This work presents the state of the art in hierarchically decomposed multilevel optimization. This work is expanded with the inclusion of evidence theory with the multilevel framework for the quantification of epistemic uncertainty. The novel method, Evidence-Based Multilevel Design optimization, is then used to solve two analytical optimization problems. This method is also used to explore the effect of the belief structure on the final solution. A methodology is presented to reduce the costs of evidence-based optimization through manipulation of the belief structure. In addition, a transport aircraft wing is also solved with multilevel optimization without uncertainty. This complex, real world optimization problem shows the capability of decomposed multilevel framework to reduce costs of solving computationally expensive problems with black box analyses.

I explore the epistemic justification of self-beliefs regarding personality traits within the internalism-externalism debate. Historically, the question of epistemic justification of self-beliefs has been discussed only with respect to our beliefs about our current mental states while the epistemic justification of our self-beliefs about our personality traits was assumed not to be any different from the justification of our beliefs about the external world. However, I use empirical psychology to highlight a few unique characteristics of our self-beliefs about personality traits that make the typical application of internalist or externalist standards less straightforward. These characteristics have to do with the biases and the self-verification that accompany our self-beliefs about our personality traits. I argue that externalism, in general, and virtue reliabilism, in particular, are more suitable to the context of our self-beliefs about our personality traits than other theories of justification. However, I contend that within the virtue reliabilism framework, a self-belief-forming process can become more competent if it generates self-belief from the instances where individuals manifest the trait in question while having the motivation and opportunity to do otherwise. I show how this condition makes the self-belief-forming process more competent and, therefore, makes the produced self-beliefs more epistemically justified. / Thesis / Master of Philosophy (MA)

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Conciliationists hold that hold that epistemic peer disagreement about whether a proposition is true constitutes a (partial) defeater for that proposition. Non-conciliationists, on the other hand, deny that peer disagreement constitutes a (partial) defeater for a proposition under dispute. A defeater is a reason to doubt the justification one thought one had in believing a certain proposition to be true. While there are dynamic views in the literature, conciliationism and non-conciliationism represent the two most defended positions. This debate has highlighted a number of interesting and underexplored ideas in epistemology, such as the distinction between first-order and second-order reasons, the uniqueness thesis, and independence requirements. I develop and defend an underexplored argument in favour of non-conciliationism. A researcher may be reasonable to remain steadfast in the face of disagreement about a proposition related to her research if doing so will yield epistemic benefits. I draw on two main sources of evidence for this claim: (i) there are numerous real-life examples where this occurs, and (ii) there is empirical evidence to suggest that cognitive diversity helps enhance prediction and problem-solving. The most pressing objection to this argument is that it conflates practical reasons with epistemic reasons. I argue that this objection fails because the reasons in question actually are epistemic. A better distinction is one between synchronic epistemic reasons and diachronic epistemic reasons. I then explore how far, if at all, this argument can be taken beyond research contexts. / Thesis / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

Moral encroachment theses (MET) operate like pragmatic encroachment theses. When the stakes of belief are high, so are the standards for evidence. This means that evidence which is sufficient in a low stakes-of-belief scenario may be insufficient when the stakes are raised. Simply, METs aim to appeal to the varying moral intuitions that one may have in cases with different moral stakes and build an epistemological difference out of that moral distinction. For example, one might think that in cases of racial profiling, because the moral stakes of belief are high, what would otherwise constitute good evidence for belief is insufficient. However, most METs assume that the probabilistic evidence on which one relies to form their belief is good evidence. Instead of examining the reliability of statistical generalizations, like those used in cases of racial profiling, the moral encroacher focuses on the moral facts of the circumstance of belief formation to explain why the subsequent belief is wrong epistemically. I will focus on Sarah Moss's account because she focuses on cases in which one forms an opinion on the basis of probabilistic evidence. I use Moss's version of the MET as a target to illustrate the challenges METs face in general. Broadly, Moss holds that a judgment's moral risk bears on its epistemic status. In Section 1, I briefly outline Sarah Moss's MET and explain why it fails to identify which cases produce epistemically problematic judgments and fails to explain why those judgments are epistemically problematic. In Section 2, I offer an alternative account, which explains why statistical generalizations about marginalized social groups are likely unreliable as evidence. Thus, use of this kind of evidence leads to epistemically problematic beliefs. I conclude by introducing epistemic risk as an explanation for why the inference made in Shopper is epistemically problematic while the inference made in Fraternity Member is not. / Master of Arts / Imagine a shopkeeper who has just realized something was stolen from his shop. There are two possible suspects: a young white man and a young Black man. He did not see the shoplifting occur, and the only evidence he has is the statistical evidence that young Black men are 70% more likely to shoplift than young white men. By all accounts, he is not racially biased, this is simply a statistical fact that he is aware of. Based on this evidence, he forms the judgment that the young Black man is the likely culprit. Let's call this case Shopper. Now imagine a student on a college campus whose friend has been assaulted. There are two possible suspects: a young man who is not a fraternity member and a young man who is in a fraternity. The only evidence that the student has is the statistical evidence that men involved in fraternities are 70% more likely to have committed sexual violence than average. By all accounts she is not anti-fraternity, she is simply aware of this statistical evidence. Based on this evidence, she forms the judgment that the fraternity member is the likely assailant. Let's call this case Fraternity Member. I think there's a difference between these two cases. Specifically, I think it's okay to make the inference in the latter case, but not in the former. Even if you don't quite share my intuition, you might still think that however 'icky' it feels to draw the above sort of inference in Fraternity Member, it feels ickier still to draw it in Shopper. Either way, I don't think these intuitions are merely responsive to the moral facts of the cases: I think there's something different about the evidence relied upon in these cases. Specifically, we have reason to thinks that the processes with which we produce the evidence relied upon in Shopper are biased.

