Undergraduate research experiences (UREs) are presented as a mechanism for improving the persistence of Black engineering students. However, because most engineering UREs are led by faculty and staff in Colleges of Engineering, it is reasonable to assume they are not immune to the systemic racial issues that plague engineering education. Existing scholarship on epistemic exclusion theorizes that individual biases and institutional practices contribute to faculty of color's scholarship being devalued and deemed illegitimate, but this topic is underexplored in UREs. LSAMP is an NSF-funded program that provides funding for institutions to create UREs for racially minoritized students in STEM, providing a ripe context for exploring the phenomenon of epistemic exclusion in UREs. This explanatory mixed methods study examines facets of epistemic exclusion prevalent in the undergraduate research experiences of Black engineering LSAMP scholars and the practices undergirding it. The findings of this study are based on survey and interview data collected from current and former LSAMP scholars. The survey results reveal perceptions of low levels of epistemic exclusion via scholarly devaluation; and there were no significant differences in survey responses based on race, gender, or whether in an engineering discipline or not. However, the qualitative phase helped explain the quantitative results. Black engineering students, specifically, experienced epistemic exclusion in ways that differ from literature on underrepresented faculty; and they perceived UREs as an opportunity for learning knowledge – not producing it. While positive peer interactions and a welcoming lab enabled epistemic inclusion, a toxic lab culture and inadequate URE program structures enabled epistemic exclusion. These findings have implications for faculty mentors, URE program administrators, policymakers, and education researchers. They are valuable for advancing our understanding of Black engineering students participating in UREs, contributing to national efforts to broaden participation of racially minoritized students in engineering education, and diversifying the research enterprise and the engineering workforce. / Doctor of Philosophy / Undergraduate research experiences (UREs) are presented as a means of improving Black engineering students' persistence. However, since most engineering UREs are led by faculty and staff in Colleges of Engineering, it is reasonable to assume they are not immune to the systemic racial problems occurring in engineering education. Existing scholarship on epistemic exclusion suggests that individual biases and institutional practices contribute to faculty of color's scholarship being devalued and considered illegitimate, yet this issue is underexplored in UREs. LSAMP is an NSF-funded program that provides funding for institutions to create UREs for racially minoritized students in STEM, offering an opportunity to explore the phenomenon of epistemic exclusion in UREs. This explanatory mixed methods study examines forms of epistemic exclusion prevalent in the undergraduate research experiences of Black engineering LSAMP scholars and the practices undergirding it. The findings of this study are based on survey and interview data collected from current and former LSAMP scholars. The survey results reveal feelings of low levels of epistemic exclusion through scholarly devaluation; and there were no significant differences in survey responses based on race, gender, or whether in an engineering field or not. However, the qualitative phase helped explain the quantitative results. Black engineering students, particularly, experienced epistemic exclusion in ways that differ from literature on underrepresented faculty; and they observed UREs as an opportunity for learning knowledge – not producing it. While positive peer interactions and a welcome lab enabled epistemic inclusion, a toxic lab culture and inadequate URE program structures allowed epistemic exclusion. These findings may be beneficial for faculty mentors, URE program administrators, policymakers, and education researchers. They are valuable for advancing our understanding of Black engineering students taking part in UREs, contributing to national efforts to broaden participation of racially minoritized students in engineering education, and diversifying the research enterprise and the engineering workforce.

Dans cette thèse, nous proposons des modèles logiques pour la représentation des croyances et leur changement dans un cadre multi-agent, en insistant sur l'importance de se fixer un point de vue particulier pour la modélisation. A cet égard, nous distinguons deux approches différentes: l'approche externe, où le modélisateur est quelqu'un d'externe à la situation; l'approche interne, où le modélisateur est l'un des agents. Nous proposons une version interne de la logique épistémique dynamique (avec des modèles d'événements), ce qui nous permet de généraliser facilement la théorie de la révision des croyances d'AGM au cas multi-agent. Ensuite, nous mod´elisons les dynamismes logiques complexes qui soustendent notre interprétation des événements en introduisant des probabilités et des infinitésimaux. Finalement, nous proposons un formalisme alternatif qui n'utilise pas de modèle d'événement mais qui introduit à la place un opérateur d'événement inverse.

