Conçu comme une simple circonscription administrative, le département s'est institutionnalisé, il est devenu un cadre d'élection (politics), de structuration de la vie partisane (polity) et d'action publique (policy). Face au constat d'un département « mal connu », délaissé par la science politique, cette thèse propose un examen approfondi du département en tant qu'objet de luttes discursives et institutionnelles. La première partie dévoile l'état des discours autour du département. Trois focus historiques mettent au jour une structure répétitive des controverses révélée par une matrice argumentative (question de la « bonne échelle », des compétences ou encore de l'identité) et des spécificités (cadres prescriptifs). Cette perspective historique atteste les transformations tant de l'institution que de ses défenseurs. La cause départementaliste se recompose en permanence au gré des changements de la société et mutations politiques. La seconde partie dresse quant à elle l'état des forces, s'intéressant aux modes de mobilisation du lobby départementaliste. Ces modes évoluent, s'agrègent : influence sur la législation en cours par les conseillers généraux parlementaires, revues réformatrices, expertise, structure associative... Il s'est agi également de montrer comment les conseils généraux par leurs attributions structurent des intérêts. / Designed as a simple administrative constituency, the département has become institutionalised and has turned into a framework for elections (politics), the structuration of partisan activity (polity), and public action (policy). In view of the fact that the département is still relatively unknown, neglected by political science, this dissertation offers an in-depth examination of the département as an object of discursive and institutional conflicts. The first part shows the state of discourse concerning the département. Three items of historical focus highlight a repetitive structure in the controversies revealed by an argumentative matrix (the question of the "proper scale", competencies and questions of identity) and specificities (prescribed frameworks). This historical perspective pinpoints transformations in the institution itself as well as of its defenders. The "départementaliste" cause reconstructs itself as society changes and political mutations occur. The second part evaluates the state of its power structure, focusing on the modes of mobilisation of the "départementaliste" lobby. These modes evolve and aggregate: influence on legislation being debated and voted on by the general councillor members of Parliament, reform-oriented journals, expertise, association... It is also been shown how general councils, through their attributions, structure interests.

Au cours des dix dernières années, les prix immobiliers ont augmenté de façon considérable. Selon certains observateurs, cette hausse peut au moins en partie être attribuée à une insuffisance de l’offre, elle-même due à des politiques foncières restrictives mises en place par certaines communes. Cette thèse cherche à comprendre ce qui motive une commune à instaurer de telles politiques de maîtrise de la croissance. Nous nous plaçons dans le cadre de la Nouvelle Economie Politique et modélisons cette décision comme le résultat d’un jeu de pouvoir entre différents intérêts liés au foncier, arbitré par des élus locaux opportunistes. Ce jeu de pouvoir oppose principalement les propriétaires immobiliers et fonciers, qui peuvent trouver des alliés parmi les entreprises locales, qui s’associent au sein de growth ou ideas machines. Dans un premier modèle nous décrivons ce jeu d’influence sous différentes hypothèses concernant l’influence du vote et du lobbying. Nous montrons que la rigueur de la politique implémentée peut sous certaines conditions être liée de façon négative à la part des propriétaires dans la population locale – et ceci malgré le fait que ces derniers sont clairement partisans d’une politique stricte. Par ailleurs, la mobilité des individus rend les décisions des communes interdépendantes et nous parvenons à une solution d’équilibre qui s’apparente directement au modèle spatial autorégressif utilisé en économétrie spatiale. Une étude empirique portant sur la taxe locale d’équipement confirme l’hypothèse d’interactions stratégiques et montre que les choix des élus sont avant tout influencés par les habitants-propriétaires et les ideas machines d’un côté et par les agriculteurs de l’autre. Dans une deuxième analyse, nous étudions si les élus locaux se servent des mesures de maîtrise de la croissance d’une manière stratégique afin de faciliter leur réélection. Nous développons un modèle de vote probabiliste dans lequel la composition de la population est endogène à la politique foncière. Une étude empirique confirme que les choix de zonage des élus locaux sont influencés par la mobilité de l’électorat, même si leur comportement ne peut pas être qualifié de stratégique. / Over the last ten years, real estate prices have risen considerably and accordingly to most observers, this can at least partly be attributed to an insufficient supply, due to local growth control measures. This thesis tries to understand what motivates local authorities implementing such policies. Local politicians are considered as opportunistic and their decision is modelled as the result of a political struggle between different land-related interests. This game for influence mainly opposes the owners of developed and undeveloped land, who find allies amongst local business interests that might form growth or ideas machines. Our first model describes this struggle under different hypotheses concerning the influence of voting and lobbying. We show that the growth controls implemented might under some conditions be less strict the greater the percentage of homeowners in the local population – despite the fact that homeowners favour strict policies. When individuals are mobile, local decisions become interdependent, and under imperfect mobility our theoretically derived equilibrium solution can directly be interpreted as a spatial autoregressive model. Our empirical analysis concerning the “taxe locale d’équipement” confirms our predictions concerning strategic interactions and shows that local decisions are influenced by “homevoters” and ideas machines on the one side, and by the local farmers on the other side. Our second model examines if local politicians use growth control policies strategically in order to modify the local electorate in a manner that facilitates their re-election. Our model is based on probabilistic voting and the composition of the local population is considered as endogenous. Our empirical analysis confirms that zoning decisions are influenced by the mobility of the local electorate, even if we cannot ascertain that politicians are acting strategically.

