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Le présent travail propose une réflexion sur l'aspect social des émotions par l'entremise d'un examen de la dimension conflictuelle de 3 émotions: le désir, la honte et le dégoût. L'aspect problématique de ces émotions se situe au niveau de leur hypertrophie, en ce qu'elle encourage une emphase sur le soi, sur l'autosuffisance et la toute-puissance de l'individu, ce qui se traduit par des répercussions interpersonnelles, notamment la réduction marquée de la diversité des relations humaines qu'entretient l'individu avec les autres, et intrapersonnelles, particulièrement la narcotisation de l'identité individuelle. Cette réflexion est animée par la pensée de 3 principaux auteurs: celle de René Girard et de Martha C. Nussbaum afin d'explorer, pour chaque émotion, les implications de leur hypertrophie chez l'individu, puis de l'incidence du contexte social sur l'hypertrophie de ces émotions; celle d'Hannah Arendt afin de mieux comprendre la dynamique des relations humaines et comme palliatif à ces répercussions interpersonnelles et intrapersonnelles.

Sen and Nussbaum generate very different degrees of obligation for the affluent under their theories of justice, despite each of them deriving their theory of justice from capability as a metric for quality of life. On one hand, Sen’s account of obligation seems very weak, while Nussbaum’s seems overwhelmingly robust. I argue that the sufficient/decisivereasons framework as put forth by philosopher Derek Parfit captures the nuances of their extremely different accounts of obligation. Further, I argue that this framework convincingly demonstrates that the accounts of obligation that Sen and Nussbaum offer in each of their versions of the capability approach are unsatisfying, as each approach occupies such extremes that they are unreasonable. In spite of this, supplementing the capability approach with a different and perhaps more centrist account of obligation can make the capability approach a more consistent and appealing theory of justice. To this end, I appropriate Thomas Pogge’s account of obligation.

Le présent travail propose une réflexion sur l'aspect social des émotions par l'entremise d'un examen de la dimension conflictuelle de 3 émotions: le désir, la honte et le dégoût. L'aspect problématique de ces émotions se situe au niveau de leur hypertrophie, en ce qu'elle encourage une emphase sur le soi, sur l'autosuffisance et la toute-puissance de l'individu, ce qui se traduit par des répercussions interpersonnelles, notamment la réduction marquée de la diversité des relations humaines qu'entretient l'individu avec les autres, et intrapersonnelles, particulièrement la narcotisation de l'identité individuelle. Cette réflexion est animée par la pensée de 3 principaux auteurs: celle de René Girard et de Martha C. Nussbaum afin d'explorer, pour chaque émotion, les implications de leur hypertrophie chez l'individu, puis de l'incidence du contexte social sur l'hypertrophie de ces émotions; celle d'Hannah Arendt afin de mieux comprendre la dynamique des relations humaines et comme palliatif à ces répercussions interpersonnelles et intrapersonnelles.

In this thesis I distinguish between two conceptions of naturalism that have been offered as possible starting points for a virtue based ethics. The first version of naturalism is characterized by Philippa Foot’s project in Natural Goodness. The second version of naturalism can be found, in various forms, among the works of John McDowell, Martha Nussbaum, and Rosalind Hursthouse. I argue that neither naturalistic approach is entirely successful on its own, but that we can fruitfully carve a path between both approaches that points the way to a positive ethical account. I then conclude with a brief sketch of what such a positive account of a virtue ethics may look like.

<p>This thesis is an examination of the concept of human development and does a comparative study of Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum. Sen rectifies the emphasis on income by welfare economics, and argues for the ‘equality of capability’; a goal that he says can be achieved by means of the intrinsic and instrumental role of democracy. However, the author notes that Sen’s development paradigm is inadequate as an account for what constitutes the kind of well-being that is fully human and asserts that Sen’s framework should be concretized politically. In view of this, the author argues that Nussbaum’s articulation of a ‘threshold of capabilities’, anchored on her reading Aristotle’s concept of human flourishing and Marx’s insight on human dignity, is a politically realistic human development framework. Nussbaum thinks that the essential human capabilities are entitlements that must be constitutionally guaranteed to ensure a decent and dignified human life for all. As a response to the reality of pluralism, Nussbaum says that the universality of these entitlements can be secured by means of an overlapping consensus. Furthermore, the extreme poverty in many nations which exposes women and children to much vulnerability has provoked the author to inquire about the applicability of Nussbaum’s framework to the global arena. As such, the thesis argues for the radical expansion of the Human Development Index used by the United Nations Development Program in measuring the quality of human life, notably the inclusion of political liberties and gender equality. In addition to this, the study puts forward the argument that global human development is best achieved through democracy, and asserts that global institutions have a moral duty to protect and promote the central human capabilities.</p>

