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This dissertation addresses a basic question of nonviolent, state-society interaction in the developing world: under what conditions do nascent civil associations in non-democratic or semi-democratic contexts successfully lobby the state yet maintain their autonomy and avoid cooptation? To address this question, the study compares how the Chambers of Commerce in Kuwait and Jordan have lobbied their respective states. The approach involves a comparison within and between each country, dividing each case into four general time periods so that there is sufficient variation in political, economic, and social conditions. The problem of the study is that despite similar political, economic, and social factors, Kuwait's Chamber of Commerce has been more successful in affecting national economic policy than Jordan's Chamber. Why? This dissertation demonstrates that current theories privileging either, state-centric, structural-economic, or society-centric variables fail to account fully for the observed outcomes. Each offers insight but none satisfy. Instead, this thesis argues that two levels of factors, macro economic and institutional organization, combine to account for patterns of business lobbying. The first independent variable is sectoral differentiation of the private economy. For each country, different types of exogenous finances help shape different sectoral attributes within each economy. The degree of sectoral differentiation (whether it is high or low) determines the contours and divisions of the private sector in which the business association is embedded. Membership drawn from the private sector helps shape the broad constraints on the business, association. Two secondary variables at the association level---membership qualifications and voting rules---in turn determine the degree to which the rank and file can affect the association's leadership coherence. These organizational variables either amplify membership divisions and conflicts, or help alleviat