While Wesley Salmon attributes the debate on scientific explanation between Carl Hempel and Peter Railton (or between the epistemic and ontic conceptions of scientific explanation, more generally) as one over which conception of explanation is correct, I claim that Hempel and Railton were responding to two different questions altogether. Hempel was addressing a question akin to 'what is <i>scientific</i> explanation?', while Railton was focused on a question more similar to 'what is scientific <i>explanation</i>?' In this paper I discuss the different questions Hempel and Railton were addressing, and how distinguishing these two questions can aid in the discussion of the requirements and adequacy of models of scientific explanation. While these two questions are clearly inter-related, I claim that we should not judge the adequacy of an answer to one of these questions on the basis of the adequacy of an answer to the other. / Master of Arts / While Wesley Salmon attributes the debate on scientific explanation between Carl Hempel and Peter Railton (or between the epistemic and ontic conceptions of scientific explanation, more generally) as one over which conception of explanation is correct, I claim that Hempel and Railton were responding to two different questions altogether. Hempel was addressing a question akin to ‘what is scientific explanation?’, while Railton was focused on a question more similar to ‘what is scientific explanation?’. In this paper I discuss the different questions Hempel and Railton were addressing, and how distinguishing these two questions can aid in the discussion of the requirements and adequacy of models of scientific explanation. While these two questions are clearly inter-related, I claim that we should not judge the adequacy of an answer to one of these questions on the basis of the adequacy of an answer to the other.

This paper aims to explore the phenomena of “fake news” and to see what kind of threat that it poses – mainly focused on epistemic damage. It will also explore different measures that can be taken in order to lessen this effect. In order to discuss the term, one must begin exploring it as not being a new phenomenon but also see what effect the introduction of digital social media platforms has had on the spread and damage caused. The paper also discusses what can be regarded as a trusted source of knowledge by covering the assurance theory of testimony and how it fits in an online context. If one can trust information based on a person stepping in as a guarantee for the knowledge – when can they be said to have done this?The paper will also cover the popularisation of Artificial Intelligence (AI)-generative tools that can help create falsified images, video and audio content that can be claimed to be evidence and how this has a negative effect as an epistemic threat. The conclusion of this paper is that a more level-headed approach, applying some form of common sense, to sharing and evaluating information being news is the best approach to counter the epistemic harm that otherwise can be caused by fake news. This could be done by starting to value ones’ view of themselves as part of the chain of testimony and to cultivate the trust that others put in them.

Epistemologists and those involved in feminist philosophy have expanded philosophical analyses of epistemic injustices and its subparts over the last decade. In doing so, such authors have thoroughly discussed the role of credibility deficits and the harms they cause for those receiving the deficits. In this literature, however, credibility excesses have not received as much attention owing to their tendency to be socially advantageous for those receiving them. In this paper, I show that epistemic justice relies in part on taking these excesses into account. More specifically, I illustrate how adjusting only credibility deficits leads to a two-fold problem. On the one hand, it leads to an epistemic harm insofar as not taking the excesses into account can cause us to draw the wrong conclusion from furnished testimonies. If one persons testimonial excess is still greater than another's corrected deficit in a certain way, then the person with the excess will be favored over the other person even once the deficit is corrected. On the other hand, it can also lead to a moral harm that wrongs the person who received the eventually corrected deficit in their capacity as a knower. It does so in instances when it undermines the person's self-trust. As such, if we are willing to adjust credibility deficits up in the project of epistemic justice we also have to be willing to adjust credibility excesses down in at least some cases. / Master of Arts / Think of a time when someone did not believe you. For some persons holding historically marginalized identities, it is a fairly common occurrence to not be believed just because one is, or is perceived to be a woman, a person of color, queer, and immigrant etc. In philosophy, epistemologists have discussed these testimonial deficits and furnished solutions that call for adjusting such deficits up in the project of justice. However, testimonial deficits are not the only instances when a person may receive a non-proportional amount of credibility. For other persons holding historically majoritized identities, it may also be fairly common to be believed just because one holds or is perceived to hold an identity such as man, white, straight, etc. The presence of credibility excesses is not as discussed in philosophical literature and what, exactly, we ought to do about these excesses is an open question. In this paper, I argue that adjusting credibility deficits up is not sufficient for reaching a just state if or when we leave the excesses unadjusted in certain circumstances. While adjusting the credibility deficits up is part of the picture, we also have to be willing to adjust the credibility excesses down in at least some cases.

