L’objet de ce travail est une réinterprétation de l’histoire des premiers contacts entre le nouveau gouvernement communiste chinois, le gouvernement tibétain et la population tibétaine, ainsi que de l’introduction progressive de l’idéologie léniniste sur le plateau tibétain, en exploitant pour cela des sources principalement officielles, parfois officieuses, publiées en RPC, et pour l’essentiel non encore utilisées à ce jour. Cette étude montre qu’il est souvent impossible de séparer tant la politique du nouveau gouvernement chinois dans le Tibet du Dalaï-lama et dans les autres régions de culture tibétaine, qu’également la réaction des populations locales dans les différents terrains du monde tibétain. Seront entre autre étudiés les motivations derrière la volonté des responsables de la RPC d’occuper le plus rapidement possible le Tibet, les innombrables difficultés liées à cette tentative, le fait qu’il sera matériellement impossible à l’APL, à la veille de la bataille de Chamdo, en octobre 1950, d’avancer plus avant en territoire tibétain, et comment Mao Zedong va réussir à transformer une déconvenue militaire en une victoire politique. Sera également analysé la politique en 1949-1951 du PCC dans les autres régions tibétaines, en quoi cette politique a pu être différente d’une région à l’autre, mais en quoi il pourrait quand même y avoir, dans cette diversité, une vision globale idéologique. Comment la victoire (incomplète) de l’APL à Chamdo aura été obtenue in extremis, l’état major de la 18e armée, comme les dirigeants de la RPC, ayant des doutes réels sur cette victoire jusqu’à la fin. Comment les responsables de la RPC, bien qu’à l’origine en position de faiblesse, vont réussir non seulement à empêcher le Dalaï-lama de partir à l’étranger, mais même à obtenir qu’une délégation soit envoyée à Pékin pour « négocier ». L’utilisation de documents chinois inédits va permettre également d’apporter des éléments nouveaux sur le déroulement des « négociations » aboutissant à l’ « Accord en 17 points ». Le dernier acte, se traduira par l’arrivée, extrêmement difficile, des premiers détachements des forces de l’APL à Lhassa et comment la capitulation du gouvernement tibétain a pu être obtenue. / The object of this study is a reinterpretation of the history of the first contacts between the new Chinese Communist government, the Tibetan government and the Tibetan population, as well as the gradual introduction of Leninist ideology on the Tibetan plateau, using for that official or sometimes semi-official sources published in the PRC, most of them not used until now. This study shows that it is often impossible to separate the politics of the new Chinese government in Tibet of the Dalai Lama and the politics of the Chinese government in other regions of Tibetan culture, as well as the reaction of local populations in the different areas of the Tibetan world. This study for example analyses the motivations behind the willingness of the leaders of the PRC to occupy Tibet as quickly as possible, the countless difficulties associated with this attempt, the fact that it will be physically impossible for the PLA, on the eve of the Battle of Chamdo in October 1950, to advance further into Tibetan territory, and how Mao will succeed in transforming a military failure into a political victory. It will also analyze the policy of the CCP in 1949-1951 in the other Tibetan regions, how this policy may have been different from one region to another, but how could there be in this diversity a global ideological vision. How the (incomplete) victory of the PLA in Chamdo was obtained in extremis, the staff of the 18th Army, like the leaders of the PRC, having real doubts about this victory until the end. How the leaders of the PRC, although originally in a weak position, will succeed not only in preventing the Dalai Lama from going abroad, but even obtain that a delegation will be sent to Beijing to " to negotiate ". The use of unpublished Chinese documents will also bring new elements on course of the "negotiations" leading to the "17-point Agreement". The final act will result in the extremely difficult arrival of the first detachments of PLA forces in Lhasa and how the capitulation of the Tibetan government will be obtained.

Victors do not always write history. To date our knowledge of how the Pathet Lao seized power in Laos in 1975 has been based on accounts from those who witnessed events but who were not privy to the thinking and planning behind them. After the violent fall of Cambodia and Vietnam, the slow, relatively peaceful and seemingly dilatory takeover of power they observed did not equate with the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party’s assertion that its seizure of power was due to the “creative application of Marxism-Leninism to Lao conditions”. This work attempts to determine the accuracy of the Lao Party’s claim by using LPRP documents and written and verbal accounts, which reveal the strategic thinking and tactics behind the Lao Revolution. The piecing together of information drawn from many and varied sources that were directly involved, at last sheds some light on how a small, weak movement overthrew a government almost without violence. It also reveals that the LPRP carefully and deliberately planned and executed the peaceful formation of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic in December 1975 in a revolution that was unprecedented in the history of Marxist-Leninist revolutions.

This thesis argues that a socially conservative tendency informed much of George Orwell's commentary between 1934 and 1943, and that the same tendency reflected a general European trend. The main sources of this thesis are a large selection of George Orwell's works and a smaller selection of works by Frantz Fanon, Jose Ortega y Gasset, and Antonio Gramsci. This thesis relies upon Orwell's involvement in the Spanish Civil War between 1936 and 1937 and his embrace of nationalism in 1940 as major organizational points of reference. This thesis concludes that Orwell's commentary was an example of a general European conservative reaction against Marxist-Leninist thought.

This thesis aims to provide a history of African American working class and Leftist activism in Atlanta, Georgia during the early 1970s. It places a series of wildcat strikes within the context of political and social transition, and charges unequal economic conditions and a racially charged discriminatory environment as primary causes. The legacies of both the Civil Rights Movement and the New Left are identified as key contributing factors to this wave of labor unrest. One path taken by former Civil Right activists was to focus on poor peoples’ movements, and one course taken by the 1960s-era New Left activists was to join forces with the working class in an attempt to build a New Communist movement. In Atlanta, these two forces converged and generated a notable force against some of city’s most prominent employers.