Thesis advisor: Richard Cobb-Stevens / Thesis advisor: Jean-Luc Solere / This dissertation attempts to locate the origins of Descartes' concept of mind in his early, unfinished treatise on scientific method, the <italic>Regulae ad directionem ingenii</italic>. It claims that one can see, in this early work, Descartes' commitment to substance dualism for methodological reasons. In order to begin an analysis of the <italic>Regulae</italic>, one must first attempt to resolve textual disputes concerning its integrity and one must understand the text as a historical work, dialectically situated in the tradition of late sixteenth and early seventeenth century thought. The dissertation provides this historical backdrop and textual sensitivity throughout, but it focuses on three main themes. First, the concept of <italic>mathesis universalis</italic> is taken to be the organizing principle of the work. This methodological principle defines a workable technique for solving mathematical problems, a means for applying mathematics to natural philosophical explanations, and a claim concerning the nature of mathematical truth. In each case, the <italic>mathesis universalis</italic> is designed to fit the innate capacities of the mind and the objects studied by <italic>mathesis</italic> are set apart from the mind as purely mechanical and geometrically representable objects. Second, Descartes' account of perceptual cognition, the principles of which are found in the <italic>Regulae</italic>, is examined. In this account, Descartes describes perception as a mechanical process up to the moment of conscious awareness. This point of awareness and the corresponding actions of the mind are, he claims, independent from mechanical principles; they are incorporeal and cannot be explained reductively. Finally, when Descartes outlines the explanatory bases of his natural science, he identifies certain "simple natures." These are the undetermined categories according to which actual things can be known. Descartes makes an explicit distinction between material simples and intellectual simples. It is argued that this distinction suggests a difference in kind between the sciences of the material world and the science or pure knowledge of the intellectual world. Though the <italic>Regulae</italic> is focused on physical or material explanations, there is a clear commitment to distinguishing this type of explanation from the explanation of mental content and mental acts. Hence, the <italic>Regulae</italic> demonstrates Descartes' early, methodological commitment to substance dualism. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2010. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Philosophy.

102f. / Submitted by Suelen Reis (suziy.ellen@gmail.com) on 2013-04-16T18:23:27Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertacao Jose Ramosseg.pdf: 1260926 bytes, checksum: 53097fbd14c8bf40917c40b05a859d3d (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Rodrigo Meirelles(rodrigomei@ufba.br) on 2013-05-29T14:47:30Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertacao Jose Ramosseg.pdf: 1260926 bytes, checksum: 53097fbd14c8bf40917c40b05a859d3d (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2013-05-29T14:47:30Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertacao Jose Ramosseg.pdf: 1260926 bytes, checksum: 53097fbd14c8bf40917c40b05a859d3d (MD5) Previous issue date: 2008 / A presente dissertação tem por objetivo explicar a estruturação da ciência cartesiana proposta nas obras do Discurso do método e na Geometrie. O caminho percorrido para chegar ao objetivo proposto foi estudar a possibilidade da caracterização da noção metódica de inteligibilidade através da filosofia matemática de Descartes. A noção metódica de inteligibilidade é o procedimento analítico que estabelece o conhecimento verdadeiro sobre o campo restrito do entendimento. Esta noção metódica possibilita, em última instância, a construção cientifica através de parâmetros claros e distintos, os quais têm como ponto de partida o pensamento analítico, a concepção de perfeição em Deus e a regularidade do método nos pressupostos matemáticos da mathesis universalis. / Salvador

