Dans cette thèse, nous donnerons tout d'abord des conditions sur les paramètres d’une EDSR à générateur lipschitzien ou à croissance quadratique telles que les processus solutions de l’EDSR admettent des densités par rapport à la mesure de Lebesgue. Puis, nous donnerons des conditions sur les paramètres d’une EDSR non-markovienne à générateur lipschitzien ou quadratique telles que les processus solutions de l’EDSR admettent une dérivée de Malliavin, à l’aide d’une nouvelle caractérisation de cette dérivée. Ce résultat nous fournira une nouvelle structure interne des espaces de Malliavin que nous étudierons. Nous donnerons ensuite des conditions nous assurant que des solutions d’EDSR non-markoviennes à générateurs lipschitziens stochastiques sont différentiables au sens de Malliavin en utilisant cette caractérisation. Nous ferons ensuite une analyse de densités pour les lois des solutions de telles EDSR et nous appliquerons nos résultats à la biologie. Enfin, nous étudierons deux exemples d’utilisations des EDSR en finance. On s’intéressera tout d’abord à un problème de maximisation d’utilité avec un horizon aléatoire que nous réduirons à l’analyse d’un nouveau type d’EDSR à coefficients singuliers et nous illustrerons nos résultats par des simulations numériques. Puis, nous résoudrons un problème de type Principal/Agent sous volatilité incertaine. / In the first part of this PhD thesis, we give conditions on the parameters of Lipschitz and quadratic growth BSDEs such that the laws of the components Y and Z of the solutions to such BSDEs admit densities with respect to the Lebesgue measure. We then provide conditions on the parameters of non-Markovian Lipschitz or quadratic growth BSDEs such that the components Y and Z of their solutions are Malliavin differentiable. We obtain these conditions by applying a new characterization of the Malliavin differentiability, as an Lp convergence criterion of difference quotients. This result provide also a new characterization of the Malliavin-Sobolev spaces that we study in detail. To finish this first theoretical part, we provide conditions ensuring that solutions of non-Markovian stochastic-Lipschitz BSDEs are Malliavin differentiable by applying the characterization of the Malliavin differentiability obtained. We then analyse the existence of densities for the laws of the components of solutions to such BSDEs and we apply our result to a model of gene expression. In the second part of this thesis, we investigate financial problems dealing with BSDEs. We first solve a utility maximization problem with a random horizon, characterized by an exogenous default time. We reduce it to the analysis of a specific BSDE, which we call BSDE with singular coefficients, when the default time is assumed to be bounded. We give conditions ensuring the existence and the uniqueness of solutions to such BSDE and we illustrate our results by numerical simulations. Then, we solve a Principal/Agent problem with ambiguity, in which the "Nature" impacts both the utilities of the Agent and the Principal, charaterized by sets of probability measures which modify the volatility.

Cette thèse porte sur les spécificités du secteur public et leurs impacts sur les incitations et la performance. Elle mobilise les outils microéconomiques de la théorie des contrats et l’analyse économétrique. Parmi ces caractéristiques, une attention particulière est portée sur les problématiques de surveillance, de gestion de l’information et de contraintes budgétaires. Le premier chapitre de cette thèse contribue au débat sur la transparence dans le secteur public en considérant l’une de ses caractéristiques majeure : un budget limité. Cette question est étudiée comme un problème de design informationnel et utilise un modèle principal agent sous aléa moral pour montrer que la transparence a plus de chance d’être sélectionnée par le principal lorsque que le budget disponible et la valeur de la tache sont faibles. Le deuxième chapitre s’attache à offrir une nouvelle explication théorique à l’intuition associant un accroissement de la pression bureaucratique à une baisse de la qualité. Dans ce but, l’idée d’«extra-mile» est introduite dans un modèle principal agent classique sous aléa-moral. Le management bureaucratique est caractérisé par l’introduction d’une procédure définie comme l’association d’une codification et d’une vérification. Une telle procédure permet une vérification plus précise de l’action de l’agent mais est source d’inefficience sociale. Le dernier chapitre, dans une démarche théorique et empirique, propose une nouvelle explication de la différence des prix de l’eau en France en se fondant sur des arguments organisationnels. / This thesis focuses on the structural specificities of the public sector and how they impact incentives and performance. It uses the microeconomic tools of contract theory and econometric analysis. Among these characteristics, special attention is paid to monitoring, information management and budget constraints by applying a theoretical lens, that allows to provide new insights into the incentive systems in place in the public sector. The first chapter contributes to the debate on transparency in the public sector by considering one of its major features, i.e. a limited budget. This issue is studied as an information design problem and employ a principal-agent model with moral hazard to show that if the principal has to choose between total transparency and total opacity, then transparency is more likely to be optimal when tasks are least valuable and budgets are lowest. The second chapter aims at capturing a new theoretical explanation for the widespread intuition that more bureaucracy could lead to less effort and quality despite improved control. To that end, the idea of “the extra mile” is introduced in a classic principal-agent model with moral hazard. Bureaucratic management is characterized by the use of procedures, defined as the association of codification and verification. A procedure allows for more accurate verification of the agent’s action, but is socially inefficient. In the third chapter, using both theory and regression analysis, we propose a new explanation for price differences in the French water industry based on organizational arguments.

