A reasoner’s beliefs can compromise or inflate the accuracy of their syllogistic judgments when syllogistic content and structure are incongruent or congruent, respectively. An integrated approach to the study of syllogistic reasoning led to the investigation of premise-based belief-content conflict and its impact on belief bias. The belief-content conflict cue attenuated belief bias in incongruent valid and invalid trials, as well as congruent invalid trials. Its efficacy was found to depend on the difficulty level of the syllogism in which it was embedded and the location of its placement. Reaction time analyses were used to guide interpretations about the relative engagement of Systems 1 and 2. The key findings suggested that belief-content conflict activated System 2 for invalid incongruent trials which would otherwise have been processed using low-cost heuristic means due to their inherent difficulty. In contrast, it appeared that in valid trials the cue led to a redirection of System 2 resources such that specialized analytic strategies were applied in incongruent trials preceded by belief-content conflict compared to those lacking this cue. Finally, belief bias was successfully offset by belief-content conflict even in cases of congruency. In congruent invalid trials without this cue participants’ intuitive awareness of the content-structure match appeared to lead to low-cost, belief-based guesses; yet when presented as the major premise this conflict cue appeared to shift System 1 processing away from content and towards structure. Albeit less diligent than System 2 analysis, the shallow consideration of structural features may have been viewed as a safer bet than any shortcut aiming to capitalize on syllogistic content. This set of findings cannot be fully accounted for by the selective scrutiny, misinterpreted necessity, mental models, verbal reasoning, selective processing, or Receiver Operating Characteristics accounts thereby highlighting the need for considering belief-content conflict in future models of belief bias.

Perspective-taking is the ability to see the world from another person’s viewpoint and is often measured using “false belief” (FB) tasks. Although most typically developing children pass FB tasks between 4 and 5 years of age, approximately 80% of children with an autism spectrum disorder (ASD) do not. Failure on FB tasks remains a persistent deficit among individuals with ASDs. However, relatively little evidence is available on teaching perspective-taking to children with ASDs. The purpose of this study was to evaluate whether teaching perspective-taking skill components would produce generalization to untrained task materials and to three perspective-taking tasks with children with autism. Perspective-taking was broken down into 6 behavioural components and each component was taught in a multiple-baseline design within each child. Procedures in the training program included prompt-fading, positive reinforcement, error correction, multiple exemplar training, forward chaining, and narrative response training. Participants consisted of 4 children with a diagnosis of an ASD. The results showed that the training program produced generalization to variations of the training materials for 14 of the 17 components. Generalization to the three perspective-taking tasks, however, was modest. This study contributes to the body of behavioural research on teaching perspective-taking skills to children with ASDs, and provides procedures for teaching component skills of perspective-taking.

Self-compassion has consistently been found to contribute significantly to psychological well-being, and previous research has found that it can be increased using a simple writing task. As the mechanism underlying task efficacy is unknown, this study investigated the role of belief. Belief was found to predict change in self-compassion, self-esteem, and depression, with higher levels being associated with less improvement, an effect in the opposite direction as hypothesized. However, increase in belief across the three trials was positively correlated with improvement in self-compassion, depression, anxiety, and stress, indicating that change in belief represents a different psychological effect than absolute level of belief. Further, those who increased in belief reported improvement in well-being, while those who decreased did not. Results suggest that task efficacy, at least in part, depends on the degree to which perspectives are reappraised to become more congruent with self-compassionate perspectives, as opposed to simply depending on task repetition.

No description available.

