I situate this dissertation and its contributions at the edge of the literature on interest group political behavior and congressional responsiveness. In particular, I use new strategies and tools to study interest group influence. In the first essay, I find that a machine-learning text-analysis detects latent patterns in the frequency of lobbying by the telecommunications industry in 2015. Meanwhile, members of Congress primarily focus on healthcare and taxes when they discuss policy issues on social media. In the second essay, I measure the change in political behavior of interest groups by ideology after the surprise result of the 2016 presidential election. The evidence suggests there was an increase in political spending by ideologically polarized interest groups shortly after the election. Finally, the cornerstone of this dissertation evaluates the results of two field experiments measuring congressional responsiveness to issue advocacy with a non-profit, non-partisan political advocacy organization. Counter to expectations in the interest group literature, I find that members of Congress are responsive on social media to interest group requests on a low-salience, non-partisan issue. These findings have important implications for representation and responsiveness in the U.S. Congress by highlighting areas of research that need further study and deeper evaluation.

Práce se zabývá problematikou dobývání renty. Konkrétně vymezuje teoretická východiska dobývání renty a analyzuje jednotlivé způsoby ovlivňování vládních představitelů, převážně lobbying a korupci. Odpovídá na otázku, v čem spočívají neefektivnosti při ovlivňování vládních představitelů zájmovými skupinami a jak je možné tyto činnosti eliminovat nebo minimalizovat jejich negativní dopad na společnost. Analytická část práce vymezuje hlavní příčiny odlišných měr korupce v České republice a na Slovensku na počátku 90. let a porovnává úspěšnost provádění antikorupčních politik v těchto zemích.

Although the prevailing viewpoint claims that corporate profitability and environmental regulation are directly at odds, there is a growing base of evidence suggesting that low-carbon companies gain a strategic advantage over dirtier competitors by lobbying for more stringent climate regulations. This paper extends previous analyses of corporate greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and lobbying using toxic releases as a measure of environmental performance to assess the assertion that both clean and dirty firms disproportionately lobby on environmental policies. In my analysis, I find that the same relationship previously found using GHG emissions as a measure of corporate environmental performance holds with toxic releases when examining only the three most widely represented industries in my data—Major Chemical, Power Generation, and Energy Utilities. When combined with findings of a negative linear correlation between firms’ toxic releases and lobbying expenditures using the same sample, my results suggest that clean firms in these industries not only lobby frequently on environmental policies—they actually do so more aggressively than their dirtier competitors. While I deduce that these results are caused by clean firms lobbying for stricter environmental regulations that impose costly compliance costs on dirty competitors, it is evident that my data do not specify if firms are lobbying for or against more stringent regulations or what the implications of those lobbied policies would entail. This inability to distinguish firms’ underlying motivations for lobbying is a fundamental shortcoming of my analysis.

The following paper explores the relationship between the tobacco industry and the United States government. Through an extensive literature review, I conclude that the government is perpetuating the tobacco crisis in the United States by aligning their policymaking actions with the interests of the industry in exchange for receiving campaign support. I find that the primary method of support the industry provides is through monetary contributions, essentially bribing legislators to assist them on tobacco control regulations. I argue that this mode of persuasion is most effective because the tobacco industry is appealing to the egos of the legislators by bolstering their finances which in turn greatly enables them to sustain their power in office. For future research, I recommend analyzing this relationship regarding the rising trend of e-cigarettes and vaping, especially among adolescents.

Cette thèse s’intéresse à la standardisation de la comptabilité environnementale. Elle est composée de trois articles (études empiriques) qui explorent ensemble différentes facettes de la participation de certaines parties prenantes au processus de standardisation de la comptabilité environnementale. Les trois études sont basées sur l’étude de cas de la standardisation de la comptabilité environnementale des produits qui sous-tend les projets « affichage environnemental des produits de grande consommation » en France et/ou le « Product Environmental Footprint » européen. Nous avons privilégié trois niveaux d’analyse. Le premier article (niveau macro) s’intéresse à explorer le travail institutionnel conduit par des acteurs marginalisés pour participer aux processus de standardisation. Dans le second article (niveau méso), nous nous intéressons aux intermédiaires de la standardisation (les consultants spécialisés en comptabilité environnementale) et plus particulièrement comment ils utilisent et mobilisent les instances de standardisation pour maintenir leur expertise et pour asseoir le caractère professionnalisant de leur activité. Enfin, dans le troisième article (niveau micro) nous nous intéressons à un participant de la standardisation (une entreprise internationale). Nous cherchons à comprendre comment la participation à un processus de standardisation de la comptabilité environnementale est influencée par le travail conduit en interne d’une entreprise et réciproquement comment, lors de sa participation le processus de standardisation a-t-il influencé l’entreprise (démarche RSE). L’ensemble des résultats contribue à améliorer la compréhension de la façon dont certaines parties prenantes participent aux processus de standardisation de la comptabilité environnementale. / This PhD thesis deals with the standardization of environmental accounting. It consists of three papers (empirical studies) that explore different facets of stakeholder participation in the process of standardizing environmental accounting. The three studies are based on the case study of the standardization of the environmental accounting of the products underlying the projects "environmental labelling of consumer products" in France and the development of the European Product Environmental Footprint. We have focused on three levels of analysis.The first article (macro level) focuses on identifying and exploring the institutional work conducted by marginalized actors to participate in standardization processes. In the second article (meso level), we are interested in the intermediaries of standardization (consultants specializing in environmental accounting) and in particular how they use and mobilize the standardization bodies to maintain their expertise and to establish the professionalism of their activity. Finally, in the third article (micro level) we are interested in a standardization participant (a multinational) in which we try to understand how participation in a process of standardization of environmental accounting is influenced by the work carried out internally within an organization and, conversely, how, during its participation, the standardization process influenced the functioning of the organization and its CSR approach. The overall results contribute to a better understanding of how standardization stakeholders are involved in the process of standardizing environmental accounting.