Ce mémoire se concentre sur le problème de la régression épistémique. Il s’agit d’un problème très important puisqu’il remet en question la possibilité de la justification. Nous nous intéresserons aux détails de ce problème, ainsi qu’aux réponses qui lui sont offertes. Traditionnellement, deux réponses sont concurrentes : le fondationnalisme et le cohérentisme. La première propose d’arrêter la régression à un fondement, alors que la seconde propose de s’intéresser à la cohérence partagée par les croyances. Toutefois, le but de notre mémoire est de présenter et de défendre une troisième solution : l’infinitisme. Introduite dans les années 1990 par Peter Klein, l’infinitisme est une des plus récentes théories de la justification et, malgré son intérêt, elle est encore très peu défendue. Cette théorie propose de résoudre le problème de la régression en basant la justification des croyances sur des séries infinies et non répétitives de raisons. Cette idée est intéressante, car l’infinitisme renverse le problème d’origine, puisque les régressions infinies sont généralement perçues comme étant un problème pour la connaissance et la source du scepticisme. Notre objectif est de montrer que l’infinitisme est la meilleure solution possible au problème de la régression. Pour ce faire, nous faisons la synthèse des principaux arguments pour l’infinitisme. Cela nous permettra de distinguer trois types d’infinitisme pour ensuite retenir un de ces types, une forme impure d’infinitisme, comme étant le meilleur. Finalement, nous confronterons l’infinitisme à ces critiques pour montrer qu’il s’agit d’une théorie de la justification qui est réellement viable. / This dissertation focuses on the problem of epistemic regression which questions the possibility of justification. For this reason we’ll take interest in the details of epistemic regression and in the solutions that different critics offer to solve the problem. Generally, two positions oppose each other : foundationalism and coherentism. The first one proposes to stop the regression at a foundation, as the second one takes concern about the coherence shared amongst the beliefs. However the purpose of this dissertation is to present and defend a third position : infinitism. Introduced in the 1990’s by Peter Klein, infinitism is one of the most recent theories of justification. Although it is quite appealing, Klein’s theory is not very popular and few people defend this position. Infinitism offers to solve the problem of regression by basing the justification of the beliefs on series of infinite and non repetitive reasons. Consequently, infinitism reverses the initial problem because infinite regression is often perceived as an issue for knowledge and a source for scepticism. Our goal is to demonstrate that infinitism is the best way to solve the problem of epistemic regression. Therefore, we’ll synthesize the arguments in favor of infinitism and that will mark out three types of infinitism from which we’ll retain one, an impure form of infinitism, as best suited to answer the problem of regression. Finally we’ll respond to the main oppositions to infinitism in order to demonstrate that it is in fact a viable theory of justification.

Baseando-nos nos princípios da perspectiva sociocultural da aprendizagem como elemento norteador e compreendendo que a alfabetização científica deve ser considerada um dos objetivos do ensino de ciências, nesta pesquisa procuramos investigar a ocorrência das práticas epistêmicas durante o desenvolvimento de uma atividade de interpretação e discussão de um artigo científico adaptado sobre o tema dinâmica populacional de elefantes marinhos. Essa análise se justifica uma vez que as práticas epistêmicas são consideradas pela literatura como ações que contribuem para o desenvolvimento da alfabetização científica. Nesta pesquisa, consideramos o grupo formado pela professora e seus estudantes como uma comunidade epistêmica de práticas, tendo em vista que ao longo da atividade os sujeitos compartilharam os mesmos objetivos tentando compreender a dinâmica populacional dos elefantes marinhos. Analisamos um conjunto de dados contendo transcrições e gravações de áudio e vídeo de duas aulas de Biologia que fazem parte de uma sequência de ensino investigativa. Mapeamos as aulas segmentando-as em unidades menores (episódios e sequências discursivas) com vistas a identificar as práticas epistêmicas por meio da análise das interações discursivas ocorridas entre os participantes da atividade. Como resultado de nossa investigação, identificamos um repertório de práticas epistêmicas menos variado em comparação com outros estudos realizados anteriormente. Entretanto, o número de ocorrências de práticas epistêmicas foi significativo, indicando que a atividade contribuiu para que as atividades subsequentes da sequência de ensino investigativa fossem desenvolvidas com sucesso. / Based on the principles of the sociocultural perspective of learning as a guiding element and understanding that scientific literacy should be considered one of the objectives of science teaching, in this research, we seek to investigate the occurrence of epistemic practices during the development of an activity of interpretation and discussion of an adapted scientific article on the dynamic population theme of elephant seals. This analysis is justified since epistemic practices are considered by the literature as actions that contribute to the development of scientific literacy. In this research, we consider the group formed by the teacher and her students as an epistemic community of practices, considering that throughout the activity the subjects shared the same objectives trying to understand the population dynamics of the elephants. We analyzed a set of data containing transcriptions and audio and video recordings of two Biology classes that are part of a sequence of an inquiry-based learning sequence. We map the classes by segmenting them into smaller units (episodes and discursive sequences) in order to identify the epistemic practices by analyzing the discursive interactions that occurred between the participants of the activity. As a result of our research, we have identified a less varied range of epistemic practices compared to previous studies. However, the number of occurrences of epistemic practices was significant, indicating that the activity contributed to the success of the subsequent activities of the inquiry-based learning sequence.

