de 1964 e 2006. O seu desenvolvimento ocorre em quatro capítulos. No capítulo I, apresento quais foram os critérios utilizados para a coleta dos textos jurídicos (artigos de revistas, capítulos de livro e livros). Um dos pontos importantes para esta pesquisa é justamente o levantamento bibliográfico. Assim detalhei todos os procedimentos seguidos para obter os textos que compõem o que denomino \"doutrina brasileira dos direitos sociais\". O capítulo II traz o arcabouço teórico necessário para uma análise da doutrina brasileira dos direitos sociais. Dedico o capítulo III para retratar a doutrina brasileira dos direitos sociais. Esse retrato está construído em dois momentos distintos. No primeiro momento, exponho tal doutrina em números mostrando a produção de textos referente aos anos de 1964-2006. No segundo momento, sistematizo-a a partir de temas que são abordados pela própria doutrina. Assim, mostro (a) quais são os temas considerados relevantes; (b) quais são as respostas construídas para os problemas relacionados aos direitos sociais. Assim, retrato a doutrina a partir dela própria sem pressupor quais seriam os temas mais importantes. Pretendi dar voz completa aos textos sem aparecer como doutrinador neste momento. Por fim, no capítulo IV, analiso a doutrina a partir da minha lente teórica criticando-a, propondo uma agenda de debate e destacando suas características. / This thesis surveys and analyses Brazilian legal scholarship on social rights (rights to healthcare, education and housing) between 1964 and 2006. Chapter I presents the methodology for the selection of the texts used (journal articles, book chapters and books) so as to explain in detail the criteria for the formation of a corpus of what I call the Brazilian social rights doctrine. Chapter II examines the theory used in this thesis. Chapter III examines such doctrine first by presenting data on the volume of texts published between 1964 and 2006 and then by organizing them according to their subject matter. This strategy allows one to (a) identify topics considered relevant by scholars in different moments; (b) identify the answers offered by scholars to the problem of social rights. Chapter IV critically analyses the Brazilian social rights doctrine and offers an agenda for future debate.

O presente trabalho pretende sistematizar e analisar a doutrina brasileira dos direitos sociais (direito à saúde, educação e moradia) produzida entre os anos de 1964 e 2006. O seu desenvolvimento ocorre em quatro capítulos. No capítulo I, apresento quais foram os critérios utilizados para a coleta dos textos jurídicos (artigos de revistas, capítulos de livro e livros). Um dos pontos importantes para esta pesquisa é justamente o levantamento bibliográfico. Assim detalhei todos os procedimentos seguidos para obter os textos que compõem o que denomino \"doutrina brasileira dos direitos sociais\". O capítulo II traz o arcabouço teórico necessário para uma análise da doutrina brasileira dos direitos sociais. Dedico o capítulo III para retratar a doutrina brasileira dos direitos sociais. Esse retrato está construído em dois momentos distintos. No primeiro momento, exponho tal doutrina em números mostrando a produção de textos referente aos anos de 1964-2006. No segundo momento, sistematizo-a a partir de temas que são abordados pela própria doutrina. Assim, mostro (a) quais são os temas considerados relevantes; (b) quais são as respostas construídas para os problemas relacionados aos direitos sociais. Assim, retrato a doutrina a partir dela própria sem pressupor quais seriam os temas mais importantes. Pretendi dar voz completa aos textos sem aparecer como doutrinador neste momento. Por fim, no capítulo IV, analiso a doutrina a partir da minha lente teórica criticando-a, propondo uma agenda de debate e destacando suas características. / This thesis surveys and analyses Brazilian legal scholarship on social rights (rights to healthcare, education and housing) between 1964 and 2006. Chapter I presents the methodology for the selection of the texts used (journal articles, book chapters and books) so as to explain in detail the criteria for the formation of a corpus of what I call the Brazilian social rights doctrine. Chapter II examines the theory used in this thesis. Chapter III examines such doctrine first by presenting data on the volume of texts published between 1964 and 2006 and then by organizing them according to their subject matter. This strategy allows one to (a) identify topics considered relevant by scholars in different moments; (b) identify the answers offered by scholars to the problem of social rights. Chapter IV critically analyses the Brazilian social rights doctrine and offers an agenda for future debate.

