Thesis Submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) In the Department of Development Studies, Faculty of Arts at the University of Zululand, 2019. / This study critically explores, in comparative terms, the socio-economic dimension (drivers and effects) of Niger Delta Militancy and Boko Haram insurgency, within the ongoing debate on the nexus between security and development. Using the mix of Root Cause and Rational Choice theories (2RCs), the study through qualitative methods, demonstrates the relative implication of socio-economic causes and effects of both insurgencies, based on evidence from interviews, available video documentaries and literatures. Acknowledging the weak, however irrefutable, connection between security and development, the study underscores that the social and economic dimension of both insurgencies must be factored into a long-term recovery plan, despite the seeming religious façade of Boko Haram. The study demonstrates that while poverty, for instance, is necessary but insufficient in explaining conflict, its persistence amidst affluence and economic growth suggest that it significantly determines the hopelessness, angst and lack of trust in the system that often nudges some citizens to seek alternative means of redress. Such means may be ethnonationalism or religion as suggestive of the Niger Delta militancy or Boko Haram insurgency respectively. In addition, both insecurities have been hijacked by certain individuals for self-benefiting ends. This hijack is somewhat driven by personal rational calculus and oiled by the pan-Nigeria “socio-economic neediness” among the masses. In this regard, while the masterminds manipulate this ‘socio-economic neediness’, the lower ranks (of these insurgencies) derive immediate economic or political benefits from participation through criminality. Meanwhile, the study found that socio-economic causes are more easily identifiable in the Niger Delta insurgencies as compared to Boko Haram’s, especially from the standpoint of legitimate grievances. For the Boko Haram insurgency, the socio-economic underdevelopment in the northern region are ideologically manipulated to mobilise wide support for the insurgency through monetary inducement, leveraging on the vulnerability of the populace. This is especially compounded by the lower level of education among it ranks of foot soldiers and general level of human underdevelopment across the region. The implication of Nigeria’s mono-cultural economy for the country’s development trajectory and the current instabilities are explored to illuminate what, why, and how the resultant socio-economic underdevelopment could be related to both insurgencies. Accordingly, the popular criticism of the socio-economic dimension that often allude to the relatively higher level of vii poverty in other parts of the north compared to Borno is critically revisited. This is done by demonstrating that Boko Haram is hardly a Borno or North-east phenomenon exclusively. Indeed, the historical and ideological resonance of Islamic extremism of Boko Haram, across the entire northern region, strongly reinforces this view. The study further demonstrates how the protracted insurgencies, among other agitations in the country continue to inhibit Nigeria’s overall development, creating an endless circle of conflict. Hence, in contributing to the attainment of a durable and sustainable resolution, this study advocates that adequate and improved redress of the socio-economic dimension, among the other notable undeniable dimensions must take place. In this regard, the study critically engages the mix of defence, diplomacy and development (the 3D) as used in other conflict regions in the world, to decipher possible ways forward. Minding context dependence of such policy frameworks and the difficulty with transferability however, the study ultimately seeks only to draw adaptable lessons, especially its accents on inter-agency cooperation (human and material resource) in comparable insurgencies. Herein lies the security-development nexus in Nigeria, given the deepening human insecurity and underdevelopment spawned by both insurgencies

The Niger Delta militancy ravaged the Nigerian upstream petroleum sector between 2004-2009, bringing it to a standstill. In response, the Nigerian state adopted an amnesty policy―a globally recognized tool for conflict resolution and peacebuilding―to protect the sector and the economy from collapse. Little is known, however, about the unintended consequences of the amnesty implementation for the Nigerian upstream petroleum sector. Thus, the purpose of this study was to fill this gap in the research literature on the Niger Delta amnesty program. Polarity management was the conceptual framework applied; relative deprivation and polarities of democracy constituted the theoretical foundation for this qualitative case study. Face-to-face interviews and focus group discussions were conducted with 29 purposefully selected participants from the senior ranks of the petroleum industry, sector trade unions, relevant government agencies, and a regional university. Data were inductively coded as part of content analysis, the data analysis strategy. Participants viewed the amnesty policy as being poorly conceived and implemented due to the many unintended negative consequences arising from the policy implementation. The key finding from the study indicates that both the sector and the Niger Delta region are worse off post the amnesty policy implementation. The study concludes that by adopting and implementing the study recommendations, stakeholders may be able to mitigate the identified unintended consequences, position the Nigerian upstream petroleum sector for sustainable growth, address the root causes of the militancy, and deliver a positive social change for the residents of Niger Delta.