People rely extensively on inference as a source of information, and sometimes they confuse inference with observation. Specifically, inferred information is sometimes mistaken for observed information. Such confusion of inference with observation can be problematic, especially if the inferred information is erroneous. One factor that might affect the probability of mistaking inference for observation is the degree of consistency between inferred information and subsequently encountered information. The present research was designed to test this possibility. In three experiments subjects made inferences on the basis of presented information, and then were given additional information that was varied in consistency with the information they had inferred. Finally, subjects were tested for accuracy in discriminating the source (inference vs. observation) of the inferred information. As expected, accuracy was lower when subsequently presented information was relatively consistent with inferred information than when it was relatively inconsistent with inferred information. This effect did not vary with delay between making an inference and attempting to discriminate information source. It is concluded that consistency of inferred information with subsequently encountered information can affect the probability of mistaking inference for observation, with the probability of error increasing as consistency increases.

This project was designed to examine the nature of recollective experience. Gardiner (1988) showed dissociations are obtained within an explicit memory test as a function of several independent variables when subjects classify recognized items into two types of recollection, one termed "Remember" (those items that subjects consciously recollect from the study list) and the other termed "Know" (those items that subjects recognize on some other basis, in the absence of conscious recollection). Gardiner and his colleagues concluded from their results that "Remember" responses are sensitive to conceptual and "Know" responses to perceptual processing. The present investigation tested this conclusion using the recognition memory task. In Experiment 1 subjects produced semantic associates to some and rhyme associates to other study items. Levels-of-processing effects were observed for recognition and "Remember" judgments. For "Know" judgments, this effect was reversed. A modality match (visual - visual) between study and test events had no effect relative to a modality mismatch (auditory - visual) condition. In Experiment 2, subjects studied pictures and words. The picture superiority effect was obtained for recognition and "Remember" judgments and was reversed for "Know" judgments. In Experiment 3, in the recognition phase, half the studied and nonstudied words were preceded by a brief (50 ms) and masked repetition, and the other items were preceded by masked presentations of unrelated words. Masked repetition enhanced recognition and "Know" responses, but did not affect "Remember" responses. In Experiment 4, subjects made confidence judgments ("Sure"/"Not Sure") to primed or unprimed recognized items. The pattern of priming effects for "Sure"/"Not Sure" responses and "Remember"/"Know" responses (Experiment 3) were dissimilar. In Experiment 5, the primes in the recognition test list were semantically related or unrelated to the test words and were presented longer than repeated primes (SOA = 250 ms). The semantic priming effect was observed only for nonstudied items and was distributed equivalently between "Remember" and "Know" judgments. These results: (1) indicate that "Remember" and "Know" responses are sensitive to conceptual and perceptual factors respectively, (2) provide support for the two-factor theories of recognition memory, and (3) show that "Remember" responses are a "purer" measure of conscious recollection than standard explicit memory tests.

People are often biased in their perception of randomness in that they tend to see patterns in random distributions. This is a serious problem because the accurate perception of randomness can be important in decision-making. This research presents three experiments investigating (a) the generality of this bias in randomness perception and (b) the trainability and transfer of the ability to judge randomness. The three experiments replicated the finding that people tend to judge random sequences as systematic. However, no evidence was obtained that the same bias occurs in judging lottery outcomes, thus calling into question the generality of the bias. No evidence was found for reducing people's perception bias with a short period of training. No evidence was found for far transfer though near transfer did occur.

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Four experiments are presented which explore the effects of warning layout (spatial structure) and organization (semantic structure) on the ability to recall and the tendency to read warning information. Warnings were either presented in paragraph layout or in a meaningfully indented "outline layout." Warning information was organized by hazard, type of warning statement, or randomly. Experiment 1 results indicate that layout and organization reliably influenced perceptions of warning eye appeal, ease of processing, and effectiveness. However, a test of recall in Experiment 2 did not reflect the effects of these variables. In Experiments 3 and 4 warnings were presented to subjects in an incidental warning paradigm. The results of these experiments indicate that warnings in outline layout elicited less variability in reading rates, were more likely to be read, and were more likely to elicit warning compliance. Implications for warning design and future research are discussed.

Three experiments explored the extent to which word fragment completion and word stem completion could be "primed," or facilitated, by prior study of the words. In Experiment 1, the manner in which the words were studied beforehand had little effect on priming of either kind of completion, but delaying the test reduced the amount of priming. More importantly, priming of fragment completion decreased over the delay to a greater degree than priming of stem completion. In Experiment 2, this interaction was not replicated when both fragments and stems were constructed without controlling the number of possible completions and were placed in the same test. In a third experiment, the number of response alternatives did not affect priming of stem completion. It was concluded that differences in the amount of priming of fragment completion and stem completion cannot be easily explained by the number of response alternatives or by the task difficulty.

It has been hypothesized that under time pressure decision makers increase the weight given to the most important information cues at the expense of other available relevant information. Three studies were performed to test this hypothesis. Subjects saw information displayed in graphical and tabular formats. There was no evidence for greater use of the most informative cues, but there was a tendency for more even weighting of cues in the graphical display format high time pressure condition. Subjects appeared to make decisions in this condition using a quick, global information gathering and integrating strategy.

Perceptual organization is determined partly by the interaction among dimension and features of stimuli entering the perceptual system. Automatization of two dimensions (i.e., the ability to attend to both simultaneously without decrement) requires prolonged practice at conjunctive search. When conjunctively defined stimuli are processed automatically, unitization (perceptual recoding of the underlying dimensions into distinct units) is said to occur. If two separable dimensions were trained to automaticity in a search task, the stimuli composed of these two dimension should be perceptual redefined as nominal dimensions (stimuli without subject-defined dimensions). This hypothesis was tested with dimensions of color and form. Subjects automatically processed the stimuli, but no perceptual redefinition was obtained as measured by performance in a subsequent speeded classification task. Because the speeded classification task is sensitive to dimensional structure, this experiment provided no evidence that unitization occurs.