This thesis examines the emergence and evolution of the Vernacular Italianate style of domestic architecture in Britain. The style was introduced in the form of a series of three country houses by John Nash in the first decade of the nineteenth century. It subsequently evolved over the next five decades into a popular template for the modest suburban house, widely disseminated through the medium of the architectural pattern books. The thesis considers the intellectual sources and antecedents which led to the emergence of this style and influenced its characteristics, analyses Nash's particular vision, and explores how the style was able to make a successful transition from villa rustica to villa suburbana, responding to the social and economic pressures which were at play in the expanding towns of the Regency and early Victorian era. It is a style which has been the subject of limited academic study to date, and the extent and significance of its role as a model villa for the new suburb is a theme which has been central to this research. A case is put forward that the style proliferated for two principal reasons: its versatility and adaptability for houses of differing physical scale and location, and its informal charm, inexpensively achieved, which conferred an air of sophistication appropriate to contemporary social aspiration. Nevertheless, as its popularity and accessibility grew over time the intellectual and aesthetic basis which underlay its origins as a product of the Picturesque aesthetic tended to be misunderstood or overlooked entirely, and by the 1860s the style had become diluted, frequently reduced to a matter of exterior detailing, with little reference either to Picturesque composition or to relationship between house and landscape, in contradiction of the tenets of Picturesque architecture propounded in the late eighteenth century, and in complete antithesis to the approach of John Nash in his original and distinctive Italianate interpretation.

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The thesis deals with market models with random inputs represented by the newsvendor problem for which the randomness is given through a random number of customers. Presented work is divided into three chapters. In the first chapter we present the elementar newsvendor problem as stochastic programming problem with a fixed recourse. In the second chapter we present the multiplayer game theory adapted to the newsvendors problem. Moreover, in the second chapter we extend the problem by the second newsvendor on the market and in the third chapter we generalize the problem for n newsvendors on the market. We deal with the situations that arise in the chapters two and three from the game theory point of view and we study characteristics of a Nash equilibrium. Presented theory is demonstrated on illustrative examples in the ends of the two last chapters. 1

Submitted by Etelvina Domingos (etelvina.domingos@ufpe.br) on 2015-03-12T19:42:47Z No. of bitstreams: 2 DISSERTAÇÃO Giannini Italino Vieira.pdf: 1131512 bytes, checksum: 1d1c4b9697bb54f6674c877898f4a1a8 (MD5) license_rdf: 1232 bytes, checksum: 66e71c371cc565284e70f40736c94386 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2015-03-12T19:42:47Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 DISSERTAÇÃO Giannini Italino Vieira.pdf: 1131512 bytes, checksum: 1d1c4b9697bb54f6674c877898f4a1a8 (MD5) license_rdf: 1232 bytes, checksum: 66e71c371cc565284e70f40736c94386 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014-02-26 / CAPES / Jogos Blotto são jogos nos quais os jogadores devem decidir como alocar seus recursos privados em um número nito de prêmios. Na maioria dos trabalhos desenvolvidos sobre Jogos Blotto, assume-se que os jogadores avaliam os prêmios da mesma forma, que estes tomam as decisões de alocação de forma simultânea, que o jogador que mais investir recurso em um particular prêmio sempre o ganha e que os jogadores possuem informação perfeita a respeito dos recursos privados dos seus oponentes. Nesta dissertação, modelamos Jogos Blotto sequenciais em que suprimimos a suposição de informação perfeita, por parte do jogador que se move primeiro, acerca dos recursos orçamentários de seu oponente. Mais especi camente, supomos que o jogador que se move primeiro sabe apenas que os recursos de seu oponente são distribuídos de acordo com uma dada função de distribuição acumulada, enquanto que o oponente, que se move depois, tem informação perfeita sobre toda a estrutura do jogo, inclusive sobre a alocação escolhida pelo primeiro jogador. Para cada modelo estudado, apresentamos as estratégias de equilíbrio de jogo. Adicionalmente, apresentamos um modelo de Jogo Blotto sequencial com informação imperfeita no qual assumimos a hipótese de que o jogador que mais alocar recursos em um determinado prêmio não o ganha com probabilidade um, mas apenas possui maior probabilidade de ganhá-lo, sendo que esta probabilidade é igual a proporção de recursos alocados pelo jogador para o determinado prêmio em relação à soma das alocações de todos os jogadores neste prêmio.