This thesis explores aspects of teachers’ obligation to implement and discuss what are referred to in the Swedish national school curricula as “fundamental values” (“värdegrunden” in Swedish). The aim is to describe and analyze dilemmas in interpretations of and teachers’ work with these fundamental values. Four questions are related to this aim. The first addresses difficulties discussed in conversations between seven upper secondary teachers, during nine meetings over the course of one year. In these conversations the teachers reflected upon how to interpret the fundamental values in relation to their daily practice. The second question focuses on the considerable diversity of Swedish schools and examines the work of the teachers through a perspective of intersectionality. The third question concerns how Martha Nussbaum’s theory of emotions as judgments of value could be used for an understanding of the identified dilemmas. The fourth question focuses on ways in which the participating teachers’ discussions may contribute to a wider discussion about possible aims and circumstances of teachers’ work with the fundamental values. Chapter 2 introduces the theoretical framework of the study, Martha Nussbaum’s (2001) ethical thinking on emotions as judgments of value. She argues that emotions have four common cognitive components. They have (1) external objects, and are directed towards these objects. They are (2) intentional, reflecting a person’s particular point of view, his or her special way of beholding the object, and (3) consist of judgments, i.e. views of how things in the world are. According to Nussbaum’s Aristotelian ethics, emotions also (4) mirror the individual’s vision of what a good human life is like, and the vulnerability of it. The concept of eudaimonia, a fulfilled or flourishing life, is central. Chapter 3 focuses on ideas of ethnicity, and on the specific obligation mentioned in the curriculum of counteracting xenophobia and intolerance in a multicultural society. Chapter 4 discusses various aspects of the teachers’ thoughts on religiosity within Swedish society (often depicted as one of most secular in the world) and within the educational system that is non-denominational. Chapter 5 draws attention to different ways in which the teachers view and teach pupils about sexual orientation. Chapter 6 presents conclusions on potential advantages of and challenges involved in Nussbaum’s Aristotelian theory of emotions, when applied to teachers’ views of and practical work with the fundamental values described in the curriculum. One advantage is that emotions may be intellectually scrutinized and morally assessed, on grounds that are known beforehand and discussed in a democratic process. The non-productive division between emotions, on the one hand, and intellectual and moral capabilities, on the other, is transcended by Nussbaum’s theory. An important challenge is to reflect upon when to discuss the cognitive content of pupils’ emotions, and when it is appropriate to state what is right or wrong, and try to influence pupils accordingly. Keywords: Emotions, vulnerability, values education, religious education, teaching, Martha Nussbaum, ethnicity, religion, sexual orientation. / Nationella Forskarskolan i Pedagogiskt Arbete

In this study I examine the arguments made by Martha Nussbaum in Poetic Justice in defence of a positive role for literary engagement in the process of moral and political judgement formation. Nussbaum argues that novel reading offers a unique chance to engage our empathy in morally beneficial ways, because it stands as a kind of practice run for appropriate moral judgement through the adoption of an emotionally engaged yet critically distant “Judicious Spectator” stance when reading. I examine her account of the activity and purported benefits of reading and argue that her use of the Judicious Spectator concept is incompatible with her claims about the structure of novels and the experience of reading. I suggest examining an alternative set of fictions, namely the genre of science fiction and in particular Ursula K. Le Guin’s novel The Left Hand of Darkness as a means to assess whether Nussbaum’s account plausibly captures the moral value of reading fiction. I argue that even a charitable reading of Nussbaum’s Judicious Spectator concept cannot explain the central thought experiment at the heart of Le Guin’s novel, as it invites readers to contemplate a re-evaluation of their own self-identities or foundational assumptions, allowing them to abandon beliefs and understandings that have perhaps unwittingly coloured their previous moral reasoning without undergoing the scrutiny of justificatory rigour. This resulting type of re-evaluation is, I argue, primarily self-reflective in nature and not externally directed to programmatic outcomes like the possible interpretations of the novel available to Nussbaum. This good, which I label ‘appropriate doubt’, is defended as a general feature of certain kinds of novel reading, and as worthy of moral attention. I conclude that this shows Nussbaum’s account of engagement with fiction to be at best, incomplete.