O aumento de gastos com a atenção à saúde apresenta-se como um fato econômico de merecida relevância no cenário internacional, sendo resultante da elevação progressiva de preços dos produtos e serviços deste mercado. Pela sua importância social e peculiaridades recebe um tratamento especial nos estudos econômicos. A economia da saúde avalia os fatores que influenciam demanda e oferta neste mercado, direcionando suas observações à interação entre seus agentes e atores, destacando seus comportamentos em relação às suas reações com o tratamento do risco de ficar doente. Possíveis falhas de mercado, envolvendo risco moral, assimetria de informação e seleção adversa, podem ser atribuídas como causas de uma demanda que foge às regras de equilíbrio econômico e favorece a elevação da oferta. Esses problemas remetem à discussão sobre como a mudança de incentivos pode acarretar aumento de gastos e perda de eficiência no provimento dos bens e serviços de saúde dos Estados Unidos da América (EUA) e no mercado de saúde suplementar brasileiro, levando em conta que a situação de elevação dos gastos com saúde, que se agrava no Brasil nos últimos dez anos, já vem sendo vivida há mais tempo em outros países e particularmente nos EUA, mostrando que o problema apresenta tendência de ser persistente. / The health care expenditure increase that presents itself as an economic fact of worldly relevance on the international scene, being the result of the gradual increase of prices of products and services in this market. Due to its social relevance and peculiarities it deserves a special treatment in economic studies. Health economics evaluates the factors influencing supply and demand in this market, directing its comments to the interaction between actors and their agents, highlighting their behaviors in relation to their reactions to the treatment of the risk of getting sick. Possible flaws in this market , involving moral hazard, information asymmetry and adverse selection can be attributed as causes of a demand that evades the rules of economic equilibrium and favors lifting the offer. These problems relate to discuss how changing incentives may lead to increased expenses and loss of efficiency in the provision of goods and services of health of United States of America (USA) and the Brazilian health plan market, taking into account the situation of rising health spending, which deepens in Brazil over the past ten years, as has been the longest lived in other countries and particularly the USA, showing that the problem shows a trend to be persistent.

O aumento de gastos com a atenção à saúde apresenta-se como um fato econômico de merecida relevância no cenário internacional, sendo resultante da elevação progressiva de preços dos produtos e serviços deste mercado. Pela sua importância social e peculiaridades recebe um tratamento especial nos estudos econômicos. A economia da saúde avalia os fatores que influenciam demanda e oferta neste mercado, direcionando suas observações à interação entre seus agentes e atores, destacando seus comportamentos em relação às suas reações com o tratamento do risco de ficar doente. Possíveis falhas de mercado, envolvendo risco moral, assimetria de informação e seleção adversa, podem ser atribuídas como causas de uma demanda que foge às regras de equilíbrio econômico e favorece a elevação da oferta. Esses problemas remetem à discussão sobre como a mudança de incentivos pode acarretar aumento de gastos e perda de eficiência no provimento dos bens e serviços de saúde dos Estados Unidos da América (EUA) e no mercado de saúde suplementar brasileiro, levando em conta que a situação de elevação dos gastos com saúde, que se agrava no Brasil nos últimos dez anos, já vem sendo vivida há mais tempo em outros países e particularmente nos EUA, mostrando que o problema apresenta tendência de ser persistente. / The health care expenditure increase that presents itself as an economic fact of worldly relevance on the international scene, being the result of the gradual increase of prices of products and services in this market. Due to its social relevance and peculiarities it deserves a special treatment in economic studies. Health economics evaluates the factors influencing supply and demand in this market, directing its comments to the interaction between actors and their agents, highlighting their behaviors in relation to their reactions to the treatment of the risk of getting sick. Possible flaws in this market , involving moral hazard, information asymmetry and adverse selection can be attributed as causes of a demand that evades the rules of economic equilibrium and favors lifting the offer. These problems relate to discuss how changing incentives may lead to increased expenses and loss of efficiency in the provision of goods and services of health of United States of America (USA) and the Brazilian health plan market, taking into account the situation of rising health spending, which deepens in Brazil over the past ten years, as has been the longest lived in other countries and particularly the USA, showing that the problem shows a trend to be persistent.