Cette thèse de doctorat est une investigation des logiques de la connaissance, de la croyance et de la dynamique d'information, en utilisant des outils de topologie et logique épistémique (dynamique). La partie I concerne les interprétations fondées sur des preuves de croyances justifiées et connaissance. Commencer par une interprétation topologique des connaissances désormais standard en tant qu'opérateur intérieur, nous développons, de manière progressive, un cadre qui (1) peut parler de preuves non seulement sémantiquement, mais aussi le niveau syntaxique, rendant ainsi la notion de preuve plus explicite; (2) prend la preuve comme la notion la plus primitive, et définit la croyance et la connaissance purement basé sur elle. Dans la partie II de cette dissertation, nous nous concentrons sur notions de connaissances ainsi que divers types de dynamique de l'information comprenant apprendre de nouvelles preuves. Plus précisément, cette partie est centrée autour des notions de certaines connaissances et savoir-faire en tant que «connaissances potentielles», ainsi que les liens entre la notion abstraite d'effort épistémique englobant toute méthode l'acquisition de preuves et les attitudes dynamiques bien étudiées telles que les annonces publiques arbitraires. Pour résumer, cette thèse réinterprète d'une part certaines logiques épistémiques et doxastiques existantes et leurs extensions dynamiques d'un point de vue topologique, fournissant une interprétation fondée sur des preuves. D'un autre côté, elle utilise des outils topologiques pour affiner et étendre les analyses antérieures, conduisant à de nouvelles logiques de la dynamique des preuves et de l'information / This dissertation brings together epistemic logic and topology. It studies formal representations of the notion of evidence and its link to justification, justified belief, knowledge, and evidence-based information dynamics, by using tools from topology and (dynamic) epistemic logic. Part I is concerned with evidence-based interpretations of justified belief and knowledge. Starting with a by-now-standard topological interpretation of knowledge as the interior operator, we develop, in a gradual manner, a topological framework that (1) can talk about evidence not only semantically, but also at the syntactic level, thereby making the notion of evidence more explicit; (2) takes evidence as the most primitive notion, and defines belief and knowledge purely based on it, thereby linking these two crucial notions of epistemology at a deeper, more basic level. In Part II of this dissertation, we focus on notions of knowledge as well as various types of information dynamics comprising learning new evidence. More precisely, this part is centered around the notions of absolutely certain knowledge and know ability as "potential knowledge", as well as the connections between the abstract notion of epistemic effort encompassing any method of evidence acquisition and the well-studied dynamic attitudes such as public and arbitrary public announcements. To sum up, this dissertation on one hand re-interprets some existing epistemic and doxastic logics and their dynamic extensions from a topological perspective, providing an evidence-based interpretation. On the other hand, it uses topological tools to refine and extend earlier analysis, leading to novel logics of evidence and information dynamics