This dissertation examines the impact of regulation and public policies on firm performance. Chapter 1, entitled “Political Contributions, Insider Trading, and CEO Compensation”, determines why CEOs from politically-connected firms receive higher pay compared to their non-politically connected peers. We investigate whether insider trading can explain high CEO pay. Using hand-collected firm-level lobbying data, we examine whether politically-connected CEOs engage in insider trading after sponsored bills are introduced and passed in the U.S. legislative bodies. Our results show that politically-connected CEOs commit insider trading, which yields higher compensation packages. In addition, we also find that lobbying benefits firm performance. Politically-connected firms receive more government contracts, which increases firm value. Overall, political contributions benefit both CEOs and shareholders. Chapter 2, entitled “The Impact of Incarceration on Firm Performance” conducts analyses on the impact of incarceration on firms based in the United States. Through time series Granger Causality Vector Autoregression (VAR) tests by state, we find that incarceration can influence labor markets measured by the state’s unemployment rate. We find that firms based in states with high incarceration underperform compared to firms based in states with low incarceration. This also holds true when examining prison reform data from the Pew Charitable Trust. Through differences in differences tests, we find that firms based in states with prison reform outperform firms based in states without prison reform. When controlling for firm and state macroeconomic factors, we find that increases in incarceration rates have a negative effect on firm performance.

Abstract not available

The thesis examines the role of regional labour councils in local employment generation. It specifically analyses the case of an Australian regional labour council, the South Coast Labour Council (SCLC), between 1981 and 1996. The Illawarra region was the centre of SCLC activity. It was an industrialised region that experienced high levels of unemployment in the period. These were greater than the State and national averages, which reflected a geographical concentration of unemployment in certain regions in Australia. The SCLC attempted to address this issue, as it was part of the union structure that was specifically focused on the regional level and on regional concerns. The study argues that the SCLC developed a local employment generation strategy and it examines how and why this was adopted and pursued. It finds that the SCLC was well placed at the regional level and was well resourced with a capacity to influence the external environment through its utilisation of both political and industrial methods in a period of agreeable internal relations. The research identifies the development of its local employment generation strategy. Sometimes the SCLC pursued its strategy in a manner of ad hoc decision-making and muddling through, while at other times it involved characteristic and distinctive regular patterns. The thesis concludes by evaluating the SCLC�s strategy of local employment generation and by exploring the applicability of the general trade union literature on methods and strategy to regional labour councils.

Le lobbying des entreprises auprès des décideurs publics est une pratique managériale de plus en plus courante. Différentes stratégies semblent exister mais les travaux qui évaluent ces actions politiques demeurent limités. Pourtant, la notion de création de valeur pour l'actionnaire, traditionnellement utilisée en finance, est susceptible d'apporter une mesure précise des effets du lobbying. <br />C'est pourquoi cette recherche se propose : <br />- d'évaluer l'influence des stratégies de lobbying des entreprises sur leur création de valeur ;<br />- de considérer un terrain peu étudié, l'Europe, et en particulier de comparer la situation des entreprises françaises et anglaises.<br />L'exploration empirique est conçue en deux temps. La première étape décrit, grâce aux techniques de l'analyse de données, les actions politiques des entreprises françaises et anglaises relevées dans la presse de 1995 à 2000. Elle montre qu'il existe un nombre limité de stratégies types de lobbying. La deuxième étape permet de mesurer la contribution de ces stratégies à la création de valeur des entreprises lobbyistes. L'étude d'événement menée à cet effet aboutit à des conclusions nuancées. Indépendamment de la nationalité des entreprises, un certain nombre de stratégies de lobbying contribuent à créer de la valeur, certaines en détruisent et d'autres sont sans effet.<br />Ces résultats contribuent à définir le lobbying en tant que stratégie à double titre. Ainsi, l'action politique de l'entreprise : <br />- cherche à générer de la valeur pour l'actionnaire en fondant un avantage concurrentiel ;<br />- est susceptible d'échouer sous la contrainte de pressions isomorphiques externes et de dysfonctionnements internes à l'entreprise.

Cette thèse est une analyse positive de la mise en œuvre des marchés de permis d'émission. Nous expliquons pourquoi les droits sont généralement offerts quand l'analyse économique normative recommande de les vendre.Nous montrons empiriquement que les permis négociables gratuits, source de profit exceptionnel, motivent des comportements de recherche de la rente. L'étude porte sur le marché américain de droits d'émission de SO2. La règle d'allocation initiale a été établie à l'issue de discussions parlementaires similaires à un jeu à somme nulle. Nous la formalisons comme une règle endogène de partage, fonction de l'effort de lobbying et nous la testons à l'aide des contributions politiques (monétaires).Nous analysons théoriquement le comportement d'un régulateur influencé ayant choisi d'organiser un marché de permis et qui doit encore décider sur deux variables politiques : la quantité globale de droits et la manière de les allouer au départ. Nous formalisons ce processus de décisions à l'aide du modèle d'agence commune.Nous montrons que le choix d'un mode d'allocation initiale n'est pas neutre en présence de défaillances du marché politique (lobbying). La décision de vendre les permis ou de les offrir gratuitement modifie l'incitation d'actionnaires d'une industrie polluante à faire pression pour ou contre la réduction des émissions.Nous analysons ensuite l'arbitrage public entre les deux variables lorsque plusieurs lobbies industriels jouent un jeu partiellement coopératif pour obtenir des permis gratuits. Le régulateur choisit en priorité d'offrir gratuitement les droits avant d'en manipuler la quantité totale, répondant ainsi efficacement à l'influence politique.