Este trabalho apresenta três extensões ao modelo de reputação proposto por Shapiro (1983). A primeira torna o modelo original mais adequado para avaliar o problema de informação assimétrica de bens de busca e bens credenciais, a segunda permite identificar o ganho de eficiência gerado pela inclusão de um sistema de informação adicional e, a terceira mostra que a provisão de um volume maior de informação pode gerar efeitos adversos quando o produto em questão possui vários atributos. Em seguida, os desenvolvimentos teóricos são utilizados para avaliar os efeitos da introdução do Exame Nacional de Cursos sobre o mercado de cursos superiores do Brasil. Algumas das predições do modelo são testadas empiricamente, fornecendo indicações de que este Exame possui um papel relevante para mitigar o problema de informação identificado neste mercado. / This essay presents three extensions to the model first proposed by Shapiro (1983) regarding reputation. The first extension adjusts Shapiro’s original model in order to make it more suitable in dealing with the problem of asymmetric information of search goods and credence goods. The second one allows the identification of the efficiency gains obtained after the inclusion of an additional information system, while the third extension demonstrates that additional information could generate adverse effects when the good under consideration has several attributes. These theoretical extensions are then applied to evaluate the effects of the Brazilian experience regarding the introduction of the Courses National Exam - Exame Nacional de Cursos – on Brazil’s market of undergraduate school courses. Some of the theoretical predictions of the model are empirically tested, offering indications that such exam plays a relevant role while diminishing the informational problem that characterizes this market.

L'évaluation des coûts et des avantages du système de banque centrale dépend fondamentalement de l'approche analytique adoptée. Les approches instrumentalistes et positivistes, discutées dans la première partie de cette thèse, se concentrent principalement sur l'importance des prédictions empiriques quantitatives. Ces approches tendent à mettre l'accent sur les conséquences immédiates et facilement mesurables. Les effets bénéfiques de court-terme des politiques monétaires expansionnistes sont ainsi étudiés en détail par les partisans de ces approches. Les critiques internes de ces dernières sont basées sur la reconnue ignorance des potentiels effets secondaires déstabilisateurs. Les coûts engendrés par les banques centrales sont vus principalement comme une perte de bien être due à une activité économique diminuée où une inflation des prix trop élevée résultant d'une déviation vis-à-vis de la politique monétaire optimale. L'approche causale-réaliste, étudiée dans la deuxième partie, donne un rôle plus restreint à la méthode empirique quantitative. Cette ligne de recherche permet une extension fructueuse de l'analyse coûts bénéfices à des notions plus abstraites qui peuvent être étudiées qualitativement tels le risque systémique et l'aléa moral. Cette étude défend que le régime moderne de banque centrale a alimenté le développement de ces deux phénomènes. Nous analysons comment la récurrence du cycle économique et la redistribution de la richesse au profit des plus aisés sont des effets importants de l'expansion du crédit. Une explication alternative de la stagflation basée sur le processus de l'intervention politique en réponse à ces conséquences inattendues est proposée. / The evaluation of the costs and benefits of central banking is to a considerable degree dependent on the analytical approach pursued.Instrumentalist-positivist approaches, as discussed in the first part of the thesis, emphasize the importance of empirical-quantitativepredictions for the development of economic models. Within this line of research, there exists a strong emphasis on those consequences of central banking that have an immediate and readily measurable empirical counterpart in the observed economic environment.Hence, the beneficial short-term effects of expansionary monetary policy in terms of increased economic activity are studied in detail and are well understood by proponents of these approaches. Internal counterarguments are based on acknowledged ignorance about potentially destabilizing side-effects. The costs of central banking are essentially seen as welfare losses from decreasedeconomic activity or excessive price inflation as results of deviations from an optimal monetary policy path. The causal- realist approach, as studied in the second part, assigns a narrower role to quantitative-empirical tools of analysis. This line of research allows for a fruitful extension of the cost-benefit analysis to more abstract notions such as systemic risk and moral hazard that can be analyzed qualitatively. It is argued that modern central banking is a contributing factor to both. Moreover, business cycles and wealth redistribution from bottom to top as important effects of credit expansion are analyzed. An alternative explanation of stagflation based on the process of political interventionism in response to unintended consequences of monetary policy is proposed.

The aim of this thesis is to describe particular financial products and compare them from the evaluation point of view. We also will review these products from the perspective of clients who differ in investment and saving attitude. We will focus on czech households and describe their habits in area of financial products and examine their behaviour during a time period in relation to phases of economic cycles and other exogenous variables. We also will describe functioning of financial system and focus on information asymmetry between houselholds and financial institutions. Further we will look at examples of moral hazard done by financial institutions. The conclusion of this thesis provides recommendations of suitable products for each client.