Submitted by Renata Lopes (renatasil82@gmail.com) on 2017-10-10T17:51:04Z No. of bitstreams: 1 mariooctavioveracampoverde.pdf: 972692 bytes, checksum: eeeec402e668a815ac731d18a5966479 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Adriana Oliveira (adriana.oliveira@ufjf.edu.br) on 2017-10-16T13:30:19Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 mariooctavioveracampoverde.pdf: 972692 bytes, checksum: eeeec402e668a815ac731d18a5966479 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-10-16T13:30:19Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 mariooctavioveracampoverde.pdf: 972692 bytes, checksum: eeeec402e668a815ac731d18a5966479 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-07-31 / Neste trabalho realizamos um estudo teorico das inequações variacionais (VI), mostrando condições necessárias e suficientes para a existência de soluções,assim mesmo apresentamos algumas classificações para vários casos especiais de VI, explicando a interconexão entre a VI e o problema de complementaridade (CP), bem como sua relação com um programa de otimização não linear e a teoria de jogos de estratégias que esta relacionada com os problemas de equilíbrio de Nash. Estabelecemos alguns resultados de equivalencia entre uma VI e um CP, mostramos por exemplo que resolver uma VI associada a uma função definida num conjunto que tem uma determinada estrutura é equivalente a resolver um problema de complementaridade mista (MiCP); assim como também, vimos que sob certas hipóteses, um ponto de equilíbrio de Nash é solução de uma determinada VI. Finalmente, aplicamos a teoria para o estudo de um caso de problema de equilíbrio de Nash, modelado via as condições de KKT como um MiCP, ou criando uma família de programas convexos,onde usei alguns algoritmos para determinar numericamente a solução do ponto de equilíbrio de Nash. / In this work, we present a theoretical study of the variational inequalities (VI), showing necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of solutions. We also present some classi fi cations for several special cases of LV, explaining the interconnection between LV and the complementarity problem. As well as its relationship with a nonlinear optimization program and the strategy game theory that is related to Nash equilibrium problems. We have established some equivalence results between a VI and a CP, for example we have shown that solving a VI associated with a function defined in a set having a given structure is equivalent to solving a mixed complementarity problem (MiCP); As well as, we have seen that under certain hypotheses, a Nash equilibrium is the solution of a given VI. Finally, we apply the theory to the study of a Nash equilibrium problem case, modeled via the KKT conditions as an MiCP, or creating a family of convex programs, where used some algorithms to numerically determine the equilibrium point solution of Nash.

Made available in DSpace on 2014-06-12T18:00:43Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 arquivo2963_1.pdf: 5543700 bytes, checksum: a8275b7ebd5adf3c67e379034b528d63 (MD5) license.txt: 1748 bytes, checksum: 8a4605be74aa9ea9d79846c1fba20a33 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010 / Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico / Este trabalho estuda as interações entre as políticas monetária e fiscal numa abordagem de teoria dos jogos. A coordenação entre essas duas políticas é essencial, uma vez que certas decisões tomadas por uma instituição podem ter efeitos desastrosos sobre a outra instituição, resultando em perda de bem estar social. Nesse sentido, foram derivadas as políticas monetária e fiscal ótimas em três contextos de coordenação ou formas de interação: quando as duas instituições minimizam sua perda apenas levando em conta seus objetivos, essa solução é conhecida como solução de Nash; quando uma instituição escolhe primeiro como proceder e a outra segue, num mecanismo conhecido como solução de Stackelberg; quando as instituições se comportam de forma cooperativa, buscando objetivos em comum. No caso brasileiro, as simulações dos modelos derivados nesses regimes de coordenação apontam uma perda mínima quando há uma solução de Stackelberg, mais especificamente quando a política monetária é a líder. Esse resultado é corroborado por outros tralhados