<p dir="ltr">This dissertation argues that shifting secular conversion therapy practices and theories in North America between 1910 and 1980 consistently relied on both queer affective experience and anti-queer and anti-trans animus to justify often brutalizing medical interventions. Canadian and American conversion therapists’ pathologizing views of queer sexual behavior and gender identity were shaped by complex interplays between cultural, legal, social, and medical perspectives, but predominately worked to uphold heteronormative social structures leading to discrimination, hate, and harm towards queer people in both countries. Focusing on affect thereby encourages scholars to recognize how conversion therapies in all their variable historical permutations are both medical <i>and </i>cultural practices that have attempted to use queer patients’ affective needs for acceptance, love, safety, and validation in ways advancing anti-gay and anti-trans social narratives in purportedly therapeutic settings since the early twentieth century.</p><p dir="ltr">This research uses a transnational approach that is at once sensitive to national differences between the American and Canadian queer experience while looking to draw connections between conversion therapy’s development and individual experiences of this practice in two national contexts over time. It additionally pays careful attention to the ways social power hierarchies based on race and class informed individuals’ affective experiences of conversion therapy between 1910 and 1980.</p>

Connu en droit administratif, le thème de l’empirisme et du conceptualisme interroge la possibilité pour la doctrine, d’induire de la jurisprudence des catégories plus générales et abstraites, facilitant la connaissance d’une discipline essentiellement jurisprudentielle. L’idée de confronter cette problématique au droit constitutionnel est d’abord liée aux mutations de la discipline depuis la création du Conseil constitutionnel en 1958. Précisément, le développement de la jurisprudence constitutionnelle pouvait laisser présumer une facette empirique en droit constitutionnel, susceptible d’interroger la nécessité pour la doctrine, de procéder a posteriori à une mise en ordre synthétique des décisions du Conseil constitutionnel. En réalité, l’alternance entre l’empirisme et le conceptualisme en droit constitutionnel dépasse le seul rapport de la doctrine et la jurisprudence. La présente étude s’efforce alors de saisir dans tous les stades de la discipline, et quelles que soient les sources, le travail de systématisation du droit. Néanmoins, il ne s’agit pas de se contenter de suivre, conformément à une démarche chronologique, l’évolution de la pensée en droit constitutionnel, mais de procéder à l’identification de périodes. Le conceptualisme ancien, hérité des premiers manuels de droit constitutionnel à la fin du XIXe siècle, a permis d’élaborer les grands principes du droit constitutionnel français. Partant, l’évolution des méthodes doctrinales tout au long du XXe et au début du XXIe siècle, en lien avec l’évolution du droit lui-même, soumet ces principes à des démarches plus empiriques. Il s’agit d’abord, d’un premier courant doctrinal apparu à la suite de la Seconde Guerre mondiale, qualifié dans le cadre de la présente étude de « empirisme politique », puis, aux alentours des années 1970, d’un second courant, défendant un « empirisme juridique ». Enfin et cette dernière période demeure en cours, le développement de la jurisprudence du Conseil constitutionnel, caractérisée par son empirisme, ouvre la voie à un « empirisme jurisprudentiel », dont les enjeux sont plus largement abordés dans la présente étude. / The issue of empiricism and conceptualism has been studied in administrative law. It refers to the possibility for academics to infer general and abstract categories from case law. Such reasoning by induction aims to facilitate the knowledge of administrative law, which essentially consists of case law. Studying this issue in constitutional law is justified by the changes which have occurred in the discipline since the birth of the Conseil Constitutionnel in 1958. Specifically, the development of constitutional case law has led to the assumption that constitutional law has a more empirical dimension and that new relations are being established between academics and judges. In practice, the alternation between empiricism and conceptualism in constitutional law goes beyond the relation between legal scholars and case law. Thus, this study attempts to capture the systematization of law in all stages of the discipline and whatever the sources. The analysis is not only following the changes in the mode of thinking concerning constitutional law by respecting a chronological sequence, it also aims at identifying periods.The conceptualism of the past, inherited from the first treatises on constitutional law at the end of the nineteenth century, has developed the main principles of French constitutional law. Since then, the evolution of doctrinal methods, throughout the twentieth and the early twenty-first century, in conjunction with the development of law itself, subjects these principles to more empirical approaches, bringing them closer to the reality of constitutional law. More precisely, three empirical periods can be identified. The first period emerged after Word War II and is described as “political empiricism” in this study. The second time appeared in the 1970’s and advocates a “legal empiricism”. Finally, the development of the jurisprudence of the Conseil constitutionnel opens the way for “case law empiricism”, widely discussed in this analysis.