Les moyens et l'organisation de la justice sont des déterminants importants de l'efficacité de cette institution. Pourtant, ces aspects restent encore marginalement étudiés dans l'analyse économique du droit. Après avoir mis en évidence le besoin d'un cadre d'analyse économique des relations entre les résultats de l'activité judiciaire, les moyens alloués au système, la demande de justice et ses modes d'organisation, nous contribuons directement à l'exploration de ces relations. D'abord grâce à un modèle théorique, nous démontrons l'existence d'un effet multiplicateur des dépenses publiques de justice en nous appuyant sur l'analyse d'un type de conflits particulier : les conflits locatifs. Nous démontrons alors qu'une augmentation marginale des dépenses consacrées à la résolution de ce type de conflits améliore de manière significative à la fois le fonctionnement des tribunaux et le fonctionnement du marché du logement locatif. Ensuite, grâce à un test économétrique à partir de données originales – en particulier celles produites par la Commission Européenne pour l'Efficacité de la Justice – nous mettons en évidence un lien positif et robuste entre la confiance des individus dans la justice et diverses variables budgétaires. Nous développons l'idée que le budget de la justice joue un rôle de signal de la qualité de l'institution pour les agents dont la connaissance réelle du système judiciaire est limitée. Enfin, dans un modèle de double aléa moral appliqué à la production de justice, nous analysons les relations entre les moyens et l'organisation de la justice puis entre cette dernière et les résultats de son activité. Nous démontrons alors que certains équilibres du jeu stratégique entre les agents responsables de la production des services judiciaires – le gouvernement et les magistrats – correspondent à des situations inefficaces car les magistrats sont amenés à effectuer des tâches administratives à la place du gouvernement, au prix d'un niveau de production de services judiciaires relativement faible. / The means and organization of justice are important determinants of the efficiency of this institution. Nevertheless, these aspects still remain marginally studied in the economic analysis of law. After we have highlighted the need for an economic analytical framework of the relationships between the results of judicial activity, the means allocated to the system, the demand of justice and its organizational features, we directly contribute to the exploration of these relationships. First, thanks to a theoretical model, we demonstrate the existence of a multiplier effect of public expenditure on justice by focusing on the analysis of a particular type of disputes: rental ones. We thus demonstrate that a marginal increase in expenditures dedicated to the resolution of rental disputes significantly improves both the functioning of courts and the functioning of the rental market. Then, thanks to an econometrical test on original data – in particular the ones produced by the European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice – we show a positive and robust link between individuals' trust in justice and different budget-related variables. We argue that the justice budget plays a role as a signal of the institution's quality for agents whose knowledge about the reality of the judicial system is limited. Finally, using a double-sided moral hazard model applied to the production of justice, we analyze the relationship between the means and the organization of justice and then, between the organization and the results of judicial activity. We thus demonstrate that some of the equilibria of the strategic game between the agents who are responsible for the production of judicial services – the government and the magistrates – correspond to inefficient situations because magistrates are led to perform administrative tasks instead of the government, at the cost of a relatively low level of production of judicial services.

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Cette thèse propose une analyse empirique de deux stratégies majeures du financement du développement; les annulations de dette et la mobilisation des ressources domestiques. Les trois premiers chapitres tentent d'analyser les effets des annulations de dette du début des années 2000 sur les finances publiques et les possibilités de réendettement des gouvernements bénéficiaires. Nos résultats montrent que les annulations de dette concédées via les initiatives PPTE et IADM ont permis d'améliorer significativement la composition budgétaire des gouvernements récipiendaires et de diversifier leurs sources de financement. Néanmoins, d'autres résultats mettent en lumière l'existence d'un aléa moral induit par ces initiatives, nécessitant ainsi une surveillance accrue des politiques budgétaires, notamment une fois l'annulation de dette octroyée. Enfin, le quatrième chapitre tente de revisiter la relation entre fiscalité et croissance en adoptant une approche macro-micro à l'aide de données de firmes. Notre analyse montre que la fiscalité est bénéfique à l'activité des entreprise, en particulier celles des pays à faible revenu. Par ailleurs, d'autres résultats suggèrent que cet effet est renforcé lorsque ces mêmes firmes font face à une faible corruption, réitérant ainsi la nécessité pour les pays en développement d'établir un environnement économique et politique sain. / This thesis aims at investigating empirically the effects of two financing strategies for low-income countries; debt relief and taxation. The first three chapters focus on the consequences of debt relief for public finance and new external financing. Results show that cancellations granted under the multilateral debt relief initiatives have been beneficial for recipient countries by significantly improving the composition of their budget and widening financing opportunities. However, findings also underline the risk of moral hazard stemming from these initiatives which thus calls for continuous sound fiscal management, especially after debt relief. Lastly, the fourth chapter revisits the taxation-growth nexus adopting a macro-micro approach. Using firm-level data in developing countries our findings suggest that taxation is favorable to firms' activity, especially when firms operate in poor countries characterized by a significant lack of infrastructure. Moreover, this effect of taxation seems to be maximal in the absence of corruption, hence reaffirming the need for healthy and enabling economic and political environments in developing countries.