Ce mémoire se concentre sur le problème de la régression épistémique. Il s’agit d’un problème très important puisqu’il remet en question la possibilité de la justification. Nous nous intéresserons aux détails de ce problème, ainsi qu’aux réponses qui lui sont offertes. Traditionnellement, deux réponses sont concurrentes : le fondationnalisme et le cohérentisme. La première propose d’arrêter la régression à un fondement, alors que la seconde propose de s’intéresser à la cohérence partagée par les croyances. Toutefois, le but de notre mémoire est de présenter et de défendre une troisième solution : l’infinitisme. Introduite dans les années 1990 par Peter Klein, l’infinitisme est une des plus récentes théories de la justification et, malgré son intérêt, elle est encore très peu défendue. Cette théorie propose de résoudre le problème de la régression en basant la justification des croyances sur des séries infinies et non répétitives de raisons. Cette idée est intéressante, car l’infinitisme renverse le problème d’origine, puisque les régressions infinies sont généralement perçues comme étant un problème pour la connaissance et la source du scepticisme. Notre objectif est de montrer que l’infinitisme est la meilleure solution possible au problème de la régression. Pour ce faire, nous faisons la synthèse des principaux arguments pour l’infinitisme. Cela nous permettra de distinguer trois types d’infinitisme pour ensuite retenir un de ces types, une forme impure d’infinitisme, comme étant le meilleur. Finalement, nous confronterons l’infinitisme à ces critiques pour montrer qu’il s’agit d’une théorie de la justification qui est réellement viable. / This dissertation focuses on the problem of epistemic regression which questions the possibility of justification. For this reason we’ll take interest in the details of epistemic regression and in the solutions that different critics offer to solve the problem. Generally, two positions oppose each other : foundationalism and coherentism. The first one proposes to stop the regression at a foundation, as the second one takes concern about the coherence shared amongst the beliefs. However the purpose of this dissertation is to present and defend a third position : infinitism. Introduced in the 1990’s by Peter Klein, infinitism is one of the most recent theories of justification. Although it is quite appealing, Klein’s theory is not very popular and few people defend this position. Infinitism offers to solve the problem of regression by basing the justification of the beliefs on series of infinite and non repetitive reasons. Consequently, infinitism reverses the initial problem because infinite regression is often perceived as an issue for knowledge and a source for scepticism. Our goal is to demonstrate that infinitism is the best way to solve the problem of epistemic regression. Therefore, we’ll synthesize the arguments in favor of infinitism and that will mark out three types of infinitism from which we’ll retain one, an impure form of infinitism, as best suited to answer the problem of regression. Finally we’ll respond to the main oppositions to infinitism in order to demonstrate that it is in fact a viable theory of justification.

The core of the present master's thesis is a comparative analysis of means of expressing epistemic modality on the background of Spanish and Czech journalistic texts. Initially, the discourse analysis and the concept of theory of enunciation are presented. Secondly, the author defines the term modality and its concept in terms of modal logic and linguistics. She concentrates on different typologies of modality presented by foreign and Czech authors as well. Further, the works focuses on the category of evidentiality and means of expression (especially lexical) of epistemic modality. The proper research is based on qualitative and quantitative analysis. The aim of this investigation is to compare the frequency of occurrence of the epistemic markers between the aforementioned languages.

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / The identification and analysis of epistemic principles have enabled significant gains in the study of skepticism in recent decades; this does not mean that we are near a consensus about which principles should be accepted. Taking p for any proposition that we normally accept to be known, like here is a hand , and h for a skeptical scenario such p is not true, but just a illusion projected in my mind , the skeptical argument can be formalized as follows: (1) If S knows that p, then S knows that ~h; (2) S doesn t know that ~h, then (3) S doesn t know that p. The first chapter of this text presents a comprehensive analysis of this argument, where is pointed out that its cogency can be defended from a valid version of the epistemic closure principle. The second chapter deals with the antiskeptical strategy advocated by Fred Dretske, which attempts to refute the skeptic arguing against its first premise, by rejecting the closure principle. At the end of this chapter, it is argued that the Dretske's arguments fail to fulfill their goal, collapsing in the face of relevant objections. Finally, the third chapter examines the answer to the skeptic presented by Peter Klein. Based on a more sophisticated understanding of the epistemic closure principle, Klein suggests that the skeptic cannot build a plausible argument for (2). It is argued that this analysis of the problem is adequate and resists criticism of his objectors. / A identificação e a análise de princípios epistêmicos têm possibilitado ganhos significativos no estudo do ceticismo nas últimas décadas; contudo isso não significa que estejamos próximos de um consenso sobre quais princípios devam ser aceitos. Entendendo p como qualquer proposição que geralmente admitiríamos saber, como aqui há uma mão , e h como algum cenário cético incompatível com a verdade de p, tal como p não é verdade mas apenas uma ilusão projetada em minha mente , o argumento cético é comumente assim formalizado: (1) Se S sabe que p, então S sabe que ~h; (2) S não sabe ~h, logo, (3) S não sabe que p. O primeiro capítulo desta dissertação é destinado à análise detalhada das premissas desse argumento, onde é apontado que sua cogência pode ser mantida a partir da defesa de uma versão válida do princípio de fechamento epistêmico. O segundo capítulo trata da estratégia anticética defendia por Fred Dretske, que busca refutar o ceticismo atacando sua primeira premissa, rejeitando o princípio de fechamento. Ao término deste capítulo, é defendido que os argumentos de Dretske falham no cumprimento de seu objetivo, sucumbindo frente a importantes objeções. Finalmente, no terceiro capítulo, discorre-se sobre a resposta para o cético apresentada por Peter Klein. Partindo de uma compreensão mais sofisticada do princípio de fechamento epistêmico, Klein sinaliza que o cético não consegue construir um argumento plausível para (2). Defende-se que essa análise do problema é adequada e resiste às críticas de seus objetores.