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Cette thèse comporte 3 chapitres principaux. Les chapitres 1 et 2 présentent des résultats expérimentaux issus d'un jeu de coordination proposé par Rosenthal (1981) et Beard and Beil (1994). Ce jeu comporte deux équilibres de Nash: le premier est efficace, le deuxième repose sur l'usage de stratégies faiblement dominées. Dans les expériences en laboratoire fondées sur ce jeu, les joueurs échouent très souvent à prendre les décisions qui maximisent simultanément les gains de toutes les parties. Ces échecs de coordination efficace proviennent de deux comportements: (i) les sujets doutent que les autres joueurs vont chercher à maximiser leur propre gain, et (ii) ceux doutes sont, dans certains cas, justifiés. Dans le chapitre l, nous présentons une nouvelle expérience qui permet de vérifier si ce comportement est dû à par l'inégalité des paiements entre les joueurs (qui subsiste dans la plupart des implémentations de laboratoire menées jusqu'à présent). Nos données montrent clairement que l'échec à maximiser les gains personnels, ainsi que la crainte que les autres pourraient se comporter de cette façon, ne proviennent pas de l'aversion pour l'inégalité. Ce résultat est robuste quant aux variations dans la saillance des décisions, à l'apprentissage par répétition, ainsi qu'aux différences culturelles entre la France et la Pologne. Nous étudions ensuite l'impact de l'information sur le comportement stratégique dans ce jeu. Les traitements expérimentaux introduisent trois mécanismes améliorant le niveau d'information dans le jeu: une simple répétition, des messages de type "cheap-talk" et l'observation des actions passées du partenaire. L'apprentissage par répétition augmente les fréquences de l'issue la plus efficace, ainsi que le risque de défaut d'appariement stratégique le plus coûteux. De plus, ce type d'apprentissage est remplacé par des signaux individuels. Comme les études précédentes, nous montrons que les signaux aident à prévoir les intentions des partenaires, ce qui réduit la fréquence des échecs de coordination. Néanmoins, contrairement à ces études, nous trouvons que la transmission d'information entre les partenaires, que ce soit en utilisant les messages ou l'observation, ne suffit pas à augmenter significativement l'efficacité globale des résultats. Cela arrive surtout car la transmission d'information ne restreint pas l'utilisation des stratégies dominées. Dans le chapitre 2, nous proposons une expérience qui applique la théorie de l'engagement, établie en psychologie sociale, dans le contexte économique du jeu de coordination. Dans cet environnement, le jeu de coordination, qui se déroule avec communication, est précédé par l'étape du serment où les sujets ont l'opportunité de s'engager solennellement à dire la vérité. Trois résultats principaux émergent. Tout d'abord, en présence du serment, la coordination sur l'équilibre le plus efficace augmente de près de 50% pour atteindre un niveau de 75%. Ensuite, grâce à la procédure du serment, les joueurs deviennent plus honnêtes: ils envoient des messages qui correspondent plus souvent à ce qu'ils font effectivement dans le jeu. De plus, les actions qu'ils choisissent sont aussi plus efficaces. En un, les joueurs qui reçoivent les messages, deviennent plus confiants et ils choisissent plus souvent une action conforme aux intentions qui leur sont envoyées. / Chapters 1 and 2 revisit the Beard and Beil (1994) two-player coordination game with two Nash equilibria: one Pareto-efficient, the other is Pareto-inefficient and involves a weakly dominated strategy. Existing experiments using this game robustly show that suboptimal outcomes arise as a result of two puzzling behaviors: (i) subjects doubt that the offer players will seek to maximize their own payoff (ii) these doubts are, in some instances, justified. In Chapter l, we report on new experiments investigating whether the inequality in payoffs between players, maintained in most lab implementations 0 this game, may explain such behavior. Our data clearly show that the failure to maximize personal payoffs, as well as the fear that others might act this way, do not stem from inequality aversion. This result is robust to: varying saliency of decisions, repetition-based learning and cultural differences between France and Pol and. Then, we assess whether information about the interaction partner helps eliminate inefficiency in this game. Our treatments involve three information ¬enhancing mechanisms: repetition and two kinds of individual signals, messages from partner or observation of his past choices. Repetition-based learning increases the frequencies of the most efficient outcome and the most costly strategic mismatch. Moreover, it is superseded b, individual signals. Like previous empirical studies, we report that signals provide a screening of partners' intentions that reduces the frequency of strategic mismatches. Unlike these studies, we find that the transmission of information between partners, either via messages or observation, does not suffice to significantly increase the overall efficiency of outcomes. This happens mostly because additional information does not restrain the use of the dominated action. Therefore, this chapter identifies important limitations of cheap-talk communication -- a mechanism generally considered by economists as a useful means to improve the efficiency of economic interactions. It suggests that in the absence of a pronounced link between one's words and actions, institutions involving communication may well happen to be insufficient for this purpose. This issue is addressed in Chapter 2 where we explore whether the social psychology theory of commitment via a truth-telling oath can improve the performance of pre-play communication regarding the coordination of strategies and the efficiency of outcomes. As an addition to the classical cheap-¬talk communication protocol utilized in Chapter l, we ask ail players to sign voluntarily a truth-telling oath before entering the lab. Three principle results emerge with commitment-via-the-oath: (1) efficient coordination increases by nearly 50 percent; (2) senders' messages are significantly more truthful and actions more efficient, and (3) receivers' trust of messages increases.