This thesis explores aspects of teachers’ obligation to implement and discuss what are referred to in the Swedish national school curricula as “fundamental values” (“värdegrunden” in Swedish). The aim is to describe and analyze dilemmas in interpretations of and teachers’ work with these fundamental values. Four questions are related to this aim. The first addresses difficulties discussed in conversations between seven upper secondary teachers, during nine meetings over the course of one year. In these conversations the teachers reflected upon how to interpret the fundamental values in relation to their daily practice. The second question focuses on the considerable diversity of Swedish schools and examines the work of the teachers through a perspective of intersectionality. The third question concerns how Martha Nussbaum’s theory of emotions as judgments of value could be used for an understanding of the identified dilemmas. The fourth question focuses on ways in which the participating teachers’ discussions may contribute to a wider discussion about possible aims and circumstances of teachers’ work with the fundamental values. Chapter 2 introduces the theoretical framework of the study, Martha Nussbaum’s (2001) ethical thinking on emotions as judgments of value. She argues that emotions have four common cognitive components. They have (1) external objects, and are directed towards these objects. They are (2) intentional, reflecting a person’s particular point of view, his or her special way of beholding the object, and (3) consist of judgments, i.e. views of how things in the world are. According to Nussbaum’s Aristotelian ethics, emotions also (4) mirror the individual’s vision of what a good human life is like, and the vulnerability of it. The concept of eudaimonia, a fulfilled or flourishing life, is central. Chapter 3 focuses on ideas of ethnicity, and on the specific obligation mentioned in the curriculum of counteracting xenophobia and intolerance in a multicultural society. Chapter 4 discusses various aspects of the teachers’ thoughts on religiosity within Swedish society (often depicted as one of most secular in the world) and within the educational system that is non-denominational. Chapter 5 draws attention to different ways in which the teachers view and teach pupils about sexual orientation. Chapter 6 presents conclusions on potential advantages of and challenges involved in Nussbaum’s Aristotelian theory of emotions, when applied to teachers’ views of and practical work with the fundamental values described in the curriculum. One advantage is that emotions may be intellectually scrutinized and morally assessed, on grounds that are known beforehand and discussed in a democratic process. The non-productive division between emotions, on the one hand, and intellectual and moral capabilities, on the other, is transcended by Nussbaum’s theory. An important challenge is to reflect upon when to discuss the cognitive content of pupils’ emotions, and when it is appropriate to state what is right or wrong, and try to influence pupils accordingly. Keywords: Emotions, vulnerability, values education, religious education, teaching, Martha Nussbaum, ethnicity, religion, sexual orientation.  / Nationella Forskarskolan i Pedagogiskt Arbete

Le présent travail propose une réflexion sur l'aspect social des émotions par l'entremise d'un examen de la dimension conflictuelle de 3 émotions: le désir, la honte et le dégoût. L'aspect problématique de ces émotions se situe au niveau de leur hypertrophie, en ce qu'elle encourage une emphase sur le soi, sur l'autosuffisance et la toute-puissance de l'individu, ce qui se traduit par des répercussions interpersonnelles, notamment la réduction marquée de la diversité des relations humaines qu'entretient l'individu avec les autres, et intrapersonnelles, particulièrement la narcotisation de l'identité individuelle. Cette réflexion est animée par la pensée de 3 principaux auteurs: celle de René Girard et de Martha C. Nussbaum afin d'explorer, pour chaque émotion, les implications de leur hypertrophie chez l'individu, puis de l'incidence du contexte social sur l'hypertrophie de ces émotions; celle d'Hannah Arendt afin de mieux comprendre la dynamique des relations humaines et comme palliatif à ces répercussions interpersonnelles et intrapersonnelles.