Canada's relations with Nicaragua changed greatly during the 1980s after the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) came to power in a revolution which overthrew the Somoza dynasty. For the first few years of the new regime in Nicaragua, Canada provided little support, declaring that Canadians had no significant interests in the country and there was no reason for them to get involved in Central America's ongoing conflicts. When Brian Mulroney first came to power with Joe Clark as his Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Progressive Conservatives generally held to the course set by the previous Liberal government. However, as the 1980s went on the Conservatives began providing Nicaragua with more bilateral aid, and became increasingly involved in the regional peace process known as Esquipulas; this culminated in Canadian peacekeepers entering the region in 1990 as part of a UN peacekeeping force. The major impetus for the government's change in attitude was the strong and consistent pressure placed on the government by the Canadian public. Aid raised privately by Canadians for Nicaragua overshadowed government aid for much of the decade, making the government response look weak. The support of the Canadian public for action in Central America was the major factor which pressured the federal government into becoming more involved in Nicaragua, even though the government was not as supportive of the new regime in Nicaragua as a large portion of the Canadian public often was.

Canada's relations with Nicaragua changed greatly during the 1980s after the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) came to power in a revolution which overthrew the Somoza dynasty. For the first few years of the new regime in Nicaragua, Canada provided little support, declaring that Canadians had no significant interests in the country and there was no reason for them to get involved in Central America's ongoing conflicts. When Brian Mulroney first came to power with Joe Clark as his Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Progressive Conservatives generally held to the course set by the previous Liberal government. However, as the 1980s went on the Conservatives began providing Nicaragua with more bilateral aid, and became increasingly involved in the regional peace process known as Esquipulas; this culminated in Canadian peacekeepers entering the region in 1990 as part of a UN peacekeeping force. The major impetus for the government's change in attitude was the strong and consistent pressure placed on the government by the Canadian public. Aid raised privately by Canadians for Nicaragua overshadowed government aid for much of the decade, making the government response look weak. The support of the Canadian public for action in Central America was the major factor which pressured the federal government into becoming more involved in Nicaragua, even though the government was not as supportive of the new regime in Nicaragua as a large portion of the Canadian public often was.

The well-known outcome of the 1988 federal election – a Conservative Party majority in Parliament and an effective “yes” to the question of whether or not the Free Trade Agreement between Canada and the United States was desired – tends to obscure the importance of the process by which a large non-party based opposition movement sought to cultivate and organize the public’s understanding of the election’s central premise. While the opposition movement failed to have Prime Minister Brian Mulroney removed from power, the discursive process that the movement both created and was the driving force behind, is key to understanding the historical context of the debate over free trade itself. This thesis will illustrate that there existed a discursive process amongst the efforts of the anti-free trade movement from 1985-1988 to cultivate, organize, and mobilize public opposition to Mulroney’s neo-liberal economic policies, through re-framing those objections into a larger and more deeply-rooted Canadian historical narrative. A discourse analysis was conducted using the various public education materials produced by major anti-free trade civil society organizations in Canada. The examination of that discourse revealed three major stages in the overall process: First, organizations relied heavily on classic paradigms of an anti-continentalist narrative to reinforce what was different between the two countries creating an us and them paradigm and building a case for Canadian exceptionalism. Second, there was an intensification of the us and them language into a more defined us versus them, or them against us, dichotomy. Third, the anti-free trade movement sought to effectively translate the previously established civic opposition into pragmatic political action in preparation for a national election campaign. The results show that there was an evolution in the ways members of the civil society opposition framed and evolved their arguments in order to turn their “issues” into more of a “crisis.” By employing (and expanding on) discursive tools used within that public narrative to generate fear of the other to validate illusions of self, and to construct believable threats to the collective, the more “micro” discussion over the growing pervasiveness of neo-liberalism took on a hyper-nationalistic and symbolic routine, one that mirrored the iconic political and electoral debates in 1891 and 1911, both of which had also been based upon the potential for free trade with the United States. Most of all, the evidence points to a popular opposition movement against free trade, which not only significantly pre-dated the official political opposition, but in some respects created its message and focus.

This thesis examines US protectionism in the 1980s from Canadian and American perspectives, and its role in Canada’s pursuit of the historic 1988 Canada-US Free Trade Agreement. It analyzes the perceived “threat” of protectionism and evaluates the agreement’s provisions against Canada’s goal of securing access to the US market. It contends that US protectionism was crucial in the Mulroney government’s decision to negotiate a bilateral agreement and was a contentious issue for the agreement’s critics. US sources, unexamined in existing historiography, confirm the increased threat of American protectionism, but emphasize a distinction between the threat and implementation of protectionist trade law. Although the agreement did not shield Canada from US trade remedies, Canada gained important presence in the trade dispute process. These conclusions are drawn from Canadian and American media and government documents, 1980s academic and think-tank commentary, legal documents, the memoirs and diaries of major players, and select archival sources.