This study investigated the perceptions of influential relationships between Texas public university presidents, university system chancellors, and state legislators. The study's purpose was to examine Texas public universities engagement in lobbying type behaviors and whether public policy is affected through interaction and communication with legislative leaders. Moreover, of importance for this study was to identifying if Texas public universities actively work to influence the Texas legislature and if lobbying behavior exists whether or not that behavior influences public policy formation within the Texas legislative process. Lastly, this study focused on perceptions dealing with the Texas statute prohibiting state governmental agencies, including public universities and university systems, from influencing legislation through use of state funds. The study was conducted in the winter of 2003 and had 29 president / chancellor respondents and 88 legislator respondents. Three survey instruments were developed by the researcher to determine Texas public university president, system chancellor, and state legislator perceptions and attitudes concerning lobbying type activities, influence, and state statute compliance. Data reported consist of percentages, t-Test of significance, and Cohen's d effect size measure. Results from the study show agreement between the groups in areas of activities utilized to influence the legislative process and actual influence of public policy. Disagreement within statute compliance was reported between the groups.

<p>Abstract</p><p>Title: An industry with a lacking trust – PR-consultants about their own responsibility and how they can contribute to an increased trust for their profession (En bransch med bristande förtroende – PR-konsulter om sitt eget ansvar och hur de själva kan bidra till ökat branschförtroende)</p><p>Number of pages: 68 (79 including enclosures)</p><p>Author: Ebba Göranzon</p><p>Tutor: Göran Svensson</p><p>Course: Media and Communication Studies D</p><p>Period: Spring 2008</p><p>University: Division of Media and Communication, Department of Information Science, Uppsala University</p><p>Aim: The aim of this essay is to study the Swedish PR-industry and the distrust that is directed towards it. The starting point is different PR-consultants opinion about their profession and industry. What do they think needs to be done to increase the trust for the industry and what kind of responsibility do they think they have?</p><p>Method/Material: Together with literature studies, a qualitative method has been used and five in-depth interviews with PR-consultants have been conducted. The persons interviewed all worked with questions concerning lobbying and influencing the public opinion, within Swedish PR-firms.</p><p>Main Results: The main results show that the PR-consultants pay different attention to the factors of the model, in terms of what can be done for the trust for the industry and profession. They all think they have a responsibility in the trust question and name all sorts of things they could do to improve it.</p><p>Keywords: Public Relations (PR), lobbying, influencing public opinion, trust</p>

This paper argues against the common historical belief that the British East India Company’s actions benefited the British Public. While many recent historical works argue that the Company had detrimental effects on India, the common consensus believes that the Company’s actions while pillaging India benefited Britain through economic treasures and access to luxuries. In the first section of the text, the author describes the British East India Company’s corruption, propaganda, and lobbying efforts to enrich individual members of the Company and protect personal and corporate profits. The next section describes the Company’s impact on Britain and argues that the Company was an overwhelmingly negative investment for the British taxpayer. The author compares the East India Company’s historic actions and impacts on Britain to the impact of modern big corporations on their own nations. The text concludes with an argument that the popular narrative, which holds that large corporations’ interests coincide with that of the nation’s public interest, is both inherently mistaken and fraught with danger. The author argues against a zero-sum worldview and for a corporate sector with checks and balances.

