This thesis will view the Napoleonic War from three distinct angles. Firstly, as a world war that was fought beyond the narrow confines of Europe where events on other continents were as important as those taking place in Europe. Secondly, the thesis will view the war from an Anglo-Swedish angle with an emphasis upon the northern and Baltic regions of Europe. This region of Europe is often forgotten when the Napoleonic War is written about despite the fact it was of vital economic and strategic importance to Britain. Thirdly, this military contest between the Great Powers will be viewed from 'below' or in other words from the perspective of a minor power unable to influence events as much as these powers. One good reason for Anglo-Swedish friendship was the strong trade links between the two countries, which led to their successful but neglected economic sabotage of Napoleon's Continental system. Yet economic factors, though vital, did not primarily account for the creation and continued life of the 'common cause'. Instead geopolitical and ideological factors gave rise to the 'common cause'. Firstly, although seeing themselves as nations apart from the continent Sweden and Britain's independence and strategic security depended upon no one power being able to upset or usurp the European balance of power. Secondly, in the eyes of Swedish and British conservatives (they ruled both countries for most of the alliance's life) Napoleonic France was not only a direct threat to their external security but Napoleon also came to symbolise everything they disliked about the new European order. To the architect of the alliance, Gustavus IV , and his fellow conservatives, Napoleon had to be defeated at all costs if Sweden, Britain and all of Europe was to survive. But the conservatives had a monopoly on neither political power nor the truth, for powerful groups in both countries opposed the war with Napoleon. These groups, in opposition during most of the war in both countries,believed an accommodation with Napoleon was possible. In 1806 the British Whigs tried and failed to find a peaceful accommodation with Napoleon. Following defeat at Russian hands and the diversion of British interest to the Iberian peninsula, the Anglo-Swedish alliance was almost dead when in early 1809 the Swedish opposition took power through a coup. They managed, unlike their British colleagues, to get peace with Napoleon, but at a high price. Defeat, despair and domestic turmoil the following year led to the election of marshal Bernadotte as ruler of Sweden. Within two years Bernadotte had begun rebuilding the 'common cause' with Britain, and in 1814 Sweden finally saw its great protagonist Napoleon defeated. The pro-war line had showed itself to be the only realistic and viable long-term option for either country.

This thesis aims to explain how British naval power was sustained in the Indian Ocean during the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. To improve efficiency and economy, the Admiralty had to reorganise the management of shore support services, as well as to rationalise the bases available to the navy to meet the enemy it faced. The basic proposal of this thesis is that British naval power was projected overseas by the Admiralty's effective reconciliation of two competing demands, the naval demand for strategic deployment and the domestic demand for reform. The thesis argues that British naval power in the Indian Ocean was increased by the acquisition of the Cape of Good Hope and Trincomalee and the naval bases built at these locations. The removal of the navy from complete dependence on the East India Company for support services was part of a long term policy of increasing Admiralty control of facilities in the east. In 1793 Bombay was the main naval base but Madras quickly became another hub supporting naval activities in the east. Other locations were considered. Calcutta was used and investigations were made into developing Penang as a navy base before Trincomalee became part of Britain’s long-term naval infrastructure. At the Cape a separate naval command was given responsibility for part of the Indian Ocean. Following the capture of Mauritius in 1810 this island was used temporarily as a forward support base. Admiralty control of the naval support services delivered to the squadrons at the Cape and in the East Indies was dramatically improved by the appointment overseas of resident commissioners from 1809. This resulted from the implementation of the recommendations of the Commission of Naval Revision, first suggested by the Commissioners on Fees in 1788. Resident commissioners ensured Admiralty instructions and policies were implemented and executed, resulting in improved efficiency and reduced costs.

Although it has long been portrayed as the nation’s ‘moat defensive’, recent examinations of Anglo-French rivalry during the long eighteenth century have revealed that the English Channel was, in reality, a highly permeable and vulnerable maritime border territory. Within this context, the Channel Islands assumed a strategic and tactical significance which was vastly disproportionate to their physical size, population or resources; emerging as what Morieux terms ‘a lynchpin of control' over local shipping and trade. Although a great deal of research has been already undertaken – particularly in relation to the Channel Islands’ role as a base for commerce-raiding and intelligence gathering – much of this has covered the entire long eighteenth century. However, it was only during the Great French War that the British government embraced the military potential of the Channel Islands to the fullest; not only exploiting the inhabitants’ knowledge of the seas and intimacy with her ‘enemies’, but also transforming the archipelago into a chain of offshore fortresses. In addition, prior scholarship has often focused on individual aspects of the Channel Islands’ involvement in the Great French War; while local historians have tended to embrace the ‘Great Man’ approach, examining the period through the lens of the careers of local commanders. Consequently, this thesis seeks to provide a more complete picture of the Channel Islands’ role within Britain’s military and naval strategy; integrating an examination of local defence and security with several of already well-covered topics. Moreover, in light of the fact that existent scholarship has often centred upon ‘Great Men’, it is hoped that the thesis shall serve to better demonstrate the extent to which the celebrated achievements of Don, Doyle and D’Auvergne rested upon the efforts of a number of ‘unsung heroes’.