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Jacques-Antoine-Hippolyte, comte de Guibert (1743-1790) dedicated his life and career to creating a new doctrine for the French army. Little about this doctrine was revolutionary. Indeed, Guibert openly decried the anarchy of popular participation in government and looked askance at the early days of the Revolution. Rather, Guibert’s doctrine marked the culmination of an evolutionary process that commenced decades before his time and reached fruition in the Réglement of 1791, which remained in force until the 1830s. Not content with military reform, Guibert demanded a political and social constitution to match. His reforms required these changes, demanding a disciplined, service-oriented society and a functional, rational government to assist his reformed military. He delved deeply, like no other contemporary writer, into the linkages between society, politics, and the military throughout his career and his writings. Guibert exerted an overwhelming influence on military thought across Europe for the next fifty years. His military theories provided the foundation for military reform during the twilight of the Old Regime. The Revolution, which adopted most of Guibert’s doctrine in 1791, continued his work. A new army and way of war based on Guibert’s reforms emerged to defeat France’s major enemies. In Napoleon’s hands, Guibert’s army all but conquered Europe by 1807. As other nations adopted French methods, Guibert’s influence spread across the Continent, reigning supreme until the 1830s. This dissertation adopts a biographical approach to examine Guibert’s life and influence on the creation of the French military system that led to Napoleon’s conquest of Europe. As no such biography exists in Anglophone literature, such a work will fill a crucial gap in understanding French military success to 1807. It examines the period of French military reform from 1760 to the creation and use of Napoleon’s Grande Armée from 1803 to 1807, illustrating the importance of Guibert’s systemic doctrine in the period. Moreover, the work argues that Guibert belongs in the ranks of authors whose works exerted a primary influence on the French Enlightenment and Revolution by establishing Guibert as a “Great Man” of the Republic of Letters between 1770 and his death in 1790.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Uppsala University, 1983. / Includes index. Bibliography: p. 159-169.

Nathan Greene is the Revolutionary Warfare general most associated with unconventional warfare. The historiography of the southern campaign of the revolution uniformly agrees he was a guerrilla leader. Best evidence shows, however, that Nathanael Greene was completely conventional -- that his strategy, operations, tactics, and logistics all strongly resembled that of Washington in the northern theater and of the British commanders against whom he fought in the south. By establishing that Greene was within the mainstream of eighteenth-century military science this dissertation also challenges the prevailing historiography of the American Revolution in general, especially its military aspects. The historiography overwhelmingly argues the myth of the valiant few -- the notion that a minority of colonists persuaded an apathetic majority to follow them in overthrowing the royal government, eking out an improbable victory. Broad and thorough research indicates the Patriot faction in the American Revolution was a clear majority not only throughout the colonies but in each individual colony. Far from the miraculous victory current historiography postulates, American independence was based on the most prosaic of principles -- manpower advantage.

This thesis investigates the progress of technological development during the interwar period of 1919 to 1939. The interwar period was a time of slashed military budgets and isolationist policies. However, despite political, financial, and organizational handicaps, each branch of the military made significant progress in the development of military technology, and the air corps and navy achieved significantly better results. The reason these two branches were able succeed was through a combination of organizational policy and the development of an overarching goal for their respective branch. Within this thesis, I investigated each of the major military branches during the interwar period, specifically the United States Army, Army Air Corps, and Navy. The air corps is considered a separate branch despite being a segment of the army due to its different strategic goal and its growing independence during the interwar period. In my research I found that the army made by far the least technological progress, but did make significant strides in terms of the development of individual components for larger projects. For example, the army developed the M1 rifle and state-of-the-art shock absorbers for tanks. The air corps succeeded in transforming from a small army auxiliary made up of woodand-fabric biplanes into a largely independent branch of the military made up of all-metal monoplane bombers. The navy developed the aircraft carrier and aircraft to accompany the new ships, in addition to making substantial upgrades to existing ships. These upgrades included strengthening ships against torpedo attacks, making engines more efficient, and adding antiaircraft guns to the ships‟ arsenals