The aim of this study is to define and further the understanding of the practice of lobbying as it manifests in the participants’ interactions with each other and to identify its specific conditions (rules, standards, traits). A research overview shows that lobbying as a political phenomenon is well researched, but that the action per se tends to been taken for granted as ‘talking’. Communication between lobbyists and politicians has predominantly been reconstructed as transmission, informationexchange. The study addresses this deficiency by applying an ethnographic method, shadowing, and by focussing on the micro-level of lobbying as a socio-political phenomenon. Lobbying is researched in moments of interaction between interest representatives and representatives of the political system, i.e. MEPs and their assistants. Seven lobbyists and politicians in Brussels have been shadowed for one week each; a further 34 interviews were conducted. The analytical strategy was to infer from the actors’ impression management (Goffman). The study is informed by a neo-institutional perspective. It assumes that cognitive, normative, and regulative structures provide meaning to social behavior, and that these resources are identifiable. Goffman’s concept of team and the distinction between frontstage and backstage emerged as central categories. My results suggest that the small world of the EU’s capital results in a sense of ‘us in Brussels’ shared by lobbyists, politicians and assistants alike. Lobbying-interaction in frontstage-mode is governed by strict conventions; ignorance or transgression are sanctioned as unprofessional. The key result, however, is that lobbyists actively work towards engagement on other terms. Lobbyists employ various strategies and build relations with politicians in order to create moments of backstage-interaction. In backstage-mode, lobbyists not only gain access to soft information, but can negotiate ways of working together with politicians in pursuit of different, but partly overlapping agendas.

This dissertation focuses on how distributive politics influences the geographic allocation of federal grants to state and local governments. A secondary focus is the role of social trust in the growth of government. In the first essay, I test the degree to which the earmark ban of 2011 prevented legislators from directing federal competitive grants to their home congressional districts and whether earmarking distorted equality in the distribution of federal grants across demographic groups. I find that earmarking skewed the distribution of federal grants toward wealthy congressional districts and away from poor congressional districts. This is a groundbreaking finding, considering that no literature has addressed the impact of earmarking on economic inequality. In the second essay, I estimate the returns to lobbying for local governments in terms of federal earmarked grants, and I find that local governments in counties with higher levels of income per capita were more likely to engage in lobbying. I also find evidence of a causal link between lobbying and federal earmarks to local governments. Given that local governments in wealthy areas tend to have larger tax bases, which allows them to more easily fund public infrastructure projects, my findings imply that lobbying and earmarking hampered the ability of federal grant programs to promote equality in the distribution of federal funds. The third essay utilizes time series econometrics to examine the relationship between government regulation, spending, interest group activity, and social trust in government.

