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This is a dissertation in philosophy of psychiatry and ethics focused on the question of how does one live and react responsibly to the experience of mood disorders such as depression and anxiety. In looking to the current state of psychiatry and cultural understandings of mental disorder, I identify what I call being “epistemically adrift” – the sense that individuals face too many conflicting opinions and a constant debate of how to live with depression that they are unable to process for themselves what their best options for living are. This feeling of being epistemically adrift is all the more complicated by the experience of mood disorder itself, which often makes individuals feel morally inadequate and pressured to do the right thing without clear direction. In the absence of a clear path regarding depression and anxiety, this dissertation proposes an ethics for depression and anxiety disorders – drawing a virtue theory from the existentialist tradition that focuses on the outskirts of mental disorder in order to create an inclusive ethical system for those generally excluded in moral philosophy. The first chapter outlines the general theory of being epistemically adrift in relation to depression and anxiety and how the themes of uncertainty in these conditions inherently lead to different epistemic insights. This chapter establishes the dissertation’s roots in existential phenomenology and epistemic injustice literature in order to sketch out how the combined uncertainty in interdisciplinary understanding of mental illness with the uncertainty experienced within mood disorders lead individuals to feeling adrift and unable to determine what they should do for themselves in living good lives. Meanwhile I argue that the insights of depression and anxiety attune individuals to the world in different ways than their non-depressed peers, which imports interesting questions regarding our responsibility toward one another. The second chapter explores a case study of this sort of insight, arguing that the experience of excessive or “delusional” guilt within depressive disorders can provide a deeper insight into our general moral responsibility towards one another. I compare this feeling of guilt to Karl Jaspers’ conception of “metaphysical” or collective guilt in his analysis of the German people after the Second World War and Holocaust. These sorts of guilt feelings within depression is often incapacitating and hard to make sense of for individuals, but it additionally has a transformative ability to reevaluate moral life. I argue that parallel to the concept of “depressive realism” where individuals with depression have different and sometimes better insights than others, depressive guilt differently attunes individuals to how they relate to others and the world at large. From there, the third chapter engages with how psychiatric diagnosis shapes and limits one’s perceptions of their freedom and agency. More specifically, this chapter employs an existentialist analysis of how one can react to their diagnosis in bad faith – deflecting their own responsibility either by indulging into diagnostic patterns as inherent destiny or denying the condition’s effect on their motivations. I argue that there must be a middle path where one takes responsibility for one’s situation as being depressed or anxious, which both acknowledges the condition but also sees it as a personal challenge to improve on one’s life. The final chapter of the dissertation culminates in the development of an ethical theory that directly centers itself within the experience of mood disorders. This theory stems from both existentialism for its commitment to projecting meaning on uncertainty and absurdity along with virtue theory which allows for a sense of imperfection and improvement over time. I have been developing a set of virtues for how to be responsible for one’s depression or anxiety. “Responsibility” in this sense is the question of how one responds to their moods and other symptoms related to mood disorders, that is, an account of responsibility that resists narratives of fault or blame. These virtues are meant to be a set of therapy-informed guidelines to help those with depression and anxiety counteract the worst feelings of being adrift and foster autonomy and dignity for themselves. / Philosophy

One understudied barrier to science education reform concerns teachers’ cognitive processes and how they relate to instructional decision-making. Epistemic cognition—teachers’ beliefs about knowledge and knowledge acquisition and goals for their students’ knowledge acquisition—could provide important insights into the choices science teachers make in the classroom and why they might and might not adopt different instructional practices. Previous research has found mixed results regarding the relationship between beliefs and practice. Uniquely, science teachers encounter epistemic beliefs from both science and education, with potential differences that may need to be negotiated. This study found significant differences between the two belief systems but failed to find differences between biology, chemistry, physics, and Earth science. Three profiles were identified that were significantly different on their epistemic beliefs in the natural sciences and the learning sciences. Those in the naïve profile (highest beliefs in certainty of knowledge, authority as source of knowledge, and attainability of truth) had significantly less self-efficacy than those in the sophisticated profile, which predicted lower frequency of investigative teaching practices and practices promoting an investigative culture. Those in the flexible profile (medium beliefs in certainty of knowledge, authority as source of knowledge, and attainability of truth) used practices promoting an investigative culture significantly less frequently than those in the sophisticated profile. The findings from this study add to the literature on epistemic cognition and its influences. / Educational Psychology