This thesis seeks to answer the question of what it would be for a person to be persuaded rationally to believe that God exists, and tries to explain in a related way the possibility of rationality in Christian faith. I begin by explicating and defending the "ethics of belief" approach to epistemology. Then two competing ethics of belief are described: "Strong Formalism", which holds, through a voluntaristic decision, a deductivist epistemology; and "Soft Rationalism", which contains an infonnalist epistemology, and rejects voluntarism. Arguments for and against each view are canvassed. But I show that our attempted adjudication is blocked by the "Ultimate Rationality Problem": no ethic of belief seems able rationally to justify its view of rationality. I reduce the Problem to this fact: any view of rationality refutes itself which tries to give a foundational method of epistemic evaluation that both gives a verdict on every proposition and avoids self-justification. I reject several suggested solutions in favour of one which replaces the foundational view of justification by a contextual view. I then generate from the process of justification itself several common epistemic standards, which allow us rationally to favour Soft Rationalism over Strong Formalism. But the former is both foundationalist and needlessly opposed to formalism. I remedy these faults by developing a "Modest Formalist" ethic of belief: a'partly formal set of standards for rational metaphysical argument,"given in. the form of a set of constitutive rules for certain games of interpretive argument. In doing this I defend an improved theory of epistemic probability, and reveal the structure of our substantive views of rationality - as this virtue would be required of believings per se, of actions based on believings, and'of actions (such as living a Christian life) based on what I describe as "experimental faith".

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No description available.

In my dissertation I explain and defend the claim that conscious beliefs are essentially prescriptive. I argue that norms of conscious belief are explained by the fact that consciously believing p involves a commitment to the truth of p, a commitment analogous to the one involved in the act of accepting an assertion in public linguistic practice. Having a conscious belief implies being vulnerable to certain questions and criticisms from other agents. For instance, when asked for reasons for her belief, a person should provide a justification which demonstrates her entitlement to accepting the given proposition as true. Moreover, if a certain belief logically follows from the agent’s beliefs then she should either accept it as a conclusion or revise her initial beliefs. I argue that both deliberative and non-inferential conscious beliefs can be construed as acceptances of assertions and that they carry the same normative import as public acts of accepting claims put forward by others. The intrinsic relation between conscious belief and language-use shows that conscious belief is irreducible to unconscious or lower-level belief, the type of belief which we attribute to non-human animals or small children. Rather than trying to reduce conscious belief to lower-level belief, I suggest that we should offer an account of the emergence of the linguistic practice of assertion in terms of animal belief and then explain the normative features of conscious belief by reference to the norms implicit in assertional practice. In addition, my work proposes a way of formulating the norms of conscious belief which is consistent with the fact that actual human beings do not have perfect logical abilities; that they can only dedicate a limited amount of time and cognitive resources to the task of reasoning.

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The aim of this thesis is to formulate a better definition of religion for legal purposes than the formulation arrived at by the High Court of Australia in the 1983 decision of Church of the New Faith v Commissioner of Pay-roll Tax (Vic). In that case, known in Australia as the Scientology (or Church of the New Faith) case, two of five justices of the High Court of Australia considered belief in a supernatural Being, Thing or Principle to be an essential prerequisite for a belief system being a religion. Two other justices stated that if such belief were absent it was unlikely that one had a religion. There are major problems with the High Court’s formulation in the Scientology case. First, it does not accommodate a number of important belief systems that are generally regarded as being religious belief systems, even though they do not involve any notion of the supernatural in the sense in which that word is ordinarily understood. Secondly, the Court provided little or no guidance as to how one determines whether a particular belief system involves a supernatural view of reality. The guidance that was given is ill-conceived in any event. Thirdly, it is philosophically impossible to postulate a meaningful distinction between the “natural” and the supposedly “supernatural” in a way that would enable the courts and other decision makers to meaningfully apply the “test” enunciated by the Court. The thesis combines a phenomenological approach and the philosophical realism of the late Professor John Anderson with a view to eliciting those things that permit appreciation or recognition of a thing being “religious”. Ultimately, religion is seen to comprise an amalgam of faith-based ideas, beliefs, practices and activities (which include doctrine, dogma, teachings or principles to be accepted on faith and on authority, a set of sanctioned ideals and values in terms of expected ethical standards and behavior and moral obligations, and various experientially based forms, ceremonies, usages and techniques perceived to be of spiritual or transformative power) based upon faith in a Power, Presence, Being or Principle and which are directed towards a celebration of that which is perceived to be not only ultimate but also divine, holy or sacred, manifest in and supported by a body of persons (consisting of one or more faithxvii based communities) established to give practical expression to those ideas, beliefs, practices and activities. The new definition is tested against 3 very different belief systems, Taoism (Daoism), Marxism and Freemasonry.