The electricity transmission and distribution (T&D) grid is undergoing a paradigm shift as renewable generation explodes while flexible, storage-like loads are being massively adopted. We address the intermittency and volatility issues of renewable resources in connection with spatiotemporal distribution location-specific marginal-cost-based prices (DLMPs) that guide flexible loads to utilize their significant degrees of freedom for the purpose of providing valuable storage-like services to the grid including demand response, energy charge/discharge arbitrage and regulation reserve services. Dynamic DLMPs can induce socially optimal energy and reserve schedules to be adopted by flexible load. To this end, existing transmission wholesale markets must be extended to include distribution network connected participants. Since the inclusion of the complex preferences of many flexible loads renders familiar centralized transmission market designs intractable, we propose and investigate tractable decentralized market designs with Electric Vehicle (EV) battery charging selected as the representative flexible load. We address the equilibrium existence, uniqueness, and efficiency issues that arise with decentralized market designs, using game theory techniques. We investigate various multi-hour and multi-commodity (energy and reserves) market designs including EV self-scheduling under distribution network information aware/unaware conditions, and single or multiple load aggregator(s) scheduling groups of EVs. We investigate the role of network related information in enabling partially price anticipating EVs to acquire market power and self-schedule to achieve individual benefits at the expense of social welfare. Our contribution is the proof of existence and uniqueness of decentralized market equilibria, as well as analytical and numerical comparative analysis. Secondly, we depart from the usual ideal battery assumption, employing instead a realistic two bucket model. We then develop a novel Markovian Decision Process (MDP) application to estimate the regulation tracking cost incurred over an hour by an EV charger employing an optimal controller to respond to the regulation signal which is reset every two seconds by the system operator. The hourly tracking error increases when the EV promises higher regulation reserves while at the same time demanding an achievable albeit high average charging rate. We solve the MDP repeatedly, in fact off line, to capture the impact of the average charging rate and the regulation reserves promised at the beginning of an hour to the resulting hourly regulation tracking error. We then estimate a convex closed form relationship mapping hourly charging rate and regulation reserve offerings to the expected hourly tracking error cost. These convex tracking cost functions provide crucial input to the day ahead hourly energy bids and regulation reserve offers made by individual EVs to the Day Ahead market in response to spatiotemporal DLMPs.

We consider two game-theoretic settings to determine the optimal values of an issuer's interchange fee rate, an acquirer's merchant discount rate, and a merchant's retail prices for multiple products in a credit card network. In the first setting, we investigate a two-stage game problem in which the issuer and the acquirer first negotiate the interchange fee rate, and the acquirer and the retailer then determine their merchant discount rate and retail prices, respectively. In the second setting, motivated by the recent U.S. bill "H.R. 2695," we develop a three-player cooperative game in which the issuer, the acquirer, and the merchant form a grand coalition and bargain over the interchange fee rate and the merchant discount rate. Following the cooperative game, the retailer makes its retail pricing decisions. We derive both the Shapley value- and the nucleolus-characterized unique rates for the grand coalition. Comparing the two game settings, we show that the participation of the merchant in the negotiation process can result in the reduction of both rates. Moreover, the stability of the grand coalition in the cooperative game setting may require that the merchant should delegate the credit card business only to the issuer and the acquirer with sufficiently low operation costs. We also find that the large, highly-specialized merchants and banks are more likely to join the cooperative negotiation whereas the small firms may prefer the two-stage game setting. Our numerical experiments demonstrate that the acquirer's and the issuer's unit operation costs more significantly impact both rates in the cooperative game setting than in the two-stage game setting.