The following dissertation contains two distinct empirical essays which contribute to the overall field of Financial Economics. Chapter 1 titles as “Corporate Lobbying, CEO Political Ideology and Firm Performance”. We investigate the influence of CEO political orientation on corporate lobbying efforts. Specifically, we study whether CEO political ideology, in terms of manager-level campaign donations, determines the choice and amount of firm lobbying involvement and the impact of lobbying on firm value. We find a generous engagement in lobbying efforts by firms with Republican leaning-managers, which lobby a larger number of bills and have higher lobbying expenditures. However, the cost of lobbying offsets the benefit for firms with Republican CEOs. We report higher agency costs of free cash flow, lower Tobin’s Q, and smaller increases in buy and hold abnormal returns following lobbying activities for firms with Republican managers, compared to Democratic and Apolitical rivals. Overall, our results suggest that the effects of lobbying on firm performance vary across firms with different managerial political orientations. Chapter 2 titled as “Corporate Lobbying and Labor Relations: Evidence from Employee” Litigations. We utilize employee litigations and other work-related complaints to examine if lobbying firms are favored in judicial process. We gather 27,794 employee lawsuits (after initial court hearing) between 2000 and 2014 and test the relationship between employee allegations and firms’ lobbying strategies. We find that employee litigations increase the number of labor-related bills in our sample. We document that the increase in employee lawsuits may drive firms into lobbying to change policy proposals. We also find robust evidence that the case outcome is different for lobbying firms compared to non-lobbying rivals, which may protect the shareholder wealth in the long run. Our results present that lobbying activities may make a significant difference in employee allegations. Our findings highlight the benefit of building political capital to obtain a biased outcome in favor of politically-connected firms.

L’objectif de ce mémoire est double. D’une part, il vise à proposer un cadre d’analyse novateur permettant d’étendre le modèle du marketing politique, traditionnellement limité au cas des partis politiques, en l’appliquant aux stratégies de recrutement (en amont) et de lobbying (en aval) des groupes d’intérêt. D’autre part, il a pour but de donner un nouveau souffle à l’étude des groupes d’intérêt en tant que sous-champ de la science politique en situant leur action dans une perspective dynamique et stratégique. De façon plus spécifique, cette recherche vise à évaluer, à l’aide de deux hypothèses, le degré de déploiement global de l’approche marketing chez les groupes d’intérêt au Québec et à comparer son niveau de pénétration spécifique au sein des différentes organisations. La première hypothèse avance que le degré de déploiement global du marketing politique auprès des groupes d’intérêt québécois s’avère relativement faible en raison d’un certain nombre de facteurs contextuels qui ont historiquement limité son intégration au sein de leurs stratégies de recrutement et de lobbying. La seconde hypothèse affirme pour sa part que le niveau de pénétration spécifique de l’approche marketing est limité à certaines organisations et varie en fonction de certains facteurs qui peuvent s’avérer contradictoires. Les données recueillies lors d’entrevues menées auprès de douze des principaux groupes d’intérêt actifs à l’échelle du Québec tendent à confirmer les deux hypothèses. / The goal of this paper is twofold. On the one hand, it aims to offer an innovative analytical framework for extending the model of political marketing, traditionally limited to the case of political parties, by applying it to the recruitment (upstream) ad lobbying (downstream) strategies of interest groups. On the other hand, it aims to give new impetus to the study of interest groups as a subfield of political science by placing their actions in a dynamic and strategic perspective. In more specific terms, this research aims to assess, with two hypotheses, the overall level of deployment of the marketing approach among interest groups in Quebec and compare its specific level of penetration within the various organizations. The first hypothesis argues that the degree of penetration of global marketing policy with interest groups in Quebec is relatively low due to a number of contextual factors that have historically limited its integration within their recruitment strategies and lobbying. The second hypothesis assumes for his part that the level of deployment of specific marketing approach is limited to certain organizations and varies depending on certain factors which may be contradictory. The data gathered during interviews with twelve key interest groups active throughout the Quebec tend to confirm the two hypotheses. / Fonds québécois de recherche sur la société et la culture

A Research Report submitted to the Faculty of Humanities, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts, Applied Ethics for Professionals Johannesburg, 2016 / This research sought to defend the proposition that not only do corporations have a moral right to lobby, corporations also have a moral duty to influence public policy through lobbying. The research has considered the ethics of corporate lobbying within the context of the extent literature in Business Ethics and from a South African perspective. An argument for corporate moral personhood has been advanced as the basis for a corporation’s moral right to lobby. The rights and duties of corporations as citizens have also been considered, and a case has been made for a normative theory of corporations as political actors with an associated moral obligation to seek to influence public policy to promote public interests. A set of ethical principles to guide responsible lobbying has been articulated as a morally justified basis for restricting a corporation’s moral right to lobby which arises from its status as a type of moral person to ensure that the power of corporations is harnessed in service of society. / MT2017