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An examination of the justification of religious belief in the philosophy of Alvin PlantingaAskew, Richard. January 1985 (has links)
Thesis (Th. M.)--Dallas Theological Seminary, 1985. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves [98]-116).
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Acceptance, belief and cognitionJarvie, A. Max. January 2005 (has links)
No description available.
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Belief in Homosexuality as Choice and Its CorrelatesChandler, Sheri L., Hutsell, D. W., Williams, Stacey L. 01 November 2011 (has links)
No description available.
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Proposals for the critical examination of belief claims in art education : a conceptual analysis of belief applied to foundational issues in art education /DiBlasso, Margaret Klempay January 1975 (has links)
No description available.
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Epistemological Axiology: What Is The Value Of Knowledge?Thompson, Eric Walter 01 December 2010 (has links)
It is my overall aim in this work to defend the view that knowledge is no more valuable than true belief or empirically adequate belief, and thus is not the primary epistemic good. I engage predominately with Jonathan Kvanvig‟s work for an assessment of the value of knowledge. In turn, I assess the arguments for the value of knowledge for their ability to support the view that knowledge is uniquely valuable. First I will consider an argument which relies on a purported connection between knowledge and proper action. It will then be suggested that arguments tying knowledge to our proper action are not adequate to justify this standard view of the value of knowledge. Furthermore, I will assess an argument that appeals to the value of truth to explain the superior value of knowledge. From this it will be concluded that truth is also less valuable than typically thought, consequently resulting in an overvaluation of knowledge. Lastly, I will investigate the possibility that knowledge has its value because of its stability and resistance to irrationality. Again, I will argue that this is insufficient justification of the standard view about the value of knowledge by offering counterexamples to both the stability of knowledge and knowledge‟s resistance to irrationality. After this I will discuss the implications of my analysis on the value of knowledge.
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小学生の対人関係ビリーフに関する研究 : 対人関係ビリーフ尺度(小学生版)の開発SHINOHARA, Hisato, 篠原, 尚人 27 December 2013 (has links)
No description available.
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The truth norm account of justificationGreenberg, Alexander David January 2017 (has links)
This thesis is about the relationship between a belief being justified and it being true. It defends a version of the view that the fundamental point of having a justified belief is to have a true one. The particular version of that view it defends is the claim that belief is subject to a truth norm – i.e. a norm or standard that says that one should believe something if and only if it’s true. It claims that belief being subject to such a truth norm can explain which beliefs count as justified and which do not. After introducing the idea of a truth norm (Ch. 1), the argument of my thesis involves two main stages. Part One of the thesis (Chs. 2-3) contains the first stage, in which I argue that my way of arguing for a truth norm, on the basis of its explanatory role in epistemology, is much more likely to be successful than a more popular way of arguing for a truth norm, on the basis of its explanatory role in the philosophy of mind. Part Two (Chs. 4-7) contains the second stage, in which I argue that the truth norm can indeed explain justification in the way I’ve outlined. I do this by answering four criticisms that have been made of the claim that belief is subject to a truth norm. These criticisms claim that a truth norm should be rejected because, in turn, a truth norm cannot guide belief formation (Ch. 4), because a truth norm prescribes believing all the truths (Ch. 5), because a truth norm never prescribes suspending judgement (Ch. 6), and because a truth norm in some cases prescribes making problematic trade-offs of having one false belief for the sake of having many true beliefs (Ch. 7). I argue that all of these criticisms fail. But it is through answering these criticisms that we can see the contours of a defensible explanation of justification in terms of the truth norm.
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The epistemic and the ethicalShmidt, Adam Benjamin 13 February 2021 (has links)
For many, epistemology is a normative discipline in much the same sense as ethics. According to the analogy, just as ethics is about what we should do and how we should live our lives, epistemology is about what we should believe and how we should go about forming our beliefs. What complicates the analogy, however, is that believing things is also a part of living life. Our beliefs aren’t only evaluable with respect to whether they are credible, true, or amount to knowledge, but also with respect to whether they are useful, beneficial, or contribute to our happiness and wellbeing. The analogy implies that epistemic considerations (like evidence, truth, or knowledge) settle questions about what we should believe just as ethical considerations (like duty, goodness, or virtue) settle questions about what we should do and how we should live. The present work is an attempt to challenge this general picture of the subject matter of epistemology. Specifically, I argue that the normative assessment of belief cannot be understood in isolation from the broader social practices and human activities in virtue of which what we believe is ethically and practically significant. Chapter I introduces the central issues and raises a challenge to views that distinguish between epistemic and ethical assessment in terms of reasons for belief and reasons for action, respectively. The conclusion of this chapter is that there must be some conceptual link between the norms of belief and the norms of action. Chapter II builds upon this challenge by spelling out that conceptual link: reasons for belief entail reasons for action, and vice versa. The main conclusion of chapters I and II is that epistemology cannot settle questions about what we should believe without also settling questions about what we should do, and ethics cannot settle questions about what we should do without also settling questions about what we should believe. Chapters III and IV provide novel answers to two significant challenges to abandoning the analogy: providing plausible accounts of the relationship between reasons and rational motivation and the normative comparison of epistemic considerations and practical reasons for belief.
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The Moment of Truth: An Analysis of the Physician/Client Interaction and Interpretation of Test ResultsTillquist, Christopher R. January 1998 (has links)
The relationships between health, the scientific approach in medicine and concepts of epidemiology underlie theoretical and cultural attitudes of the nature of behavior and health risks. Medical tests that diagnose risk factors are thought to be predictive of disease. Physicians employ these tests to more accurately assess the health of their patients and convince their charges to change their behaviors. Communication of newly described risk factors is challenging for both physicians and patients as each party negotiates
modifications of behavior and perceptions of reality.
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Psycho-cultural constructs of illness in a Chinese populationLau, Bernard W. K. January 1998 (has links)
No description available.
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