Wong, Muk Yan. / Thesis submitted in: October 2007. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2008. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 88-93). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / Introduction --- p.1 / Chapter Chapter One: --- What is a Cognitive Theory of Emotion? / Chapter Section One: --- How are emotion and cognitive elements related? --- p.5 / Chapter Section Two: --- What kind of cognitive element is involved? --- p.13 / Chapter Chapter Two: --- Challenges from Neuroscience / Chapter Section One: --- The Quick-and-Dirty Route Argument --- p.31 / Chapter Section Two: --- The Backward Masking Argument --- p.35 / Chapter Section Three: --- The Brain Development Argument --- p.38 / Chapter Chapter Three: --- Possible Responses from the Cognitive Theory of Emotion / Chapter Section One: --- Response to the Quick-and-Dirty Route Argument --- p.44 / Chapter Section Two: --- Response to the Backward Masking Argument --- p.56 / Chapter Section Three: --- Response to the Brain Development Argument --- p.64 / Chapter Chapter Four: --- Reflection on the Conversation between Neuroscience and Philosophy / Chapter Section One: --- Conceptual Questions Versus Empirical Questions --- p.71 / Chapter Section Two: --- Competition for the Authoritative Interpretation of Common Understanding --- p.74 / Chapter Section Three: --- Explanatory Power as the Final Aim of Both Philosophy and Neuroscience --- p.77 / Conclusion --- p.82 / Bibliography --- p.85

<p> The psychologist J. J. Gibson, and later the enactivists, espoused a view of perception emphasized active sensory exploration, and the biological functions perception serves. They tended to neglect the internal complexity of perceptual systems. Neuroscientists and computer vision researchers, on the other hand, focus on the complex structure and inner workings of perceptual systems, to the neglect of biological and behavioral context. Here I will formulate a version of ecological realism which reconciles and critiques these seemingly disparate approaches. </p><p> I argue that the objects of perception are relational invariant structures preserved within the changing flux of perceptual input. The function of perception is to enable appropriate behavior with respect to affordances, which are objective three-way relations between worldly features, animal abilities, and animal needs. The invariant relationships perceived tend to be those which signify affordance relationships for the species and individual in question. </p><p> The perception-action cycle is but one example of the circular dynamics of perceptual systems. The neural portions of such systems are also in a state of constant feed-forward and feedback dynamical interaction with one another. These dynamics confer an active autonomy on perceptual systems as manifested by phenomena like dreams, hallucinations, and perceptual illusions. Metaphorically, such systems may function to constantly formulate and test hypotheses about affordances based on perceptual evidence and prior categorical experience. Hierarchical predictive models of perception, in which perceptual systems consist of a hierarchy of Bayesian statistical predictors, represent a possible means by which this metaphor might be crafted into a testable scientific hypothesis. Perception, even if it involves actively autonomous perceptual systems coping with ambiguous input, is epistemically reliable most of the time, because it is constantly tested by action. Perceptual states are true or valid if they bear an appropriate relationship to objective affordance relationships, and false or invalid if they do not. These views require a reformulation of the venerable distinction between `direct' and `indirect' perception. Perception is ontologically direct in the sense of dealing in objective relationships in the world, but justificationally indirect in the sense of requiring an argument that perceptual beliefs are generally epistemically reliable.</p>

Occupational therapy (OT) has been greatly influenced by the medical model, despite its origins as an alternative to medicine. OT practice that finds its theoretical basis in a medical model is criticized as limited in therapeutic value, and as lacking boundaries distinguishing OT from other disciplines. By advancing a philosophical anthropology (Gehlen) with biological evidence from detachment theory (Moss), this project identifies and illuminates the power and unique value of occupational therapy. Occupational participation, made possible by OT, is described as a tool for structuring human lives into manageable temporal components with varying degrees of motivation and social interconnection. The value of providing opportunities for occupational participation is described as analogous to the value of instincts in animals’ lives; occupations are seen as the core elements that drive and shape human experiences. The inadequacies of current definitions of and research on addiction are reviewed and, as an alternative to current approaches, an occupational model for understanding addiction is outlined. Addiction is described as an attempt to create a manageable life—that is, as an occupation, and the concept of focused flexibility is introduced to normatively distinguish ‘addiction-occupations’ from other, potentially more ‘healthy’ occupations. Health is discussed in relation to the proposed philosophical anthropological, social, and biological situation of human beings. Finally, a qualitative study is undertaken to examine whether an occupational model of addiction accurately describes the experiences of addicts, thereby warranting further research. Findings from this preliminary study suggest addiction is experienced as an occupation, and that the concept of addiction as an occupation should be further explored.