Over the years there has been significant research around the misspecification of the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), which challenges the linear relationship between beta and market returns. One of the biggest challenges relates to the “small-firm effect,” which states there are two classifications of stocks (large and small) and that the companies with small-market capitalizations have higher returns. However, the definition of a small-cap is vague and there has been little focus in academia on the stocks in the middle-market capitalization deciles. Despite this, institutional and retail investors created the “mid-cap” category in the early 1990s and, since then, the risk-adjusted returns have been exceptional, relative to small- and large-cap stocks. This study examined mid-cap stocks from an academic perspective and delves into the “mid-cap myth” by evaluating the category over the past 85 years to answer the question around whether mid-caps are superior to other asset class. The results revealed that the highly touted and advertised mid-cap stock performance premium during the 1980-2013 time period was statistically insignificant. Moreover, mid-caps did have superior risk-adjusted returns over the extended time period studied (1928 to 2014); however, these superior returns relative to small-caps were not driven by the uniqueness of the mid-sized companies, but by the underperformance of small-cap stocks, specifically small-cap growth stocks. When studying the behavior or migration of mid-size companies, they do not appear to exhibit unusual behavior relative to companies with smaller market capitalizations, especially in the area of mergers and acquisitions. Thus, the question becomes why small-cap companies underperform relative to their risk level. The answer lies in the inclusion of the NASDAQ stocks to the CRSP database after 1972. This change not only doubled the number of stocks deemed small-caps, but also added a significant number of unprofitable fast-growing companies to the small-cap growth category, specifically in the technology and healthcare industries. The study benefits practitioners by providing insight into the omnipresent claim of mid-cap outperformance from 1980-2014, while also benefiting academia by providing more insight into small-caps’ underperformance during this period and how investigating small-cap growth companies further could add insight into the viability or magnitude of the size and value premium going forward.

Purpose: To investigate the usefulness of the Economic Value Added Momentum ratio and to determine if Swedish non-real estate, non-financial companies been either positively or negatively affected by their Corporate Real Estate structure from an EVAM perspective. Design/methodology/approach: Using a regression analysis composed of the OMX large and mid cap non-real estate, non-financial companies, investigates the relationship between companies’ real estate holdings and their ability to sustain a positive EVAM. The study covers the time period from 2006 to 2009 and includes 172 observations. Findings: The data showed that a negative relationship between EVAM and PPTY at the 10% real estate intensity interval might exist. However, no evidence was found that might suggest that a negative relationship between EVAM and corporate real estate holdings at the higher (15% real estate intensity) or the lower (5% real estate intensity) existed. This could suggest that companies’ that own lower percentages of real estate assets (less than 5% of PPTY) are not affecting their EVAM value and that companies’ that own larger amount of real estate (15% of PPTY or higher) are better at managing their real estate assets and thus it is not negatively impacting their EVAM. Research Implications: Real estate is reported at historical cost rather than at current fair market values. As the economy has, historically, enjoyed more periods of expansions than contractions, intuitive companies’ real estate assets are undervalued. Economic recession and booms can also dilute both the positive and negative aspects of real estate ownership. Although this investigation seeks to neutralize this phenomenon by including two periods of economic expansion and two periods of economic recession, it is unreasonable to claim that this will completely neutralize this affect. Practical Implications: The companies that have a PPTY of between 10% and 15% might be better off selling their real estate holdings or investing additional funds in real estate so as to either have a PPTY below 10% or above 15%. Companies that are in-between the 10% and 15% real estate ownership segment might not deem it cost effective to have specific real estate professionals or to invest in real estate know-how; however, the firms’ might at the same time own too much real estate, making it too costly to do nothing. Consequently, the companies could be better off deciding on a particular strategy: owning more real estate or owning less real estate. Originality/Value: Investigates if a linkage between a company’s ability to generate a positive EVAM and a company’s quantity of real estate assets exists.