La thèse vise à expliquer dans son contexte historique les Règles pour la direction de l'esprit par rapport au concept de l'esprit cartésien. J'argue que les Règles montrent une tendance vers un concept dualiste de l'esprit. Les raisons pour cette position, je pense, sont la plupart méthodologiques. Dans les Règles, Descartes a développé les fondements philosophiques de la méthode cartésienne qui a pour objet la résolution de tous les plus célèbres problèmes de l'époque dans la science de la nature et la mathématique. Cette méthode s'est fondée sur l'idée que tous les phénomènes naturels puissent être expliqués par les modèles géométriques. Alors, pour Descartes la méthode de la science de la nature est réductive, basé sur les modèles mathématiques. En conséquence, Descartes a évidement cru que les modèles qui expliquent la nature physique ne sont pas les mêmes qui puissent expliquer la nature de l'esprit. En plus, chez les Règles, l'esprit paraît comme le véhicule de la compréhension du monde physique, et par la physiologie du cerveau et par déterminer les paramètres scientifiques de l'explication et la représentation du monde physique. Donc l'esprit est bien séparée du monde physique dans les deux sens : il ne se réduit pas aux principes physique et il organise et soutiens les principes physiques. Nous validerons cette thèse en insistant sur quatre points spécifiques: (1) l'importance historique du texte des Règles pour la pensée cartésienne, (2) la nature et l'histoire de la mathesis universalis, (3) la physiologie de la cognition, et (4) les natures simples. / The dissertation aims to contextualize and understand the Regulae ad directionem ingenii as embodying theses central to the development of Descartes' mature metaphysical concept of mind. I argue that the Regulae demonstrates a tendancy toward a dualistic concept of mind. The reasons for this, I believe, are largely methodoligical. In the Regulae, Descartes develops the philosophical foundations for a scientific method that, he thought, would allow him to solve some of the most puzzling phenomena in nature and mathematics. This method is basically predicated on the idea that all natural phenomena, i.e., physical entities, can be understood by reducing those entities to geometrical models. These geometrical models could understood and explained either mechanically or algebraically. In either case, for Descartes the scientific method is essentially reductive. As a consequence,, he clearly believes that the models that explain the physical world are not the same as those that explain the nature of the mind. Furthermore, in the Regulae, the mind appears to be a vehicle for understanding the physical world, through the physiology of the brain and by determining the scientific parameters for any representation or explanation of the physical world. Thus, the mind is truly separated from the physical world in two senses: it cannot be reduced to physical principles and it organizes and found those physical principles. We will see how this is the case by focusing on four issues: (1) the historical significance of the text in the development of Descartes' thought (2) the mathesis universalis (3) the physiology of cognition and (4) the simple natures.

Le vif intérêt de Descartes porté constamment au concept de nature se manifeste dans son usage fréquent du terme avec toute sa complexité sémantique. La nature lui signifie d’abord la physique, à laquelle il travaille particulièrement dans les années 1630. Elle est ensuite l’essence et ce qui rend possible notre disposition essentielle en nous instituant, et cet usage se trouve fréquemment en Meditationes. Mais le concept cartésien de nature n’épuise pas toutes ses apparitions dans les usages du terme explicite, car il apparaît aussi implicitement dans un lien dyadique de la recherche du jeune Descartes. D’une part, celui-ci reconnaît dès le début de sa carrière l’existence intrinsèque des vérités dans notre esprit, dont les semences de vérités et les naturae simplices en tant qu’aboutissement de ce concept. D’autre part, le but principal du jeune philosophe est d’élucider les facultés naturelles de l’ingenium, avec la méthode épistémologique qui peut en être tirée naturellement. Le « naturel (-lement) » ne concerne pas seulement le mécanisme des connaissances, mais aussi la question de ce qui les rend naturelles, à savoir leurs fondements. Le concept de nature renvoie ainsi, pour Descartes jusqu’au Discours de la méthode, moins à l’essence qu’à la structure naturelle de connaître les vérités naturellement existantes dans l’esprit, et sa physique est une science appliquée de ces vérités sur les phénomènes naturels. Cette élucidation de la naturalité épistémique est une condition préalable à sa prochaine recherche sur la naturalité ontologique par la quête de raisons de certitude, à savoir la recherche en nature au sens d’essence qui s’effectuera en Meditationes. / The keen interest of Descartes constantly found in the concept of nature manifests itself in his frequent use of the term with all its semantic complexity. Nature means to him first of all the physics, on which he works particularly in the 1630s. Then, it is the essence and what makes possible our essential disposition by instituting us, and this use is frequently found in Meditationes. But the Cartesian concept of nature does not exhaust all its appearances in the uses of the explicit term, because it also appears implicitly in a dyadic link of the research of the young Descartes. On one hand, he recognizes from the beginning of his career the intrinsic existence of truths in our spirit, among which are found seeds of truths and naturae simplices as a culmination of this concept. On the other hand, the main purpose of the young philosopher is to elucidate natural faculties of ingenium with the epistemological method that can be drawn from it naturally. "Natural(-ly)" concerns not only the mechanism of knowledge, but also the question of what makes it natural, namely its foundations. The concept of nature refers thus, for Descartes until the Discourse on Method, less to the essence than to the natural structure to know the truths naturally existing in mind, and his physics is an applied science of these truths to the natural phenomena. This elucidation of the epistemic naturality is a prerequisite for his next research on the ontological naturality by the search of reasons of certainty, namely the research of nature in the sense of essence which will be carried out in Meditationes.