A disjunction is an expression using ‘or’, such as ‘Anne has a Ford or a Tesla’. From such a statement, we cannot usually infer either disjunct, for example, that ‘Anne has a Ford’. However, in choice situations like ‘You may have coffee or tea’ we can infer either option. The problem of free choice disjunction is to determine why these choice inferences are legitimate (von Wright 1968, Kamp 1973, Meyer 2016). Central to this discussion is the observation that a modal possibility operator ranging over a disjunction sometimes implies a conjunction of possibilities. In the case of permission, we express this as the choice principle ‘May (P or Q)’ entails ‘May P and May Q’ (Zimmerman 2000). Unfortunately, this inference cannot hold in a logical language without significant modification of the systems involved. I explore the history of proposed solutions to this problem, including semantic solutions that assign a distinctive meaning to free choice disjunctions and pragmatic solutions that use features of their utterance to solve the problem. I draw connections between semantics and pragmatics and, using the tools of dynamic logic (Baltag et al. 1998, van Benthem 2010), I present a formal account of one major (Gricean) approach to the problem (Kratzer & Shimoyama 2002). Ultimately, I explore the role of logic in this debate and argue that we should formally represent the meaning of these expressions directly as conjunctions of possibilities. Thus, rather than trying to account for the choice principle within a logical system, we must instead account for the fact that, in choice situations, the meaning of ‘May (P or Q)’ translates into logical formalism as (May P & May Q). / Thesis / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) / A disjunction is a statement using ‘or’, like ‘Anne has a Ford or a Tesla’. From such a statement, we cannot infer either disjunct—e.g. ‘Anne has a Ford’. In choice situations like ‘You may have coffee or tea’ we can infer either option. Why this choice inference is legitimate is the problem of free choice disjunction. I explore the history of solutions to the problem, including semantic solutions that propose a special meaning to choice disjunctions and pragmatic solutions that appeal to the circumstances in which they are uttered. I draw connections between semantics and pragmatics and present a formal account of one major pragmatic approach to the problem. Where others have sought to explain how 'May(P or Q)' entails 'May P and May Q', I argue instead that the meaning of ‘May (P or Q)’ in choice scenarios translates directly into logical formalism as ‘May P & May Q’.

The status of theory in the Digital Humanities (DH) has been the subject of much debate. As a result, we find different theory narratives competing and entangled with each other. If at all, these narratives can only be grasped and examined from a somewhat detached perspective. Here, we attempt to investigate these elusive narratives by means of a conceptual history approach. In doing so, we define different theory dimensions, ranging from specific cultural and literary theory frameworks to more generic uses of the concept of theory. We examine the use and semantic changes of these theory notions in a large corpus of DH journals. Using a mixture of heuristic methods and approaches from the field of distributional semantics, we aim to create tellable conceptual stories of DH theory.

In 2007, Robin Stern published The gaslight effect: How to spot and survive the hidden manipulation others use to control your life, highlighting gaslighting as a form of psychological abuse that makes victims question the validity of their perceptions. Since then, gaslighting has primarily been tackled from a psychological perspective. Some sociologists, however, theorize that gaslighting is not simply a psychological issue but a sociological one as well. They argue that gaslighting may take place unintentionally when a perpetrator acts on their biases towards members of other social groups, a concept known as epistemic gaslighting. As a form of intentional abuse, gaslighting has been established to have profoundly negative effects on its victims. However, there is a significant gap in research pertaining to the sociological aspects of gaslighting. This study therefore aims to establish the connections between power, social identity, and gaslighting susceptibility. Given the assumption that gaslighting relies on a power differential, this study uses an online, survey-based format to produce data which preliminarily supports the existence of epistemic gaslighting, and aims to be useful in ultimately linking psychological and sociological views of gaslighting behaviors.

This study examined the motivations pre-service teachers possess as they progress though a teacher education program. Using Watt and Richardson’s (2007) Factors Influencing Teaching Choice (FIT-Choice) model as the theoretical underpinnings, the following research questions set the foundation for this study: 1) Do pre-service teachers’ motivation to pursue a teaching career change over the course of a teacher education program, and 2) Is there a relationship between pre-service teachers’ values and their satisfaction with their choice to pursue a teaching career? Quantitative results indicate significant drops in motivation from students’ Freshman/Sophomore year to students’ Graduate year. Qualitative results demonstrated a greater frequency of responses for social utility values, intrinsic motivation, positive prior teaching and learning experiences, career development aspirations, and epistemic values. / Educational Psychology

<p dir="ltr">In contemporary engineering education landscapes, integrating the arts and engineering often adopts a utilitarian lens, emphasizing the enhancement of engineers' creativity or the aesthetic embellishment of final solutions. However, this narrow perspective overlooks the profound potential of the arts in co-creating meaningful solutions, perpetuating epistemic injustices by relegating the arts and other ways of knowing to mere complements of technical knowledge. In this seminar, I present the findings of an autoethnographic inquiry aimed at disrupting traditional disciplinary boundaries within engineering design education. I explore novel educational paradigms by integrating arts and engineering to challenge the notion of engineering as the exclusive owner of problem-solving knowledge.</p><p dir="ltr">Through the lens of autoethnography, I engage in reflective analysis of my role as a curriculum and instructional designer endeavoring to integrate the arts and engineering in pursuit of epistemic justice for the arts. Four distinct curricular initiatives are studied: the Compassionate Engineering course for undergraduate engineering students, the Shadow Puppetry Box activity for middle-school students within a summer camp setting, the Elegance in Engineering module for graduate-level engineering education, and the Social Justice and Civil Engineering module designed for undergraduate civil engineering students. By crafting autoethnographic artifacts such as video reflections and video art, I embrace reflexivity and introspection, elucidating the critical considerations and obstacles encountered in designing for epistemic justice through arts-engineering integration. Additionally, I explore how the learning design process facilitated the development of comprehensive and impactful curricula. I also examine the outcomes and implications of implementing these emergent curricula on pedagogical approaches and student learning experiences.</p><p dir="ltr">This study provides a space for reflection, inquiry, and inspiration, inviting participants to challenge conventional disciplinary boundaries, interrogate prevailing engineering paradigms, and envision transformative approaches to interdisciplinary education. By embracing the complexities of arts-engineering integration, I endeavor to forge new pathways toward inclusive and equitable educational practices, reshaping the education landscape for the better.</p>