O estudo da argumentação e da construção de argumentos vem ganhando cada vez mais espaço na área de pesquisa de Ensino de Ciências. A mudança no foco de estudo do sujeito epistêmico, de uma perspectiva individual para a ideia de uma comunidade de conhecedores, nos permite analisar como se dá o processo de produção, comunicação e avaliação do conhecimento científico escolar por meio das interações discursivas. O presente trabalho se insere no contexto da necessidade de produzir conhecimentos acerca dos aspectos epistêmicos no processo de construção de argumentos tendo como foco professores e formador. Objetivamos investigar a mobilização de Práticas Epistêmicas dos professores para a construção de argumentos e suas relações com o Movimento Epistêmico do formador, analisando como as ações do formador favorecem a adoção de tais práticas e promove a construção de argumentos durante a aplicação de uma Sequência Didática em Ecologia em uma oficina de formação continuada de professores de ciências. Mediante a relação entre os Movimentos Epistêmicos do formador e a mobilização de Práticas Epistêmicas pelos professores, analisamos os aspectos epistêmicos na construção de argumentos, tendo como base os argumentos de referência que a Sequência Didática traz em seu escopo. Nossos resultados apontam dois aspectos relevantes desse processo: o direcionamento e a avaliação. O aspecto de direcionamento do formador se constitui na interação entre os objetivos da Sequência Didática e a comunidade de aprendizes. O aspecto de avaliação para a construção de argumentos se caracterizou nos momentos em que o direcionamento se relacionava com as crenças, valores e saberes dessa comunidade. Ressaltamos a importância de desenvolvimento de maiores estudos que se aprofundem sobre os aspectos relacionados ao que conta como conhecimento relevante e os meios para adquiri-lo no contexto de formação de professores. / The study of argumentation and the construction of arguments has been more discussed in the field of research in science teaching. Changing the focus of study of the epistemic subject, from an individual perspective to an idea of a community of experts, allow us to analyze hoe the process of knowledge production, process of communication and process of evaluation of the scientific knowledge through epistemic aspect in the argument-construction process focusing on teacher and trainers. It aims to investigate the mobilization of teacher\'s Epistemic Practices when constructing arguments and its relation to the educator\'s Epistemic Moves, analyzing how the educator\'s actions favor the adoption of such practices and promotes the construction of arguments when using a didactic sequence application in Ecology in a continuing education workshop for science teachers. Through the relationship between the educator\'s Epistemic Moves and the mobilization of teacher\'s Epistemic Practices, it was possible to analyze the epistemic aspects in the construction arguments, based on the reference arguments that are within the scope of Didactic Sequence. Our results show two relevant aspects of this process: targeting and evaluation. The trainer\'s targeting aspect is based on the interaction between the goals of the Didactic Sequence and the community of learners. The evaluation aspect focusing on the construction of arguments, based on situations in which the orientation was related to the beliefs, values and knowledge in the present community. We highlighted the importance of developing more efforts to go deeper on the aspects related to relevant knowledge and the ways to acquire in the context of teacher training.

Stereotype threat is a psychological phenomenon that occurs when individuals become aware that their behavior could potentially confirm a negative stereotype. Though stereotype threat is a widely studied phenomenon in social psychology, there has been relatively little scholarship on it in philosophy, despite its relevance to issues such as implicit cognition, epistemic injustice, and diversity in philosophy. However, most psychological research on stereotype threat discusses the phenomenon by using an overly narrow picture of it, which focuses on one of its effects: the ability to hinder performance. As a result, almost all philosophical work on stereotype threat is solely focused on issues of performance too. Social psychologists know that stereotype threat has additional effects, such as negatively impacting individuals’ motivation, interests, long-term health, and even their sense of self, but these other effects are often downplayed, or even forgotten about. Therefore, the “standard picture” of stereotype threat needs to be expanded, in order to better understand the theoretical aspects of the phenomenon, and to develop broader, more effective interventions. This dissertation develops such an “expanded picture” of stereotype threat, which emphasizes how the phenomenon can negatively impact both self-identity and epistemic agency. In doing so, I explore the nature of stereotypes more generally and argue that they undermine groups’ moral status and contribute to what is called “ontic injustice.” I also show how stereotype threat harms members of socially subordinated groups by way of coercing their self-identity and undermining their epistemic agency, which I argue is a form of epistemic injustice. Lastly, I analyze the expanded picture’s implications for addressing the low proportion of women in professional philosophy. I critically engage recent arguments that these low numbers simply reflect different interests women have, which if innate or benign, would require no intervention. My expanded picture shows the mistakes in this sort of reasoning, which is also present in discussions on the underrepresentation of women in science. The expanded picture of stereotype threat that this dissertation develops is not only practically important, but also advances key philosophical debates in social epistemology, applied ethics, and social metaphysics.