In this paper preparers’ and non-preparers’ positions regarding accounting for goodwill are examined through studying submitted comment letters on ED3 ‘Business Combinations’. Preparers have, because of economic consequences, incentives to lobby for the non-amortisation approach and non-preparers for the amortisation approach. As hypothesised, non-preparers are found to support amortisation of goodwill to a greater extent than do preparers. Moreover, the two groups’ supportive arguments, i.e. how they argue for or against the non-amortisation or amortisation approach, are studied. Again, as hypothesised, the results show that the two groups use the same type of ‘sophisticated’ framework based arguments instead of economic consequences arguments. Taken together the examination of the comment letters thus indicates that both preparers and non-preparers point at conceptual strengths and weaknesses, instead of pointing at the real cause of the lobbying activities, i.e. perceived economic consequences, when they try to affect the final outcome of the standard. These findings confirm earlier research which has suggested that self-interested lobbyists use accounting theories and concepts as useful justifications.

ABSTRACT This dissertation constructs three strategic trade models. The first model is a single-shot two-stage game model of intra-industry trade with trade retaliation against government provided export subsidies and lobbying by foreign firm on domestic government¡¦s import tariff. The second model is an infinite repeated game model of intra-industry where the history of government and firm interaction is the basis for constructing trade strategies. The third model is a single-shot three-stage game model of intra-industry trade with the linkage between domestic and foreign intermediate-input and final-good industries and the choice of optimal export subsidies in the two industries for two governments. Chapter 1 introduces the motivation, objectives, framework, and literature review of this dissertation. The literature review is organized as follows. Initially we review the foundations of the basic intra-industry trade model, where our model is rooted. Next we present the more significant papers that describe the sensitivity of the basic model, because our repeated game model will show yet another way that the basic model is sensitive. Next we present some dynamic game theoretic results, which we use to construct our repeated game model. Finally, we review some papers related to intermediate input and strategic trade. The first model is developed in Chapter 2. We discover that there are two perfect strategy subgame perfect equilibria in this model. And then an import tariff is available, and using that tariff will remove the benefits originally conferred by an export subsidy. Active trade policy is not eliminated by the two governments and tariff policy is larger than subsidy policy. Hence, an import tariff will more than offset the anticipated gains from a subsidy policy. There is no reason to believe that one equilibrium is better or more likely than another, because the highest payoffs equilibrium of the two governments and domestic firm is not the best payoff equilibrium of the foreign firm. We used the single-shot game model of Chapter 2 and molded it into a repeated game in Chapter 3. First, we found the set of Nash equilibria toward solving the repeated game model. Second, we only focused on the subgame perfect equilibria from the infinite Nash equilibria¡¦s set. We used the result in Fudenberg and Maskin (1986) to define the subgame perfect equilibria. Third, we showed that in the repeated game a subgame perfect strategy of free trade can increase all players¡¦ payoffs which are better than the single-shot game equilibrium payoffs. Chapter 4 develops the third model. We observe how domestic and foreign governments choose their optimum export subsidy policies for their intermediate input and final good production by using the linkage between domestic and foreign intermediate-input and final-good industries under the condition of vertical specialization. The result indicates that under the condition of vertical specialization, the two governments will choose positive export subsidies for their final goods while they will give no subsidies for their intermediate inputs. Chapter 5 presented the implications of vertical specialization on the cross-strait economy and trade. To maintain the competitive advantage of Taiwan economy and smoothly upgrade industry structure, transferring the labor-intensive industry and the labor-intensive production sections to China seems an optimum choice under the principle of comparative advantages. Nevertheless, for Taiwan, the upgrade of local industries has never stopped, but with the acceleration of industrial relocation, the transformation of production and trade structures are also taking place. The impact carried by this transformation is extensive and profound. In addition to obvious impact on the economic perspective, if the structure of employment market cannot react in time, a great social cost may be incurred. How to utilize the edge of industrial specialization between the Strait to strengthen Taiwanese industries¡¦ competitive, enhance product development ability through cooperation with multinational enterprises, dominate product development, and establish a center of task division for regional industries can be one of the main focuses in the development of Taiwan¡¦s industrial policy.

No description available.

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Thesis (doctoral)--Universität Konstanz, 2007. / Includes bibliographical references (p. [373]-419).

Thesis (M. Phil.)--University of Hong Kong, 1997. / Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (M.J.)--Carleton University, 1992. / Also available in electronic format on the Internet.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Oregon State University, 2008. / Printout. Includes bibliographical references. Also available on the World Wide Web.

Thesis (M. Publ. Admin.)--Kutztown University. / Source: Masters Abstracts International, Volume: 45-06, page: 2947. Typescript. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 82-84).

Over the past two decades, transnational private standards such as “dolphin-safe,” “fair-trade,” and “sustainably produced timber,” have become ubiquitous. The regulatory landscape of many issue areas includes a mix of these private standards and government regulation. This is puzzling as firms adopting these standards voluntarily commit to exceeding government regulation, yet may not recoup the additional costs related to production changes and certification of their processes. To understand why firms adopt transnational private standards and how these standards affect government policies, this dissertation examines how the adoption of sustainable forestry standards changed the regulatory dynamics between firms and governments between 1997 and 2016. The dissertation consists of three analyses of the interaction between standards’ adoption and government regulation. The first study quantitatively evaluates forest sector policies in 38 countries, and demonstrates that whether industries use their adoption of transnational private standards to gain competitive advantages over foreign rivals, or alternatively, to avert further government regulation depends on market conditions and the willingness of consumers to pay a premium for certification. The second study investigates the extent to which to which governments in Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom have included transnational private standards in regulation to provide producers in import-competing industries competitive benefits over foreign producers. It establishes that in most cases, governments calibrated forest sector policies to increase trade benefits in response to the trade orientation of sectors and their level of transnational private standards adoption. The third study examines lobbying across industries and finds that industries adopted lobbying strategies on different forest sector policies based on whether those policies would improve their competitiveness and the extent to which to which they believed they could influence government policy. In aggregate, these studies demonstrate that governments of more-developed countries incorporated transnational private standards into their forest sector policies to the extent that doing so would provide economic benefits to their industries, and that they did so due to corporate lobbying. / 10000-01-01