This thesis examines US protectionism in the 1980s from Canadian and American perspectives, and its role in Canada’s pursuit of the historic 1988 Canada-US Free Trade Agreement. It analyzes the perceived “threat” of protectionism and evaluates the agreement’s provisions against Canada’s goal of securing access to the US market. It contends that US protectionism was crucial in the Mulroney government’s decision to negotiate a bilateral agreement and was a contentious issue for the agreement’s critics. US sources, unexamined in existing historiography, confirm the increased threat of American protectionism, but emphasize a distinction between the threat and implementation of protectionist trade law. Although the agreement did not shield Canada from US trade remedies, Canada gained important presence in the trade dispute process. These conclusions are drawn from Canadian and American media and government documents, 1980s academic and think-tank commentary, legal documents, the memoirs and diaries of major players, and select archival sources.

The well-known outcome of the 1988 federal election – a Conservative Party majority in Parliament and an effective “yes” to the question of whether or not the Free Trade Agreement between Canada and the United States was desired – tends to obscure the importance of the process by which a large non-party based opposition movement sought to cultivate and organize the public’s understanding of the election’s central premise. While the opposition movement failed to have Prime Minister Brian Mulroney removed from power, the discursive process that the movement both created and was the driving force behind, is key to understanding the historical context of the debate over free trade itself. This thesis will illustrate that there existed a discursive process amongst the efforts of the anti-free trade movement from 1985-1988 to cultivate, organize, and mobilize public opposition to Mulroney’s neo-liberal economic policies, through re-framing those objections into a larger and more deeply-rooted Canadian historical narrative. A discourse analysis was conducted using the various public education materials produced by major anti-free trade civil society organizations in Canada. The examination of that discourse revealed three major stages in the overall process: First, organizations relied heavily on classic paradigms of an anti-continentalist narrative to reinforce what was different between the two countries creating an us and them paradigm and building a case for Canadian exceptionalism. Second, there was an intensification of the us and them language into a more defined us versus them, or them against us, dichotomy. Third, the anti-free trade movement sought to effectively translate the previously established civic opposition into pragmatic political action in preparation for a national election campaign. The results show that there was an evolution in the ways members of the civil society opposition framed and evolved their arguments in order to turn their “issues” into more of a “crisis.” By employing (and expanding on) discursive tools used within that public narrative to generate fear of the other to validate illusions of self, and to construct believable threats to the collective, the more “micro” discussion over the growing pervasiveness of neo-liberalism took on a hyper-nationalistic and symbolic routine, one that mirrored the iconic political and electoral debates in 1891 and 1911, both of which had also been based upon the potential for free trade with the United States. Most of all, the evidence points to a popular opposition movement against free trade, which not only significantly pre-dated the official political opposition, but in some respects created its message and focus.

The well-known outcome of the 1988 federal election – a Conservative Party majority in Parliament and an effective “yes” to the question of whether or not the Free Trade Agreement between Canada and the United States was desired – tends to obscure the importance of the process by which a large non-party based opposition movement sought to cultivate and organize the public’s understanding of the election’s central premise. While the opposition movement failed to have Prime Minister Brian Mulroney removed from power, the discursive process that the movement both created and was the driving force behind, is key to understanding the historical context of the debate over free trade itself. This thesis will illustrate that there existed a discursive process amongst the efforts of the anti-free trade movement from 1985-1988 to cultivate, organize, and mobilize public opposition to Mulroney’s neo-liberal economic policies, through re-framing those objections into a larger and more deeply-rooted Canadian historical narrative. A discourse analysis was conducted using the various public education materials produced by major anti-free trade civil society organizations in Canada. The examination of that discourse revealed three major stages in the overall process: First, organizations relied heavily on classic paradigms of an anti-continentalist narrative to reinforce what was different between the two countries creating an us and them paradigm and building a case for Canadian exceptionalism. Second, there was an intensification of the us and them language into a more defined us versus them, or them against us, dichotomy. Third, the anti-free trade movement sought to effectively translate the previously established civic opposition into pragmatic political action in preparation for a national election campaign. The results show that there was an evolution in the ways members of the civil society opposition framed and evolved their arguments in order to turn their “issues” into more of a “crisis.” By employing (and expanding on) discursive tools used within that public narrative to generate fear of the other to validate illusions of self, and to construct believable threats to the collective, the more “micro” discussion over the growing pervasiveness of neo-liberalism took on a hyper-nationalistic and symbolic routine, one that mirrored the iconic political and electoral debates in 1891 and 1911, both of which had also been based upon the potential for free trade with the United States. Most of all, the evidence points to a popular opposition movement against free trade, which not only significantly pre-dated the official political opposition, but in some respects created its message and focus.