Leibniz publie à Leipzig en 1684 un court opuscule devenu classique, Meditationes de Cognitione, Veritate et Ideis. Cet essai de quelques pages constitue un véritable discours de la méthode pour la philosophie allemande. Ce travail tente de justifier cette assertion en reconstituant les étapes de la réception par Christian Wolff et Emmanuel Kant de ce court texte. Elle est ainsi conduite à étudier le développement en Allemagne d’une Begriffsanalyse. Elle affronte donc ce problème : qu’est-ce qu’analyser pour Wolff puis pour Kant ? L’étude de cette logique des notions, de son lien avec les mathématiques et du concept cartésienne de Mathesis universalis, aboutit à préciser la distinction kantienne entre méthode dogmatique et dogmatisme. Cette enquête remonte aux sources leibniziennes de la division classique des jugements en analytiques et synthétiques. Elle se conclut par l’étude de la critique d’Eberhard. Bref, pour reprendre une formule de Michel Fichant, elle tente d’établir « que derrière l’allemand de Kant se tient le latin de Leibniz ». / Leibniz published in 1684 a short opuscule, Meditationes de Cognitione, Veritate et Ideis. This Leibniz’s essay of few pages is a true discours de la méthode for the German philosophy. This research tries to justify this declaration and restores the reception of this short text by Christian Wolff and Immanuel Kant. This work studies the development of the Begriffsanalyse in Germany. But, what means analysis for Wolff and for Kant? The study of this logic of notions, its bond to mathematics and with the Cartesian conception of Mathesis universalis, clarifies the Kantian distinction between dogmatic method and dogmatism. This inquiry goes back to the Leibnizian origin of the classical division of analytic and synthetic judgments. This work comes to an end by the study of Eberhard’s critic of the Critic. In short, like Michel Fichant formulated, this study wants to make manifest that « behind German words of Kant lay down Latin words of Leibniz ».

By extending Husserl’s own historico-critical study to include the conceptual mathematics of more contemporary times – specifically category theory and its emphatic development since the second half of the 20th century – this paper claims that the delineation between mathematics and philosophy must be completely revisited. It will be contended that Husserl’s phenomenological work was very much influenced by the discoveries and limitations of the formal mathematics being developed at Göttingen during his tenure there and that, subsequently, the rôle he envisaged for his material a priori science is heavily dependent upon his conception of the definite manifold. Motivating these contentions is the idea of a mathematics which would go beyond the constraints of formal ontology and subsequently achieve coherence with the full sense of transcendental phenomenology. While this final point will be by no means proven within the confines of this paper it is hoped that the very fact of opening up for the possibility of such an idea will act as a supporting argument to the overriding thesis that the relationship between mathematics and phenomenology must be problematised.