This dissertation discusses logistical aspects of the Persians invasion of Greece; the Athenian need for timber for building warships; supply problems in their assault on Syracuse; and the march of Alexander's army from Macedonia into Asia. The amount of cereals needed by the Persian and Greek armies and navies is calculated from modern nutritional data and an estimate of the numbers of combatants. The location and size of the Persian food dumps; the excavation of the Athos canal; and the ships and materials needed to build the bridges of boats are considered. The Athenian need for ship-timber led to the costly occupation of Amphipolis. An assured supply of cereals was one motive for the disastrous Sicilian Expedition. The Athenian fleet was an inefficient long-range support for an army which had to protect its non-combatant sailors. This was realised by Alexander the Great, who crossed the Hellespont without naval support. / Classics and Modern European Languages / M.A. (Classics)

Text in Afrikaans / Die twee boeke waarin J.J. Collyer die kampanjes in Duits Suidwes-Afrika (Namibie) en Duits Oos-Afrika (Tanzanie) beskryf, bevat enkele kennis stellings wat vandag nog bruikbaar is. Collyer verduidelik dat militere foute van die verlede histories deur die staf ontleed moet word om sodanige foute in die toekoms te vermy. Hy gaan egter verder en verduidelik dat die moontlikheid om toekomsti.ge optrede te verbeter nodig is om onnodige bloedvergieting te verhoed. Hierdie verhandeling het ten doel gehad om die laaste stelling van Collyer te ondersoek en te bepaal of dit wel in Suid-Afrika toegepas is. Die navorsingsprobleem van die verhandeling was om te bepaal ofKrygsgeskiedenis aangewend is om die militere doktrine in Suid-Afrika mee te verbeter. Die bevinding van die verhandeling was dat daar slegs in enkele gevalle deur die SuidAfrikaanse Nasionale Weermag (en sy voorgangers) wel van Krygsgeskiedenis gebruik gemaak was om doktrine mee te ontwikkel en dat baie meer gedoen behoort te word. / The two books of 1.1. Collyer which discuss the campaigns in German South West Africa (Namibia) and German East Africa (Tanzania) contain knowledge propositions that are still valid today. Collyer explains that the military mistakes that were made in the past should be analysed especially by the staff today to prevent making the same mistakes in the future. He goes on to explain that future conduct should be improved in order to prevent unnecessary bloodshed. This dissertation's aim was to investigate Collyer's proposition and to determine whether this was applied in South Africa. The research problem of the dissertation was to determine whether Military History was utilised to improve South Africa's military doctrine. The finding of the dissertation was that the South African National Defence Force (and its predecessors) utilised Military History only in very few cases to develop doctrine and that much remains to be done. / Political Sciences

Approved for public release; distribution in unlimited. / This thesis examines the evolution of NATO as an institution in the International System by reference to Articles 4, 5 and 6 of the Washington Treaty of 1949. Initially, the thesis considers NATO from an international relations perspective. It then proceeds to examine the institutional evolutionary process of the Alliance since its inception and implementation in 1949. Furthermore, it explores the significance and the meaning of the aforementioned Articles. This thesis utilizes the case study method and refers to four distinct events that have shaped allied policies and strategies: the Suez Crisis of 1956, the establishment of the politico-military consultation process, the Yom Kippur War (1973), and the end of the Cold War (1989-1991). It also examines the allied policies after the events of September 11, 2001. Moreover, it identifies a general pattern of events pertinent to crisis creation inside NATO when the organization is facing a defense issue outside the Euro-Atlantic area. Finally, the thesis concludes that NATO is more than an ordinary military Alliance, as advocated by its longevity, agility and adaptability, which allows the Alliance to maintain a central position in the International System as a robust politico-military organization. / Lieutenant Commander, Hellenic Navy

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This dissertation discusses logistical aspects of the Persians invasion of Greece; the Athenian need for timber for building warships; supply problems in their assault on Syracuse; and the march of Alexander's army from Macedonia into Asia. The amount of cereals needed by the Persian and Greek armies and navies is calculated from modern nutritional data and an estimate of the numbers of combatants. The location and size of the Persian food dumps; the excavation of the Athos canal; and the ships and materials needed to build the bridges of boats are considered. The Athenian need for ship-timber led to the costly occupation of Amphipolis. An assured supply of cereals was one motive for the disastrous Sicilian Expedition. The Athenian fleet was an inefficient long-range support for an army which had to protect its non-combatant sailors. This was realised by Alexander the Great, who crossed the Hellespont without naval support. / Classics and Modern European Languages / M.A. (Classics)