This thesis explores the extent to which the doxastic ‘should' is information-sensitive and the implications of this for a number of debates in normative epistemology. The doxastic ‘should' is a special case of the deontic modal ‘should' and occurs in sentences such as ‘You shouldn't believe everything you read online'. In the recent semantics literature, it has been suggested that the deontic ‘should' is information-sensitive, meaning that sentences of the form ‘S should do A' are relativized to information-states. After a short introductory chapter, I survey the relevant semantics literature in chapter 2 and provide a simplified contextualist semantics for the doxastic ‘should', according to which the truth-conditions of sentences containing the doxastic ‘should' vary with the information-state provided by their context of utterance. In chapters 3 to 6, I discuss the different kinds of information-states the doxastic ‘should' can be relativized to and how the respective relativization matters for normative epistemology. Chapter 3 argues that the doxastic ‘should' has a subjective and an objective sense and that this distinction solves the apparent conflict between subjective epistemic norms and the truth norm for belief. Chapter 4 addresses the question of how one should react to misleading higher-order evidence. I propose that two seemingly opposing views on this issue, Steadfastness and Concilliationism, are both correct. In a sense of ‘should' that is relativized to one's first-order evidence, one should remain steadfast in the face of misleading higher-order evidence, but in another sense, which is relativized to one's higher-order evidence, one shouldn't. In chapters 5 and 6, I argue that when we advise others on what they should believe, we talk about what they should believe in light of their and our joint evidence. Chapter 7 concludes this thesis with a defence of contextualist semantics for the doxastic ‘should' against truth-relativist challenges.

Notre travail s'attache à examiner la spécificité ainsi que la pertinence du mode d'explication cognitiviste des croyances, tel qu'il est défini par Raymond Boudon, à travers, tout d'abord, une analyse de la notion de "rationalité épistémique" et un examen de certaines des objections qui peuvent lui être faites. Nous interrogeons ensuite la compatibilité de ce type d'explication avec l'idée, propre à un certain nombre de travaux en sciences sociales, selon laquelle les intérêts sociaux et/ou les mécanismes fonctionnels sont aptes à expliquer la formation des croyances. Enfin, nous réfléchirons à la question de savoir si la présence éventuelle de facteurs explicatifs mixtes doit nous inciter à repenser la question de la rationalité des croyances, c'est-à-dire ici de la contribution explicative des raisons au sein de leurs modes de formation. Cette interrogation nous mènera alors à une tentative d'élucidation de la notion de "contexte épistémique" ainsi qu'à un examen de sa pertinence explicative. / My work aims at examining the specificity and the relevance of what Raymond Boudon calls 'the cognitivist model of belief explanation', through an analysis of the notion of 'epistemic rationality' and an examination of some objections against it. Then I ask the compatibility between this kind of explanation with the common idea in social science that social interests and functional mechanisms are relevant to explain the belief formation process. Finally, I will study the question of the influence of the plurality of explanative factors on the rationality of social agent's beliefs. This interrogation will lead us to an elucidation of the notion of 'epistemic context' and its explanative relevance.